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UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 
YOHANNES AYALEW BIRRU, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND MEDIUM-
TERM GROWTH STRATEGIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (WITH 
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO ETHIOPIA) 
SUMMARY 
Ethiopia’s Five–Years Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) (2009/10-
2014/15) was an ambitious economic growth strategy.  The plan relied on huge 
investment on infrastructure, health and education to achieve a minimum 
average annual rate of growth of 11 percent and transform the economy from 
agriculture to manufacturing base.  This thesis analyzes internal consistency of 
Ethiopia’s medium-term growth strategy, and the challenges posed by the 
structural transformation process on monetary policymaking.   
      The first chapter examines the link between infrastructure capital 
accumulation and growth, and explores complementarities between 
infrastructure development and export growth strategy. To this end, a three-
sector analytical model that is built from the production functions of three 
separate sectors, i.e., the infrastructure, exports and non-export private sectors, is 
developed as an analytical framework to address the gap in the literature. The 
estimation results indicate that public infrastructure has a strong spill-over effect 
on the export and non-export sectors, and differences in marginal productivities 
of labour and capital between export and non-export sectors range from 12.5 
percent in East Asia to 250 percent in Latin America.   
     The second chapter explores whether the structural transformation process in 
developing countries affects the stability of demand for money and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.  The chapter applies a panel co-integration 
analyses on selected fast-growing African countries including Ethiopia. It is 
found that, given aggregate national income, a-one-percent increase in rural per-
capita income, a proxy to structural transformation, boosts the demand for 
money by more than 0.3 percent.  
     In the third chapter, Ethiopia’s five year Growth and Transformation plan is 
evaluated for internal consistency using a modified financial programming 
model. Given the low level of savings, the planned boost in investment on 
infrastructure is expected to face financing challenges. This potentially threatens 
the country’s macroeconomic stability.  The estimation results indicate that the 
baseline scenario is not sustainable in the long run indicating the need to 
reconsider current policies and strategies.  Based on simulation results of six 
alternative policy scenarios, the exchange rate is found to be the most effective 
policy instruments in terms of addressing both the foreign exchange and saving-
investment gaps forecasted by the baseline scenario.   
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Introduction 
This thesis analyzes the current challenges of a medium-term growth strategy in 
developing countries and the role of public infrastructure investment with particular 
emphasis given to Ethiopia. The research originally stems from a personal interest on 
the challenges of the design of an appropriate medium-term growth strategy and a 
monetary policy framework in developing countries. For instance, in the late 1980s and 
1990s, economists, particularly those affiliated to the World Bank advocated that 
developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, should emulate the successful 
experiences of East Asian countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan.  Hence, the 
structural adjustment programs implemented in the 1980s and 1990s aimed at urging 
African countries to reform and open up their economies, and take macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural policy measures that allocate resources in favour of the 
export sector. The Bank identified exports as the most efficient sector of the economy.  
However, the reform experiences of most developing countries in the wake of structural 
adjustment programs were disappointing. After two decades of reform experiences, 
most African countries found themselves poorer than they were in the 1970s.  
     Large disparities have been observed between the economies of East Asia, on the 
one hand, and economies of African and Latin American countries, on the other.  In the 
last three decades, between 1980 and 2011, East Asian countries were growing, on 
average, 1.6 times and and twice as fast as Africa and Latin America, respectively. 
During this period, East Asian countries registered an average growth rate of 5.8 
percent, compared with 3.6 percent and 2.8 percent, in Africa and Latin America, 
respectively.  One of the main reasons for the success of East Asian economies is that 
they managed to attract more private investments than their African and Latin American 
counterparts did. For instance, the annual average private gross fixed investment to 
GDP ratio was 21.4 percent, which was more than twice the average registered by the 
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nine fast growing African countries (10.6 percent) in the panel, and more than 1.3 times 
the growth rate registered in Latin America (16.1 percent).   
     East Asian countries have also preformed far better than Africa and Latin America in 
terms of export growth. Therefore, they have been successfully transformed from being 
mainly primary commodity exporters to manufacturing goods and services exporters. 
Consequently, their average export-to-GDP ratio was 63 percent between 1980 and 
2011, compared with 17.3 percent and 22.2 percent, in Africa and Latin America, 
respectively. The East Asian countries were also much more successful in terms of 
macroeconomic management and poverty reduction. They registered the lowest average 
inflation rate and the fastest reduction in poverty incidence in the last three decades, 
between 1975 and 2005 compared with their African and Latin American counterparts 
[Todaro and Smith, 2009].  These divergences in the relative performances of countries 
in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction have aroused interest for 
macroeconomists and policy makers in the developing world.  
     This thesis is organized in three chapters. Each chapter develops a theoretical and 
analytical framework to deal with three different challenges and empirically test using 
data drawn from secondary sources. The first challenge is to isolate the impact of 
infrastructure accumulation on economic growth.  Even though various studies have 
been conducted to understand the strength of the effect of infrastructure capital 
accumulation on growth, the jury is still out there on the issue. The second challenge 
relates to understanding the effect of structural transformation on the stability of money 
demand function. The third challenge has to do with designing a plausible medium-term 
growth strategy with the right mix of policies.  In the first two chapters, the thesis 
employs a panel data analysis on selected developing countries while the third chapter 
exclusively deals with the Ethiopian data.  The empirical findings are used to forward 
policy recommendations.  In the empirical analysis sections, the major challenge of the 
thesis was getting a continuous and sufficiently long time series data for countries in the 
panel, particularly for the African countries.  The thesis heavily draws on data from the 
United Nations, IMF and World Economic Development databases for most countries. 
The thesis also utilizes data from the National Bank of Ethiopia, the former Ministry of 
Finance Economic Development (now the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation) and the Central Statistics Authority reports in the Ethiopian case. The 
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following paragraphs briefly present the objectives and the main findings of the three 
chapters in the thesis. 
     The first chapter examines whether increasing investment on infrastructure enhances 
economic growth using the panel data on selected developing countries from Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, and tries to draw lessons to Ethiopia.  In recent years, the 
role of infrastructure capital accumulation in enhancing economic growth has gained 
increased acceptance due to the increased positive outcomes from studies on the area.  
These studies claim that infrastructure affects long-term growth by enhancing 
productivities of factors input and generating positive externalities to the rest of the 
economies through different channels.  However, there are researchers that still doubt 
infrastructure’s growth enhancing role. The latter argues that infrastructure plays only a 
transitory role. It enhances growth only during the transition dynamics when the 
economy is moving towards the steady state equilibrium.  
     The chapter finds that the source of such controversies has been lack of a suitable 
analytical framework that allows researchers to conduct empirical test on the claims of 
each group. For the analysis of the role of public infrastructure on economic growth, 
most empirical researches rely on the conventional one-sector growth model, by adding 
public infrastructure capital as an additional factor input (Straub 2008a). The estimation 
results that come out of this model are usually controversial because the magnitude and 
the sign of the coefficient depend on: one, the initial stock of infrastructure capital, and 
two, the degree of its utilization. For instance, while researchers such as Limao and 
Veneables (2001), De, et al (2008), Djankov, et al (2006) who employ either micro 
approach or gravity models find a strong link between infrastructure capital and growth, 
many of the studies including Hulten and Schwab (1991), Neuser (1993), Poret (1991) 
and Canning and Pedroni (2004) who used a one-sector growth modelling approach 
found little empirical evidences on the link. Wang (2002) argues that, in countries 
where infrastructure investment accounts for a significant portion of the national output, 
empirical studies tend to find negative elasticity for real gross domestic product with 
respect to infrastructure capital input.  Moreover, Canning and Pedroni (2004, p.19) 
argue, “below a growth maximizing level of infrastructure, increases in infrastructure 
4 
 
 
provision increase long run income, while above this level an increase in infrastructure 
reduces long run income
1”.    
     The main criticism on the conventional one-sector model is that it cannot capture the 
inter-sectoral flows of externalities in the economy. For instance, increase in 
infrastructure services affects aggregate output through three channels.  First, 
infrastructure services enter the national accounts calculation as measures of final 
product such as electricity, water, transport and communication services. Second, public 
infrastructure and private factors of production have a high degree of 
complementarities. The provision of infrastructure services such as electric power, road 
network and telecom services enhances the productivity of land, labour and physical 
capital.  This leads to higher accumulation of capital in the economy [Wang, 2002 and 
Straub 2008a].  Third, public infrastructure generates positive externalities to private 
sector output
2
, as argued in the new growth theory.  One of the distinguishing features 
of public infrastructure from private capital is that provision of its services is subject to 
market imperfection and, therefore, the accumulation and operation of infrastructure 
capital needs government intervention.  As a result, the aggregate production function 
exhibits diminishing returns to capital and increasing returns to scale.   The 
conventional one-sector model captures only the first channel. It cannot capture the 
other two channels by design as capturing the second and the third channels require 
splitting the aggregate production into a sector that generates externalities and a sector 
that benefits from the externalities.  
     This chapter also argues that infrastructure capital accumulation is not the only 
source of externalities that create market failure in developing countries.  Using 
empirical analysis, it finds that export growth generates strong externalities to private 
sector production consistent with previous studies by Feder (1983), Krueger (1980) and 
Ram (1987).  Therefore, the thesis finds that even the two sector model developed by 
Feder (1983) that is designed to capture inter-sectoral flow of externalities is not able to 
address the criticism. Therefore, I developed a three-sector model that splits the 
production function into three sectors: infrastructure sector, the export sector and non-
                                                          
1
 Negative elsaticites coefficients imply overpovisioning of public infrastructure capital in the economy. 
2
Agenor and Montiel (1999, p.679) explain that “the presence of externalities implies that if, say, one firm doubles its 
inputs, the productivity of the inputs of other firms will also increase.  Introducing spillover effects leads to a 
relaxation of the assumption of diminishing returns to capital”.  
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export private sector. The model is tested on panel of countries drawn from Africa, East 
Asia and Latin America.  The major findings of the model are: one, both the 
infrastructure and the export sectors generate positive externalities to the rest of the 
economy. Two, infrastructure capital accumulation and export development strategy are 
complementary to each other.   
     In the second chapter, the thesis explores whether structural transformation affects 
the stability of demand for money and the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Available 
evidences indicate that rapid economic growth in many African countries since the late 
1990s has resulted in rapid urbanization and increased integration of the rural people 
into the modern (monetized) economy. The latter affects the stability of demand for 
money in at least in the following two ways:  first, during the structural transformation 
process the structure of production and trade shifts in favour of the modern sectors. 
Therefore, the share of national output used to be produced by family labour (in 
subsistence agriculture) continues to be replaced by a monetized production system. 
This, in turn, enhances specialization and division of labour in the rural area.  Second, 
given rural income, increase in the availability of infrastructure services such as 
electricity, transport and telecommunication, raise the demand for money by the rural 
population. Therefore, ignoring the effect of monetization implies that, in the long run, 
monetary policy could potentially underestimate the extent of the demand for money, 
and the economy could be underprovided with long-term liquidity, which could 
potentially be translated into real assets.   
     To address this challenge, the thesis develops a demand for money model that 
incorporates the impact of structural transformation. Applying the model on a panel of 
nine fast-growing African countries including Ethiopia, the chapter finds that, given 
aggregate national income, a-one-percent increase in rural per-capita income, a proxy to 
structural transformation, boosts the demand for money by more than 0.3 percent.   
   The third chapter provides an empirical analysis of the medium-term growth strategy 
in Ethiopia using a financial programming framework.  The chapter identifies two major 
limitations on the traditional financial programming framework. First, the model relies 
on the neoclassical assumption that the production function exhibits constant returns to 
scale with capital assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns [Romer, 2006, 
Agenor and Montiel, 1999 and Chen, 1997].  This implies that factor inputs other than 
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labor and capital are relatively unimportant in the production function and government 
policies such as investment in public goods do not have growth effects. Second, the 
model also relies on the extreme assumption of constant income velocity of money 
based on the quantity theory of money [Reinhart, 1991]. This contradicts findings of the 
studies that argue that in high growth countries with a rapid monetization process, the 
income velocity of money exhibits a continuous decline [Reinhart, 1991 pp.22-23]. 
Therefore, before proceeding to the empirical analysis exercise, the chapter finds it 
necessary to modify the exiting financial programming framework based on the 
theoretical and empirical analyses presented in chapter 1 and chapter 2 of the thesis.    
  The First Five-year Growth and Transformation (GTP I) (2011-2015) announces an 
annual average growth target of 11.2 percent and the vision statement indicates that the 
government will continue to target double digit growth in the Second and the Third 
Five-year Growth and Transformation Plans, to make sure that the country joins the 
lower middle income countries club by 2025.  GTP I envisaged raising the total 
investment to GDP ratio from 22.3 percent in 2010 to 28.1 percent by 2013. And, the 
ratio is expected to grow in the Second and Third Five-year Plan periods. Given the low 
domestic-savings-to-GDP ratio, which was 9.5 percent in 2010, the first question that 
comes to mind for planers and economists is how the strategy could be sustainable in 
the medium term. Heavy reliance on public infrastructure investment to enhance long-
term growth poses significant challenges on the sustainability of the balance of 
payments and the government budget.  In the First Five-Year Growth and 
Transformation Plan, annual average foreign exchange demand to finance major 
manufacturing and infrastructure investment projects in the private and public sectors 
(excluding agriculture, services, other private manufacturing sectors and government 
budget)
3
 is projected at Birr 315.4 billion (USD 24.5 billion) [Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2010].  The latter is about four-fifth of the entire foreign exchange 
that the economy generated in the recent five years prior to the plan, i.e., 2006 to 2010.   
     Using the modified model, six alternative policy scenarios were run for the period 
2014-2025 to see the responses of the various markets and to test how the policy shocks 
address the resource gaps.  The model responds very positively to an exchange rate 
                                                          
3
The National Bank of Ethiopia forecasted additional foreign exchange equivalent to USD 54 billion the 
projected amount for major sectors is needed in GTP I period to finance agriculture sector, services 
sectors, government budget and other non-priority public investment projects [NBE, 2011]. 
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shock.  A 40 percent one-time devaluation increases average exports to 18.4 percent of 
GDP during the period from 13.8 percent in the baseline.  Consequently, the average 
annual current account deficit shrinks to USD 9.8 billion from USD 19.9 billion and the 
foreign exchange gap turns to a surplus for the first four years (2014-2017) of the 
forecast period.  The saving-investment gap also sees a significant reduction, from 9.6 
percent of GDP in the baseline to 6.1 percent.  The second policy scenario, which aims 
at increasing private savings through forced savings scheme, on the other hand, seems 
to be less effective, although it produces the expected results in terms of the reaction of 
the various markets.  The third scenario, which assumes a potential GDP growth rate 
that is 2 percentage point lower than the baseline, also produced mixed results, although 
the responses in terms of the narrowing of the foreign exchange and saving-investment 
gaps are positive.  Exports see slight declines from the baseline while average inflation 
rises marginally to 13.2 percent from 12.9 percent in the baseline.  Lower aggregate 
supply growth is the main reason behind the depressed export growth and rising 
inflation.  On the other hand, the current account deficit narrows down from USD19.9 
billion in the baseline to USD15.8 billion mainly due to a decline in imports.  
     The simulation, which runs a lower potential growth assumption combined with a 20 
percent devaluation of the Birr, gets positive responses in almost all markets considered 
except in the money market.  Notwithstanding a 2-percentage points reduction in 
potential GDP growth, the 20 percent devaluation boosts exports to 15.2 percent of 
GDP from 13.4 percent in the baseline.  Consequently, the average annual current 
account deficit goes down to USD 11.1 billion from USD19.9 billion.  The saving-
investment gap experiences a significant improvement, narrowing to 3 percent of GDP.  
Therefore, the lesson drawn from this exercise is that use of combined policies produces 
better results than taking one policy measure at a time.  The contractionary monetary 
policy scenario that aims at addressing the money market disequilibrium by reducing 
the base money, also produced the expected results.  Inflation goes down, resulting in a 
real deprecation of the exchange rate.  
     Last but not the least is the lesson from the sixth scenario, which solves for the 
equilibrium exchange rate.  The simulation that targets a zero foreign exchange gap 
throughout the projection period has demonstrated that exchange rate is an effective 
policy instrument in addressing the resource gap problem.  It illustrates that exchange 
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rate adjustment does not need to be a one-time big shock, but instead must be a 
carefully designed series of depreciations that takes into account the projected resource 
gaps in individual years. One issue with this policy conclusion is to ask whether a 
steady and anticipated depreciation will have the same effects as the essentially 
unforeseen surprise devaluation that the financial programming model presumes.  
     To conclude, the analysis of this chapter shows that the targets in the Growth and 
Transformation Plans could be achieved only if the inconsistencies observed in the 
baseline scenario between the targets and the policy mixes and, the consequent 
widening resources gaps are properly addressed.  This demands the government to re-
examine its current policy mixes.      
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Chapter 1  
Public infrastructure, Exports and Growth: 
The Experiences of    Selected African, 
Latin American and East Asian Countries 
1.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides an analytical framework to empirically examine the link between 
public infrastructure capital accumulation and economic growth.   Using a growth 
accounting framework, a three-sector model is developed in an endogenous growth 
framework that allows capturing spillover effects from infrastructure to the export and 
non-export private sectors
4
 and from the export to non-export private sector.  Moreover, 
the model helps to empirically address the puzzle that ‘why opening up of economies to 
international markets were successful in some countries, particularly in East Asian 
countries, in terms of enhancing economic growth, and not in others’ [Todaro and 
Smith, 2009].   Moreover, the chapter tries to draw policy lessons to Ethiopia’s Five-
year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which gives heavy emphasis on big pubic 
infrastructure projects.  
                                                          
4 Other non-export sector includes non-export private and non-export-non-infrastructure public sectors. 
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     The link between infrastructure and economic growth has been a subject of 
considerable interest to development economists in recent years.  Since the seminal 
paper by Aschauer (1989), a large number of studies have been published on the area, 
some for and some against the infrastructure-growth nexus hypothesis.
5
  In recent years, 
literature seems to converge to the idea that infrastructure indeed has a significant 
growth enhancing effect [Agenor, et al 2005; Caldaron and Serven, 2003; Liamo and 
Venables, 2001; and Esfahani and Ramirez, 2003].  This view has, however, been 
contested by Neuser (1993), Poret (1991) and Canning and Pedroni (2004), which claim 
that recent studies have overstated the contribution of infrastructure to long-term 
growth
6
.    For instance, Canning and Pedroni (2004) use an error-correction model to 
estimate the bidirectional causation effects. They find no effect of infrastructure on 
long-term growth on average, although they do find that it is not universally true for all 
countries and that in some there is evidence of overprovision while in others there is 
evidence of under-provision.   
     Currently, there is a general consensus that infrastructure capital accumulation 
enhances long-term growth.  The recent debate seems to focus on whether it is quantity 
or quality of infrastructure that matters most in developing countries.  The poor quality 
of infrastructure capital could arise due to either over-provisioning of infrastructure 
capital or underfunding of operations and maintenance expenditures [Wang, 2002; 
Calderon and Serven, 2008; and Adam and Bevan, 2015].  Focus on investment in new 
infrastructure capital, without paying proper attention to the quality of its services, ‘has 
a powerful macroeconomic consequence, in particular for the sustainability of growth’ 
[Adam and Bevan, 2015]
7
. Moreover, a study by Calderon and Serven (2008, p. 29) 
finds a “robust evidence that infrastructure development – as measured by an increased 
volume of infrastructure stocks and an improved quality of infrastructure services – has 
a positive impact on long-run growth and a negative impact on income inequality”.    
                                                          
5For instance, studies by Aschauer (1989), Calderon and Serven (2004), Agenor et al (2004) and Calderon (2009) 
argue that infrastructure accelerates growth. On the other hand, Hulten and Schwab (1991), Hulten (1996), 
Holtz_Eakin and Schwartz (1995), Rodriguez (2006) and Straub et al (2008) tend to argue that infrastructure has only 
a transitory effect on growth. 
6  These studies argue that infrastructure capital accumulation relaxes growth constraints and increases the level of 
output by expanding the economy’s capacity to absorb more private capital.  For instance, in electric power 
constrained economies, improving the capacity of electric power generation allows more new private investment and 
also full capacity utilization of existing firms.  However, long term growth remains unaffected.   
7
 Adam and Bevan (2015, p.ii16) argue, “what matters for growth is the sustained flow of productive services 
provided by the public capital stock to private factors of production, which in turn requires that the capital stock is 
efficiently operated and maintained”. 
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     This chapter also argues that infrastructure capital accumulation is not the only 
source of externalities that create market failure in developing countries.  Using 
empirical analysis, it finds that export growth generates strong externalities to private 
sector production consistent with previous studies by Feder (1983), Kruger (1980) and 
Ram (1987).   Concerning the contribution of exports, Kruger (1980, p.401) asserts that, 
“time-series and cross-section data have been pooled, so that deviations of countries’ 
growth from their trends have been estimated as a function of the growth of export 
earnings.  In all of these specifications, the rate of growth of exports has turned out to be 
a highly significant variable”.  In the late 1980s and1990s, economists, particularly 
those from the World Bank, advocated to developing countries, particularly to Sub-
Saharan Africa, to emulate the successful experiences of East Asian countries, such as 
South Korea and Taiwan.  So, the structural adjustment programs implemented in the 
1980s and 1990s were urging the reforming African countries to open up their 
economies and take macroeconomic stabilization and structural policy measures that 
allocate resources in favour of the export sector, which is identified as the most efficient 
sector.   The reform experiences of most of developing countries in the wake of 
structural adjustment programs were not, however, encouraging. 
     A number of studies tend to argue that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the main explanation 
for the growing divergence between East Asian countries, on the one hand, and African 
and Latin American countries, on the other, was the gap in the state of social and 
physical infrastructure.   While East Asian countries undertook extensive infrastructure 
development programmes
8
, investment in infrastructure declined significantly in most 
African and Latin American countries (see the discussions in Todaro and Smith, 2009; 
Cudmore and Whalley’s, 2002 and Straub, 2008a).  For instance, Straub (2008a, p.33) 
indicates, “While in recent years major Latin American countries have invested less 
than 3% of GDP on average [quoted from Fay and Morrison, 2007], some East Asian 
countries like China and Vietnam are investing around 10% of their GDP in 
infrastructure [quoted from Straub, Vellutini and Walters, 2008]”.  
     Despite the general consensus in the literature that public infrastructure capital 
accumulation has a growth enhancing effect, there is a gap in the available analytical 
                                                          
8 For instance, Todaro and Smith (2009) states that, ‘Taiwan inherited an infrastructure system far superior to that of 
most poor countries from the period of Japanese colonial rule (1905-1945).  And, the Taiwanese government 
supplemented this by undertaking extensive infrastructure development program in the 1950 and 1960s’. 
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macro frameworks to test the conjecture. Particularly, the existing analytical 
frameworks are not capable of incorporating externalities generated from more than one 
sector
9
.   Therefore, this chapter tries to fill this gap by providing theoretical and 
analytical frameworks that explain the presence of complementarities between the three 
sectors - the infrastructure, the export and the private domestic output sectors.  
     The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 presents the 
theoretical framework for the three-sector model.  Section 1.3 analyzes limitations of 
the existing analytical frameworks.  The structure and theoretical foundation of the 
three-sector model is presented in section 1.4.  Section 1.5 and section 1.6 describe data 
sources and methodology of estimation, respectively, while section 1.7 presents the 
estimation results. Finally, the chapter concludes by giving summary and policy 
implications in section 1.8. 
1.2   Theoretical Framework  
1.2.1 Infrastructure-Economic Growth Nexus 
Recently, growth literature on developing countries has shown considerable interest in 
analyzing the role of public infrastructure capital accumulation on economic growth.  A 
number of studies argue that investment in public infrastructure boosts private sector 
productivity, and entice the private sector to accumulate more capital.   
     Wang (2002) categorizes the effects of infrastructure on aggregate output into three.  
First, infrastructure services enter the national accounts calculation as measures of final 
product such as electricity, water, transport and communication services. Second, public 
infrastructure and private factors of production have a high degree of 
complementarities. The provision of infrastructure services such as electric power, road 
network and telecom services enhances the productivity of land, labour and physical 
capital. Agenor (2005, p.6) argues that “by raising the marginal productivity of private 
inputs (both labour and capital), public infrastructure raises the perceived rate of return 
                                                          
9
 The existing theoretical and analytical frameworks fail to recognize the inter-sector spillover effects, particularly the 
presence of complementarities between the infrastructure and the export sectors.  As a result, it becomes difficult for 
policy makers to design policies that enhance the inter-sector spillover effects and give particular focus on the sector 
that produces optimal results. 
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on, and increases the demand for, physical capital by the private sector”.  This leads to 
higher accumulation of capital in the economy [Wang, 2002 and Straub 2008a]. 
     The third channel is the positive externalities that public infrastructure generates to 
private sector output
10
, as argued in the new growth theory.  As a result, the aggregate 
production function exhibits diminishing returns to capital and increasing returns to 
scale   [Agenor and Montiel, 1999 and Acemelugu, 2009]. Growth literature treats 
infrastructure as a public good, which has general characteristics of being non-rival and 
non-excludable [Agenor, 2005].   One of the distinguishing features of public 
infrastructure from private capital is that provision of its services is subject to market 
imperfection and, therefore, the accumulation and operation of infrastructure capital 
needs government intervention.  Ramirez and Esfahani (1999, p.5) argue, 
“Infrastructure services often entail economies of scale due to network externalities.  
And, cost recovery from users tends to be more difficult and inefficient because often 
the marginal cost is declining, the services are viewed as basic needs (e.g. water), or 
exclusion of non-paying users is too costly (e.g. urban streets and rural roads).”  
     In a purely competitive economy, the presence of such externalities leads to an 
underinvestment in infrastructure capital because private agents do not take into account 
the external benefits of infrastructure capital accumulation.  Therefore, for the 
equilibrium growth rate to be close to optimal, government needs to invest in 
infrastructure capital, and, thereby, reduce the production costs of the economy, 
particularly the private sector
11
 [Agenor and Montiel, 1999].  A study by Albala-
Bertrand and Mamatzakis (2004) on the Chilean economy finds that an increased 
infrastructure capital reduces the production cost of the economy, thereby increasing 
productivity.  Moreover, Easterly and Servén (2003) argue that the growing divergence 
between East Asia and Latin America could be attributed to the growing gap in 
infrastructure investment between the two regions.  They found that public 
infrastructure investment declined significantly in a number of Latin American 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s due to fiscal adjustments.   
                                                          
10Agenor and Montiel (199, p.679) explain that “the presence of externalities implies that if, say, one firm doubles its 
inputs, the productivity of the inputs of other firms will also increase.  Introducing spillover effects leads to a 
relaxation of the assumption of diminishing returns to capital”.  
11 As an intermediate input public infrastructure services enters into the private sector production and enhances the 
productivity of all other inputs [Agenor, 2005 and Caldaron and Serven, 2003]. For instance, an expansion in road 
networks reduces commuting time thereby enhancing labour productivity indirectly; reduces the cost of transporting 
goods to and from ports or other towns, and improves private capital durability [Straub, 2008a]. 
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1.2.2 Exports-Economic Growth nexus 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, even before the advent of the new growth theory and 
infrastructure-growth nexus starts to gain wider acceptance in the literature, export 
growth and out-ward oriented economic policies began to arouse the interests of 
economists, particularly the World Bank, following the success stories of East Asian 
countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, and the failures of import substitution 
strategies in most Latin American and African countries [Clarcq, et al, 2006; Rodríguez, 
2006; Bruton, 1998; Krueger, 1980; Chenery, 1986; and Feder, 1983; and Todaro and 
Smith, 2009].  The central arguments in favour of export-growth linkage are: first, there 
are differences in the marginal productivities of factor inputs between the export and 
non-export sectors.  Countries that follow policies that favour exports tend to have 
closer-to-optimal resource allocation and higher rates of growth of national income. 
Competitive pressures in the international market make them spend a significant portion 
of their resources on innovation and R&D:  Caldera (2009), using panel data analysis on 
Spanish manufacturing industry, found that after controlling for size, temporal and 
industry differences, exporters appear to spend more in innovation (20 percent) than 
non-exporters, and introduce more product innovations (13 percent) and process 
innovations (7 percent). 
     Secondly, apart from factor allocation effect, exports also generate externalities to 
the rest of the economy by facilitating “development of efficient and internationally 
competitive management, the introduction of improved production technique, training 
of higher quality labour, steadier flow of improved inputs, etc” [Feder, 1983 p.61].  
Clercq, et al (2006, p.40), using unbalanced dataset for 34 countries for the period from 
2002 to 2005, found that “entrepreneurs’ export orientation functions as a catalyst for 
the emergence of new businesses within a country’s borders, and that such export 
orientation by itself is influenced by a country’s levels of outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI), export and import”.  In fact, in developing countries, the externalities 
would be more through technology adaption and reverse-engineering than through 
invention of new ideas [Grossman and Helpman, 1991]. 
     Thirdly, countries with export-oriented economic strategies contribute to economic 
growth by offering greater economies of scale due to enlargement of the effective size 
of the market (Ram, 1987).  This in turn widens market opportunities to non-export 
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sectors and allows them to enjoy all other benefits of economies of scale such as 
improved managerial skill, specialization and division of labour [Feder, 1983].       
     Fourthly, export oriented policies increase the rate of growth of domestic savings
12
 
by increasing corporate savings and encouraging governments of developing countries 
to adopt prudent macro-economic policies that boost personal savings.  A sustainable 
increase in the rate of growth of exports implies a continuous improvement in the 
country’s competitiveness in the international market (thereby, profit margins of firms 
increase). Second, retaining a competitive position in the international market entails 
government commitment to maintain macro-economic stability through prudent 
monetary and fiscal policies.  For instance, Krueger (1980 p.403) argues, “... an export-
oriented strategy imposes constraints on policy makers.  Policy makers receive feedback 
in a relatively short time period as to the cost of their policies”. There is now a general 
consensus that the most important reason for the East Asian economies success is the 
adoption of an export oriented industrial strategy [Chen, 1997; Todaro and Smith, 2009; 
and Feder, 1983] 
1.2.3 Infrastructure-Export Performance-Growth Nexus 
In growth literature, the link between infrastructure capital accumulation and export 
growth is less controversial than the link between infrastructure and growth or exports 
and growth [De, Khan and Chaturvedi, 2008; Fedderke and Bogetic, 2006; and Limao 
and Venables, 2001].  But, what has not been explicitly dealt with in the literature is the 
presence of complementarities between infrastructure capital accumulation and export 
growth and their role in realizing optimal long-term growth.  The complementarities 
between infrastructure capital and export growth strategy arise from the necessity to 
exploit the opportunities of economies of scale and scope.  Infrastructure, as has been 
described in section 1.2.1 above, increases the productivity of factor inputs and 
generates additional externalities to private firms through improved transport and 
communication network, lower transport and financial transaction costs and creating 
                                                          
Domestic savings is a reflection of the performance of the current account balance of the BOPs: X-M = (S-I) + (T-G).  
The identity is derived from the domestic aggregate demand and aggregate supply relationships: C+I+G+X-M = 
C+S+T, where 
X is exports of goods and services, M is imports of goods and services; S is private savings; I is private investment; T 
is government total tax revenue; G is government total expenditure; Yd is aggregate demand; and Ys is aggregate 
supply. 
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greater economies of scale for private firms [Straub, 2008a].  In developing countries, 
with a narrow domestic market, the benefits of infrastructure capital could not be fully 
utilized and translated to long-term growth benefit if the countries are not ready to take 
advantage of the wider market opportunities available outside their borders. 
     A number of studies confirm that investments in transport, ports, electricity and/or 
telecommunication reduce trade and transaction costs thereby enhancing a (developing) 
country’s participation in international trade and accelerating regional integration efforts 
[De, Khan and Chaturvedi, 2008; Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2006; Fedderke and 
Bogetic, 2006; and Limao and Venables, 2001].  For instance, Limao and Venables 
(2001), using a cross-section model, found that a 10-percentage-point increase in 
transport costs typically reduces trade volume by approximately 20 percent.   
     In fact, as a strategy, improvements in transport, telecommunication and/or port 
infrastructure are more effective in terms of making the country open to international 
trade than the traditional trade liberalization measures such as tariff and non-tariff 
barrier reduction and exchange rate adjustments in developing countries [De, 2007; Das 
and Pohit, 2006; Cudmore and Whalley, 2002; and Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2006].  
The study by Cudmore and Whalley’s (2002) has found that trade liberalization, before 
relaxing major trade-related infrastructure constraints, such as transport and ports 
infrastructure, is welfare worsening
13
.  These findings imply that in developing 
countries where transport and logistics costs make up a significant portion of production 
costs, an export growth strategy, without an adequate strategy to address deficiencies in 
domestic infrastructure services, could not make exports successfully competitive in the 
world market. Citing World Bank (2001), De (2007, p.3), discusses that for “the 
majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, Latin American and Caribbean, and a large 
part of Asia, transport cost incidence for exports is five times higher than tariff cost 
incidences”14.  Moreover, Limao and Venables (2001) estimate that intra-Africa 
transport costs are 136 percent higher than predicted by a standard gravitational model, 
and 59 percent of these costs is attributed to poor infrastructure.  
                                                          
13This goes with Rodrik’s (2006) argument that reforming countries have to undertake serious diagnostic measures, 
and prioritize the reform areas. Referring to the East Asian Development experience, hesuggests that developing 
countries need to identify the most binding constraints and work with that first. 
14 De (2007, p.24) found that a 10 percent saving in transport costs is likely to increase trade by about 6 percent.  
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     Rodriguez (2006) also finds that despite market-oriented reforms during the 1980s 
and 1990s, disparities between the incomes of poor and rich countries continue to 
widen.  Using empirical evidence, he asserts that decline in infrastructure investment 
that has occurred in many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s was one of the 
major explanations for this great divergence in world incomes.  All these imply that 
there are strong complementarities between infrastructure and export growth.  
Therefore, an export growth strategy, without infrastructure development policies or 
vice versa, would produce sub-optimal results, and is expected to be less successful in 
enhancing long-term growth.    
1.3   Limitations of Existing Analytical 
Frameworks 
1.3.1   A One-Sector Growth Regression Model 
Most macro literature employ a one-sector production function similar to equation (1.1) 
as a framework to analyse the contribution of infrastructure to growth [Straub, 2008a; 
Straub, et al 2008b; Esfahani and Ramirez, 1999; Button, 1998; Canning and Pedroni, 
2004]. 
      Y = AG
α
 L
β
 K
1-α-β
    ............................................................................................... 1.1 
where Y is real aggregate output, K is the (non-infrastructure) aggregate capital stock, L 
the labour force, G the infrastructure capital stock, and A is a parameter that captures 
factors affecting the level of technology or what is called exogenous technical progress; 
and α, β Є (0, 1).  Thus, the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in all 
factors [Agenor and Montiel, 1999].   
     Multiplying equation (1.1) by K/K and collecting similar terms together, we get the 
following equation [Agenor and Montiel, 1999]. 
Y = A(G/K)
α
 (L/K)
β
K............................................................................................ 1.2 
At the steady-state, (G/K) and (L/K) are constant.  Therefore, output exhibits linearity in 
the stock of private capital and, therefore, the production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale in all factors of inputs – including G [Agenor and Montiel, 1999].  In 
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equation (1.2), all factor inputs are viewed as some form of reproducible capital (human 
and physical capital) with an AK-type technology.   In this framework, infrastructure 
has labour and capital augmenting effect.   
     The above framework is subject to the following two limitations:  One, the model 
captures only the direct (factor productivity effects) of infrastructure capital 
accumulation. Capturing the indirect (externalities) effect requires making total factor 
productivity (or the technical progress term A) as a function of externalities such as road 
and power network, use of improved technology, and economies of scale, among others.  
However, these externalities are difficult to incorporate in a one-sector production 
function framework because capturing externalities requires splitting the production 
functions between the sector that generates externalities and the sector that benefits 
(from the former).  This is because outputs of the sector that generates externalities 
would be used as additional factor inputs in production function of the sector which 
benefits from the externalities
15
 [Wang, 2002; Feder, 1983 and Agenor and Montiel, 
1999]. 
     Two, inherent in the one-sector production function is the assumption that factor 
(labour and capital) productivities are equal across sectors in the economy.  So, the 
framework does not accommodate factor reallocation externalities between sectors.  A 
number of studies argue that factor reallocation to the most productive sectors could be 
an important source of growth in least developed countries.   
1.3.2   The Growth Accounting Equation 
Taking total derivative of equation (1.1), we can derive the following growth accounting 
equation:  
dY/Y = α*dG/G + β*dL/L + (1-α-β)*dK/K.......................................................... 1.3 
Then, by adding a constant and an error term, we can use equation (1.3) for empirical 
analysis as follows: 
dYt/Yt = α0+ α1*dGt/Gt+ α2*dLt/Lt+ α3dKt/Kt + ut............................................... 1.4 
                                                          
15When both the direct and indirect effects of infrastructure capital are captured, the production function exhibits 
increasing returns to scale, instead of constant returns to scale [Agenor and Montiel, 1999]. 
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α1 is the elasticity of output with respect to public infrastructure, α2 is the elasticity of 
output with respect to labour and α3 is the elasticity of output with respect to private 
capital. The elasiticities are estimated using data on the shares of income that go to the 
respective factor inputs.   From equation (1.4), we can derive the Solow residual (Rt) as 
follows: 
Rt = dYt/Yt – (α0+ α1*dGt/Gt+ α2*dLt/Lt+ α3dKt/Kt) ........................................... 1.5 
In equation (1.5), R measures anything but the private returns of factor inputs, i.e., G, L 
and K, such as economies of scale, export growth, human capital development, and 
other factors that affect technological changes [Chenery, 1986; Romer, 2006; Feder, 
1983; and Agenor and Montiel, 1999]. The large unexplained residuals
16
 in growth 
accounting, and the empirical challenge that countries actually grow at a speed higher 
than that could potentially be predicted by the neo-classical model for a longer period, 
and growing divergence of growth between countries
17
 have been mentioned as 
evidences of the presence of externalities that could not be explained by a change in the 
quality or quantity of factors of production
18
 [Agenor and Montiel, 1999].  
     Quite a number of studies apply a growth accounting technique to know the 
proximate determinants of growth, particularly the contributions of factor inputs such as 
labour, capital and other inputs over some period, without going deeper into the analysis 
of what causes the changes in the determinants themselves
19
 [Romer, 2006; Arslanalp et 
                                                          
16Harberger (1989, p. 94) explains that “the residual was initially thought of as a coefficient of technical advance 
(since it effectively measured the growth of output per unit of input), but it was quickly recognized to be a composite 
of the effects of many different foreces: (i) improvements in the quality of labour through education, experience, and 
on the job training; (ii) reallocation of resources from low-productivity to high-productivity uses, either through 
normal market forces, or through the reduction of barriers or distortions; (iii) expoitation of economies of scale; and 
(iv) improved ways of combining resources to produce goods and services, not just at the level of new machines or 
processes, but also by relatively mundane adjustments at the level of the factory or the farm.”.  
17Agenor and Montiel (1999, p. 669) states that “in 1960 average real per capita incomes in Asian and African 
countries were roughly similar.  Thirty years later, income per capita had more than tripled in Asia while it had risen 
only moderately in Africa”.   
18Straub (2008b, pp 4-5) describes that “An important feature of East Asia’s infrastructure history has been the 
construction of major transport links between cities.  Korea’s Seoul-Pusan highway built in the 1960s, Malaysia’s 
road network built in the 1970s and 1980s, China’s rail network and more recent express ways development, and 
Vietnam’s Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh city and Hanoi-Haiphery have all enlarged and integrated domestic markets, as well 
as providing the logistical connections for access to port and international markets.  Further investment in these 
transport networks may not give the same boost to productivity, but it is possible that the larger markets they 
facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale within firms, the production of more specialized skills match 
between employers and workers.”  
19
 The growth accounting framework has been widely applied in individual country growth analysis and cross-
country growth comparisons [Arslanalp et al, 2010; and Straub et al, 2008; Young, 1995; Feder, 1983; Ram, 1987; 
Agenor and Montiel, 1999; Wang and Yao, 2003; and Wang, 2002]. 
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al, 2010; and Straub et al, 2008]. Romer (2006) argues that growth accounting does not 
get at the underlying sources of growth. It only examines its immediate determinants. 
He argues that assuming an economy on its balanced path described in the Solow 
growth model, it is known that, in this case, growth is coming entirely from growth in 
A.  However, growth accounting attributes only a fraction to the residual (R). The other 
fractions are attributed to growth in factor inputs
20
.  
1.4 Structure and Theoretical Foundation of the 
Three-sector Model 
This section presents the structure and theoretical foundations of the three-sector model 
that is believed to address the shortcomings of existing macro approach growth 
accounting models.  The model is developed following Feder (1983) and Wang (2002) 
two-sector production function approaches.  The main assumptions of the model are: 
First, infrastructure and export sectors have spill-over effects. While infrastructure 
generates externalities to exports and non-export sectors through productivity and 
capital accumulation effects, exports generate externalities to the non-export private 
sector through productivity and capital accumulation.  Two, there are productivity 
differences between the export sector and non-export sectors. As a result, factor 
allocation in favour of the export sector improves factor productivity and enhances 
economic growth.  Third, due to positive externalities from infrastructure and export 
sectors, aggregate output exhibits increasing returns to scale.    
Basic structure of the model is as follows: 
F = F(LF, KF, GF)   
X = X(LX, KX ; F)............................................................................................... 1.6 
R = R(LR, KR,; F, X)  
Y = F + R + X    
where, Y is total output (GDP) at factor cost; F is infrastructure service outputs; R is 
non-export private sector output; X is exports of goods and services; KF and LF are 
private capital stock and labour inputs in public infrastructure sector respectively; KR 
                                                          
20
 Hence, Barro (1998, p.1) argues that the growth accounting technique could be particularly useful if the 
fundamental determinants of that matter for factor growth are substantially independent from those that matter for 
technological change. 
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and LR are private capital stock and labour inputs in non-export private sector 
respectively; KX and LX are private capital stock and labour inputs in export sector 
respectively, L is labour and GF is infrastructure capital stock. All variables are in 
constant prices. 
     As a factor input, G enters the infrastructure sector production function, F(.), to 
produce infrastructure services.  Private capital stock (KF) also enters in F(.) because the 
sector is assumed to hire some of the services of private capital such as machineries, 
buildings and equipments [Feder, 1983; Ram, 1987; and Wang, 2002].  
     Infrastructure capital accumulation contributes to real GDP in three ways:  one, 
infrastructure services are counted as final outputs such as electricity, transport and 
communication.  Two, as intermediate input, infrastructure capital accumulation 
enhances productivities of all other factor inputs, and, as a result, boosts capital 
accumulation.  This is the complementarities argument. Three, infrastructure output (F) 
enters both in non-export private sector output and exports production function because 
it generates positive externalities to these sectors.,  
     In the export production function, F is expected to raise factor productivity in the 
sector, and generates positive externalities by providing network externalities, lowering 
transaction costs such as transport and logistics costs and creating economies of scale. 
By definition, R includes both non-tradable and import substituting tradable goods. 
Hence, improvements in infrastructure services and reduction in transport costs benefit 
both imports and domestically produced goods. However, positive externalities to 
import substituting domestic outputs is expected to outweigh that of direct imports for 
the following two reasons: one, through the direct and indirect effect of infrastructure 
capital accumulation, domestic industries benefit not only from the reduction in 
transaction costs (such as transport costs) but also the increase in productivities of factor 
inputs and technical progress.  Two, market imperfections through tariffs and taste-
biases towards home-produced traded goods tend to boost the demand for domestic 
products even for those products with prices (including tariff) close to that in the 
international market [Benigno and Thoenisson, 2003].   
     On the other hand, exports enter, as a factor input, in the non-export private sector 
production function. It is assumed that export growth enhances private sector output 
through two channels: one, it generates externalities to the sector by creating economies 
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of scale to domestic firms, providing internationally competitive managerial skill, 
trained labour and use of improved technology.  Two, it is also assumed that marginal 
factor productivities of factor inputs in the export sector are higher than that of the non-
export sectors. Hence, reallocation of factor inputs from non-export sector to the export 
sector enhances growth.  
Following Feder (1983), the marginal productivity differences are formulated as 
follows:   
MPPLF/MPPLR = MPPKF/MPPKR = 1,   
MPPLX/MPPLR = MPPKX/MPPKR = 1 + δ ............................................ 1.7 
      -∞<δ < ∞ 
where MPPLF, MPPLX and MPPLR represent marginal physical product of labour in the 
infrastructure, export and non-export private sector respectively, and MPPKF, MPPKX 
and MPPKR are marginal physical product of capital in the infrastructure, export and 
non-export private sectors, respectively.   
     Equation (1.7) indicates that marginal productivities of factor inputs in the export 
sector are higher by a factor equal to ‘δ’ than those in the rest of the economy.  Feder 
(1983) presents three reasons for the differences.  One, exporting firms operate in a 
more competitive environment than the rest of the economy.  So, they tend to have more 
skilled labour, and internationally competitive and efficient management. Moreover, 
exporting firms also tend to invest on research and development.  Two, exports are less 
regulated and face fewer constraints such as credit and foreign exchange shortages in 
developing countries. Three, export firms operate in high perceived uncertainty.  
Taking total differentials of individual equations in equation (1.6) yields 
dF =   ∂F/∂KF (dKF) +      ∂F/∂LF (dLF)+ ∂F/∂GF (dGF) 
dX =  ∂X/∂KX (dKX)+    ∂X/∂LX (dLX)+ ∂X/∂F (dF)  ……………………...…........ 1.8 
dR =  ∂R/∂KR (dKR)  +    ∂R/∂LR (dLR)+ ∂R/∂F (dF) + ∂R/∂X (dX)  
Then using the relationship in equation (1.7) and substituting (1+δ) ∂R/∂KR for ∂X/∂KX 
and ∂R/∂KR  for ∂F/∂KF; and doing similar substitutions for labour inputs in equation 
(1.8) yields: 
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dF =            ∂R/∂KR (dKF) +          ∂R/∂LR (dLF)+ ∂F/∂GF (dGF) 
dX = (1+δ) ∂R/∂KR (dKX)+ (1+δ) ∂R/∂LR (dLX)+ ∂X/∂F (dF) ………………........... 1.9 
dR =           ∂R/∂KR (dKR)  +          ∂R/∂LR (dLR)+ ∂R/∂F (dF) + ∂R/∂X (dX) 
Following Feder (1983), I assume a linear relationship exists between the real marginal 
productivity of labour in a given sector and average output per labour in the economy. 
This was originally argued by Bruno (1968).   
 ∂R/∂LR = B(Y/L)   ..........................................................................  1.10 
Let ∂R/∂KR = α; ∂F/∂G = μ; ∂R/∂X = c; where α, μ and c are constants representing 
marginal changes in the respective sectors with respect to a change in private capital, 
pubic capital and export output.   
Using the national output relationship in equation (1.6), i.e., Y= F+R+X; dividing all 
equations in 1.9 by Y; and replacing ∂R/∂LR by B(Y/L), we get   
dY/Y = α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F(dF/Y) + ∂R/∂F(dF/Y) + 
∂R/∂X(dX/Y) +  δ/(1+δ)dX/Y....................................................................... 1.11 
A plausible specification for the spillover effects is to assume that public infrastructure 
affects export and non-export private sectors with a constant elasticity and, similarly, 
export affects the non-export private sector with a constant elasticity. The constant 
elasticity indicates the long-run partial effects of infrastructure output and export growth 
on the respective sectors [Wang, 2002].  So, we can reformulate the production 
functions in euqation (1.6) as follows: 
R = R(LR, KR,; F, X)  =  (F)
Zψ (LR, KR,;  X)  ............................................................  1.12 
R = R(LR, KR,; F, X)  =  (X)
ω
Ψ(LR, KR,; F)  .............................................................  1.13 
X = X(LX, KX; F)     =  (F)
Vф (LX, KX) ……………….………….….......................  1.14 
Therefore, 
     ∂R/∂F = z(R/F)...................................................................................................... 1.15 
      ∂X/∂F= v(X/F) …………………....…………………….............……..........….. 1.16 
     ∂R/∂X = ω(R/X)................................................................................................... 1.17 
24 
 
 
Substituting equations (1.15), (1.16) and (1.17) into equation (1.11), we get equation 
(1.18) below (for detailed derivation and assumptions of the model see Annex 2.1) 
dY/Y = α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [1/(1+δ)] v(X/F)(dF/Y) + z(R/F)(dF/Y) + 
ω(R/X)(dX/Y) +  δ/(1+δ)dX/Y.......................................................................... 1.18 
Rearranging terms in equation (1.18), 
dY/Y =α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [v/(1+δ)] (X/Y)(dF/F) + z(R/Y)(dF/F) + 
ω(R/Y)(dX/X) +  δ/(1+δ)(dX/X)(X/Y............................................................... 1.19 
Alternatively, following Wang (2002), one can also assume that, not only current 
infrastructure output, but also expected growth in infrastructural output attracts more 
private investment. He argues that private firms tend to be attracted to an economy 
where there is a strong commitment to improved infrastructure services.  The higher the 
rate of growth of infrastructure output is, the larger would be the volume of private 
investment.  
Therefore, replacing F by F*, equation 1.19 could be expressed as: 
dY/Y = α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [v/(1+δ)] (X/Y)(dF*/F*) + z(R/Y)(dF*/F*) + 
ω(R/Y)(dX/X) +  δ/(1+δ)(dX/X)(X/Y).............................................................. 1.20 
Equation (1.20) implies that expected infrastructure output growth has a capital 
accumulation effect. Wang formulated the following equation for expected 
infrastructure output. 
F*t – F*t-1 = θ [Ft-1 - F*t-1],      0 < θ ≤ 1 ………….....……………...........…….. 1.21 
Equation (1.21) follows lagged adjustment mechanism where F* is the expected rate of 
infrastructure output and θ is adjustment parameter.  After recursive expansion, the 
dynamic adjustment process of equation (1.21) could be re-expressed as: 
F*t = θ∑s(1- θ)
s
 Ft-s  ;              0 < s < ∞   ……………......................................…… 1.22 
Wang (2002, p.419) explains that “... the expected level of F, which factors in the 
externality onto the private sector, is a weighted average of all present and previous 
values of Ft, since the weight sums to unity  [θ∑(1- θ)
s
 = 1]”.  
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     Substituting equation (1.22) into equation (1.20) produces a specification associated 
with the adaptive expectation process.  Equation (1.23) below is identical to the 
formulation of the the geometric distributed lag [Wang, 2002; Allen 1967; and Baltagi 
and Griffin, 1997].    
dYt/Yt = αθ(dKt/Yt) + βθ(dLt/Lt) + μθ(dGFt/Yt) + [v/(1+δ)]θ(dFt/Ft)(Xt/Yt) + 
zθ(dFt/Ft)(Rt/Yt) + ωθ(dXt/Xt)(Rt/Yt) + [ δ/(1+δ)]θ(dXt/Xt)(Xt/Yt) +  
                (1 - θ)dYt/Yt-1.................................................................................................. 1.23 
Decomposing the Spillover Effects  
The infrastructure and export sectors spillover effects in both equation (1.19) and 
equation (1.23) can be decomposed into five components.  Four of them are common to 
both equations while the fifth one is applicable only to equation (1.23).  
1/ Gains due to positive externalities from the infrastructure sector to the export sector 
(adjusted for marginal productivity differences between export and non-export 
private sector (δ)): [v/(1+δ)](dFt/Ft)(Xt/Yt);  
 2/ Gains due to positive externalities from the infrastructure service to the non-export 
private sector:  z(dFt/Ft)(Rt/Yt); 
 3/ Gains due to positive externalities from the export to the non-export private sector: 
ω(dXt/Xt)(Rt/Yt);  and, 
 4/ Gains due to higher factor productivity in the export sector [ δ/(1+δ)](dXt/Xt)(Xt/Yt). 
Moreover, equation (1.23) incorporates the fifth component, (1 - θ) dYt/Yt-1, . In this 
model, it is assumed that expected growth in infrastructure services enhances private 
sector capital accumulation. 
     Equations (1.19) and (1.23) are nested equations, which encompass the neo-classical 
one-sector models, which are specified as equation (1.24) and equation (1.25) below.   
Models for Empirical Estimation 
By adding a constant and an error term in each equation, equations (1.19) and (1.23) 
will be used for the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.  In addition, equations 
(1.24) and (1.25) will be estimated separately for comparison purpose.   
26 
 
 
The One-Sector models 
1. Without Externalities from Expected Infrastructure Output Growth 
dYt/Yt = α(dKt/Yt) + β(dLt/Lt) + μ(dGFt/Yt) ………...…………........ 1.24 
2. With Externalities from Expected Infrastructure Output Growth 
dYt/Yt = αθ(dKt/Yt) + βθ(dLt/Lt) + μθ(dGFt/Yt) + (1-θ)dYt/Yt-1........ 1.25 
      where, the subscript ‘t’, in the equations (1.24) and (1.25) represents time.   
1.5  Data Sources and Analysis  
1.5.1   Data Description and Variable definition 
The chapter conducts a panel data analyses on selected countries drawn from Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.  Infrastructure service output (F) is defined based on World 
Bank’s “core infrastructure” definition [Mamatzakis and Albala, 2004 and Wang, 
2002], which includes electricity, water, transport, storage and communication. The data 
are drawn from United Nations Statistics database, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (for 
the breakdowns of private and government investment), the National Bank of Ethiopia 
database and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation Database. The 
estimation period covers 1980-2011. All variables are in real terms.  Real non-export 
private sector output (R) is computed as a residual: deducting the sum of real exports of 
goods and services (X) and real infrastructure service outputs (F) from the real GDP 
(Y)
21
.   
     Change in private real physical capital (dK) is computed as a residual by deducting 
government capital formation (dG) from total gross capital formation (dKT).  As done 
by Feder (1983) and Ram (1987), and most other researchers, population series is used 
for labour input (L), as time series data for employment is not available in most 
developing countries. The limitation of using a population series is that it implicitly 
assumes the ratio of employed-to-total-population and the inter-sector structure of 
employment in the economy  
                                                          
21 From the relationship Y = F + X + R in equation (1.3), the R series is derived as: R = Y – (F + X).   
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Table 1-1.  Data Sources and Variable Definitions 1/ 
Variable Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
Y Real gross domestic  Product   at 
Market Prices at national currency 
unit (NCU) 
UN Statistics database, except 
for Ethiopia. The Ethiopian 
data is obtained from MOFED 
dKT Total real gross fixed capital 
formation at NCU 
“ 
G Real government gross fixed 
capital formation at NCU 
Computed using the 
respective country ratios of 
government fixed capital 
formation to total gross fixed 
capital formation obtained 
from IMF Fiscal Department 
dK Real gross private fixed capital 
formation at NCU 
Computed as a difference 
between dKT and G 
L Total labour force Total population obtained 
from UN Statistics 
X Real exports of goods and non -
factor services at NCU 
UN Statistics database, except 
for Ethiopia. The Ethiopian 
data is obtained from MOFED 
F Infrastructure output (includes 
transport, storage, communication, 
electric, gas and water supply) 
“ 
R Real private non-export sector 
output 
Computed as: R = Y-X-F 
1/ All nominal values are converted into real values using the respective countries’ GDP deflator obtained from UN 
Statistics database. 
 
remained constant throughout the estimation period. This, is a less plausible 
assumption, particularly in the fast growing economies of East Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, where the structure of employment changes relatively fast towards the modern 
sector.       
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Table 1-2.    Descriptive Analysis of Variables unused in the Model: 1982-2011 
  East Asia Africa Latin America 
  
 Mean  Max.  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Max.  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Max.  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev. 
dY/Y 5.8 15.3 -15.1 3.5 3.6 25.1 -95.4 7.8 2.8 15.5 -25.1 5.6 
dK/Y 21.4 34.4 9.0 6.23 10.6 29.4 1.8 5.4 16.1 24.7 7.4 3.7 
dL/L 2.3 8.8 -1.7 1.3 2.5 17.2 -91.2 6.4 2.9 7.8 -1.2 1.6 
G/Y 8.1 21.0 2.1 3.7 7.0 19.2 0.9 3.8 5.2 21.7 0.3 4.2 
dF/F 6.6 23.6 -28.1 5.4 2.3 100.0 -648.6 47.9 2.1 32.8 -55.1 13.2 
dF/F*F/Y 0.6 1.8 -1.8 0.5 0.4 17.2 -8.5 1.5 0.3 3.7 -3.8 1.1 
dF/F*X/Y 2.3 16.2 -15.0 5.1 1.3 69.9 -600.6 43.8 1.6 23.1 -32.3 8.7 
dF/F*R/Y 3.7 26.1 -20.7 5.0 0.6 25.2 -39.5 3.9 0.3 10.0 -20.7 3.8 
dX/X 7.5 39.5 -48.0 9.5 3.7 55.5 -89.3 20.6 2.8 35.7 -76.2 16.5 
dX/X*R/Y 2.2 20.0 -28.9 7.6 2.7 48.6 -78.6 16.4 1.6 24.4 -58.8 12.1 
dX/X*X/Y 4.5 37.0 -35.9 7.8 1.0 18.1 -11.2 3.4 1.0 11.8 -13.8 3.7 
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Selection of countries for each region is mainly based on data availability and 
similarities in economic development.  From Africa eight countries, namely Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya,   Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia are included in the 
sample while six countries are chosen from Asia, namely, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Singapore.   Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela are the four countries 
chosen from Latin America. 
Table 1.2 indicates large disparities between growth rates of East Asia, Africa and Latin 
America.  East Asia was growing 1.6 times faster than Africa and twice as fast as Latin 
America. The average growth rate between 1982 and 2011 was 5.8 percent for East Asia 
while it was 3.6 percent and 2.8 percent for Africa and Latin America, respectively.  In 
terms of private investment, again, East Asia performed far better than Africa and Latin 
America.  Private gross fixed investment averaged 21.4 percent of GDP in East Asia 
followed by 16.1 percent in Latin America and 10.6 percent in Africa. Moreover, East 
Asia has the highest investment rate in infrastructure compared with the other two 
regions, investing 8.1 percent of its GDP on the sector annually while the eight 
countries in Africa invest 7.0 percent of their GDP and Latin America 5.2 percent only.  
Accordingly, total gross fixed investment amounted to 29.5 percent of GDP in East 
Asia, 17.6 percent in Africa and 21.3 percent in Latin America.   
     A wide disparity is also evident between the three regions in terms of infrastructure 
output growth and export of goods and services growth.  Real infrastructure output 
services were growing at an average rate of 6.6 percent in East Asia, 2.3 percent in 
Africa and 2.1 percent in Latin America.  On the other hand, real export growth 
averaged 7.5 percent in East Asia, 1.7 percentage points beyond real GDP growth rate, 
while, in Africa and Latin America, real export growth rates remain closer to the real 
GDP growth rate, i.e., 3.7 percent and 2.8 percent, respectively, despite the low export 
bases in these regions.  Consequently, East Asian countries have much higher export-to-
GDP ratios than African and Latin American countires. For instance, between 1980 and 
2011, exports accounted for 63 percent of GDP in East Asia, on average, whereas, in 
Africa and Latin America, exports accounted for 17.3 percent and 22.2 percent, 
respectively.  
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1.5.2     Unit Root Analysis 
Before proceeding to estimation of the model, the time series properties of the variables 
are examined. Modern time series theories argue that if the variables are non-stationary, 
the OLS regression method could be inappropriate because the usual “t” and “F” tests 
become meaningless, and the estimated coefficients would be “spurious” [Greene 
2000].  We perform the unit root test using five types of panel unit root tests: Levine, 
Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Fisher-type tests 
using ADF and PP tests.   
Let’s assume the following ADF specification, 
∆yit = αyit-1 + ∑jβij∆yit-j + X'it + uit …....……………………………...………. 1.30 
           j= 1,..., ρ  
The first two tests, i.e., Levine, Lin and Chu (2002), and Breitung (2000) assume that 
there is a common unit root process, i.e., α =  ρ – 1, across cross-sections.  On the other 
hand, the last three tests - Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Fisher-typ tests using ADF and 
PP tests - allow for individual unit root process so that ρi may vary across cross-sections 
[Maddala and Kim, 1998 and Baltagi, 2005]. These tests are simply multiple-series tests 
that have been applied to panel data structure where the presence of cross-section 
generates ‘multiple series’ out of a single series.  
     The results of the unit root tests conducted on the panel data of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America indicate that all the variables in the model are stationary in levels.  
Private fixed capital formation as a ratio of GDP (dK/Y), fails to pass the stationarity 
test four out of the five tests  in the case of East Asia.  However, since it passes the 
Breitung t-stat test at one percent level, we can reasonably assume that the variable is 
stationary.  On the other hand, government fixed capital formation as a ratio of GDP 
(G/Y) fails to pass only two out of five tests in East Asia.  With only stationary 
variables, OLS technique could be applied.   
     Therefore, the next question is whether the countries in each category qualify to be 
pooled together in a single equation.  In this case, the appropriate technique is a 
covariance analysis. 
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Table 1-3:   East Asia - Unit Root Test Results at Level 
  Common Unit Root Process Individual Unit Root Process 
  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Breitung 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
  
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant and 
trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
dY/Y -8.041*** -8.088*** -7.602*** -7.218*** -7.181*** 74.907*** 69.982*** 75.6*** 182.9*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dK/Y -0.429 -0.971 -2.727*** -0.178 -0.704 15.928 15.286 11.900 14.400 
  (0.334) (0.166) (0.003) (0.429) (0.241) (0.318) (0.359) (0.618) (0.419) 
dL/L -5.649*** -5.612*** -4.852*** -4.945*** -5.584*** 52.362** 55.891*** 67.0*** 106.4*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
G/Y -1.775** -0.817 -1.539* -1.314* -0.714 20.999 18.719 16.3 9.000 
  (0.038) ( 0.207) (0.062) (0.095) (0.238) (0.102) (0.176) (0.298) (0.830) 
dF/F -6.633*** -7.114*** -3.548*** -7.269*** -9.732*** 76.028*** 96.107*** 76.2*** 225.7*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*F/Y -7.230*** -6.899*** -3.829*** -7.837*** -8.768*** 81.907*** 84.728*** 82.2*** 202.6*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*R/Y -0.941 -7.259*** -3.624*** -3.126*** -8.806*** 38.262*** 92.639*** 75.2*** 160.3*** 
  (0.173) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*X/Y -5.887*** -4.282*** -1.583* -7.473*** -6.956*** 78.374*** 66.632*** 83.6*** 137.1*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X -12.875*** -10.291*** -8.984*** -11.917*** -10.130*** 129.860*** 100.406*** 134.7*** 118.7*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*R/Y -6.286*** -8.113*** -5.344*** -7.676*** -8.938*** 84.452*** 88.626*** 104.5*** 94.2*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*X/Y -11.160*** -12.407*** -9.924*** -10.800*** -12.770*** 117.731*** 135.226*** 135.6*** 176.0*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 1-4:   Africa - Unit Root Test Results at Level 
  Common Unit Root Process Individual Unit Root Process 
  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Breitung 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  ADF - Fisher Chi-square PP - Fisher Chi-square 
  
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant and 
trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
dY/Y -7.770*** -9.489*** -2.279*** -7.945*** -10.248**8 97.319*** 117.252*** 102.1*** 112.3*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dK/Y -0.329 -2.899*** -1.852** -0.917 -2.478*** 31.100*** 35.147*** 32.1*** 37.4*** 
  (0.371) (0.002) (0.032) (0.180) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) 
dL/L -10.983*** -9.938*** -4.826*** -12.585*** -11.729*** 98.844*** 328.193*** 83.3*** 316.6*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
G/Y -3.722*** -2.236** -2.695*** -4.525*** -3.377*** 50.406*** 41.657*** 44.3*** 38.2*** 
  (0.000) (0.013) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
dF/F -10.239*** -10.030*** -2.780*** -9.347*** -10.356*** 112.507*** 114.574*** 124.1*** 137.7*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*F/Y -12.351*** -10.494*** -2.022** -12.382*** -11.324*** 145.479*** 120.946*** 140.2*** 137.4*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*R/Y -10.418*** -10.161*** -3.590*** -9.462*** -10.515*** 113.964*** 115.224*** 125.5*** 134.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*X/Y -8.979*** -8.029*** -0.062 -9.644*** -9.748*** 116.595*** 109.248*** 126.2** 140.7*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X -11.129*** -10.403*** -9.583*** -12.854*** -12.352*** 152.254*** 142.800*** 150.3*** 522.1*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*R/Y -9.887*** -9.420*** -5.811*** -10.924*** -10.330*** 125.996*** 116.377*** 126.2*** 163.2** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*X/Y -11.082*** -11.048*** -4.524*** -12.439*** -12.980*** 144.849*** 155.514*** 146.6*** 376.8*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table1-5:  Latin America - Unit Root Test Results at Level 
  Common Unit Root Process Individual Unit Root Process 
  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
Breitung 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
  
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
With 
Constant 
With 
constant 
and trend 
dY/Y -3.213*** -9.092*** -1.460* -5.696*** -7.051*** 45.514*** 93.457*** 70.0*** 98.2*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dK/Y -2.217*** -2.625*** -1.750** -2.190*** -2.122** 17.509** 16.836** 15.5** 9.8 
  (0.013) (0.004) (0.040) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.032) (0.050) (0.276) 
dL/L -3.058*** -5.167*** -3.495*** -3.121*** -4.600*** 23.727*** 33.355*** 38.1*** 30.6*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
G/Y -4.070*** -1.874*** 0.372 -5.176*** -2.400*** 42.690*** 18.374** 26.4*** 18.3** 
  (0.000) (0.031) (0.645) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.019) 
dF/F -3.480*** -3.291*** -3.379*** -4.514*** -4.133*** 34.915*** 32.817*** 50.8*** 42.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*F/Y -4.725*** -4.478*** -4.822*** -4.846*** -4.520*** 37.757*** 35.498*** 56.9*** 49.7*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*R/Y -3.031*** -3.160*** -2.970*** -4.223*** -3.969*** 32.485*** 31.758*** 48.6*** 39.8*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dF/F*X/Y -4.446*** -4.795*** -3.063*** -5.113*** -6.418*** 40.116*** 47.186*** 56.0*** 50.8*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X -4.577*** -7.707*** -4.545*** -4.703*** -7.054*** 36.778*** 51.946*** 62.3*** 54.0*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*R/Y -4.155*** -7.954*** -4.644*** -4.609*** -7.641*** 36.026*** 56.726*** 64.4*** 57.6*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
dX/X*X/Y -5.115*** -7.260*** -3.926*** -4.673*** -6.133*** 36.513*** 44.616*** 59.7*** 50.5*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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1.5.3    Analysis of Covariance 
Hsiao (2003, p 14) argues that in a panel least-square estimation, it is assumed that 
“...the regression parameters take values common to all cross-sectional units for all time 
periods”.  If this assumption is not valid, the panel least-square estimates lead to false 
inferences.”  Following Hsiao (2003, p.15), the chapter “assumes that parameters are 
constant over time, but can vary across individuals”  
yit = αi+ βi’xit + uit,    i = 1, ...,N,........................................................................1.31 
            N = 1,...,T, 
Then we can test the following two hypotheses: 
  Hypothesis 1 (H1): regression slope coefficients are identical, and intercepts are not. 
That is, 
 yit = αi+ β’xit + uit.............................................................................................. 1.32 
  Hypothesis 2 (H2): Both slope and intercept coefficients are the same.  That is  
 yit = α+ β’xit + uit............................................................................................... 1.33 
The F-test for H1 is:     
F1 = {(S2 –S1)/[(N-1)K]}/{S1/[NT- N(K+1)]}  
The test for H1 is conducted against the unrestricted regression, which assumes both 
intercept, and slopes are heterogeneous.  Where, S represents residual sum of squares 
(RSS).  S1 represents unrestricted RSS (in this case, both intercept and slope are 
heterogeneous) and S2 stands for the restricted sum of square.  Rejecting H1 implies that 
the regression’s slope coefficients and intercepts are heterogeneous. 
The F-test for H2 is:     
 F1 = {(S3 –S2)/ [(N-1)]}/ {S2/ [N (T-1) -K]}  
In this case, the unrestricted RSS is S2 and the restricted RSS in line with H2 is S3  
     Results of the covariance analysis are presented in Table 1.1 below.  The analysis 
indicates hypothesis one (H1) is rejected at 1 percent level of significance in the case of 
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Africa and Latin America.  Only in the case of the East Asian group that the hypothesis 
is not  
   Table 1-6.   Analysis of Covariance 
    Degrees of Freedom 
Actual   
F-ratios     Numerator Denominator 
  
H1: Constant Slope but Heterogeneous 
intercept 
      
1 East Asian Countries 48 111 1.17 
2 African Countries 72 186 1.68*** 
  
        Using dummies: 1984 for Ethiopia and 
1993&94 for Rwanda 
70 126 1.17 
3 Latin American Countries 32 92 1.52** 
           Using dummy for 1983 27 78 1.29 
  
H2: Constant Slope and Homogeneous 
Slopes 
      
1 East Asian Countries 6 202 2.82*** 
2 African Countries       
  
Using dummies: 1984 for Ethiopia and 
1993&94 for Rwanda 
8 222 1.25 
3 Latin American Countries       
           Using dummy for 1983 4 103 0.31 
 
rejected.  Rejecting H1 implies countries do not have common constant parameters.  
This suggests that one should conduct individual time-series estimation on each county 
data.  However, on closer inspection it is clear that the heterogeneity stems from a few 
large exogenous shocks. Hence, intercept dummies are used to capture the outliers.  
Accordingly, when the year 1984 of the Ethiopian famine and the years 1993 and 1994 
representing the periods of the build-up for Rwandan Genocide and the occurrence of 
the actual Genocide are dummied out, the test for Africa fails to reject H1.   For Latin 
America, the year 1983 in which most of the countries in the group experienced 
significant fall in national output is dummied.   
1.6 Methodology of Estimation  
As illustrated in section (1.3), equation (1.19) is a simple growth model while equation 
(1.23) is a dynamic one.  This section presents the estimation techniques applied in each 
case and tries to indicate some of the limitations of these techniques. 
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1.6.1 Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) Estimators vs. Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) Estimators 
For the simple growth model, i.e. equation (1.19), the least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) model, by allowing for fixed country specific effects, is applied.  The LSDV 
model is a classical regression model that is built on the standard assumptions that all 
the explanatory variables are exogenous. The fixed country specific effects model 
assumes that wealthier countries in the panel could spend more on public infrastructure 
investment. Moreover, a feasible GLS specification is applied to take care of possible 
cross-section heteroskedasticity.  
     On the other hand, in the case of the dynamic growth model, specified in equation 
(1.23), the presence of serial correlation in the error term or the presence of a random 
country effect renders the lagged dependent variable correlated with the error term. It is 
argued that estimation of a dynamic model with LSDV model might lead to inconsistent 
estimates, even if all the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error 
components [Baltagi and Griffin, 1997].  The LSDV performs well only when the time 
dimension of the panel is large [Judson and Owen, 1999].  In this case, most panel data 
econometrics literature recommend applying a GMM estimator.  However, the problem 
with the GMM estimator is that “when the time dimension gets large (T > 20), as it is 
often the case in macroeconomic data, computational requirement increases 
substantially and a GMM estimation using all available instruments may not be 
practical to implement” [Judson and Owen, 1999, p.13].  Using Monte Carlo simulation, 
Judson and Owen (1999) found that for sufficiently large T, i.e., T=30, LSDV performs 
better than a GMM estimator even in the case of unbalanced panel.  The GMM 
estimator is found to perform better in a panel with T < = 20. Given that the time 
dimension in our model is sufficiently large, i.e., T = 31, we find that the LSDV model, 
with a feasible GLS setting, is the appropriate model.  Hence, the LSDV estimator is 
applied to the dynamic growth model as well.  
1.6.2 Fixed Effect vs. Random Effect 
Literature on panel data argues that the fixed effect model is a reasonable approach 
when one can be confident that the differences between units can be viewed as 
parametric shifts of the regression function. On the other hand, if it is believed that 
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sampled cross-section units are drawn from a large population, it might be more 
appropriate to view individual specific constant terms as randomly distributed. In this 
chapter, the samples are drawn from a limited population of countries in each region.  
They are chosen as countries of interest (not random) [Judson and Owen, 1999]. 
Moreover, differences across countries are expected to be mainly related to initial 
conditions such as wealth and resource endowment.  The richer the country is the more 
it is expected to spend on public infrastructure investment [Greene, 1999].   A positive 
correlation is expected between the country-specific effects and public infrastructure. In 
this case, it is more appropriate to assume that the differences between units are 
parametric shifts. Therefore, in this chapter, a fixed-effect model is applied, allowing for 
changing intercepts across-countries in the panel.   
     Sections (1.7.1) and (1.7.2) present the estimation results of the one-sector and the 
three-sector models, with- and without-expected-infrastructure-output-growth effects, 
respectively.   However, as the estimated results of parameters of interest are almost 
similar in both models, i.e., equation 1.19 and equation 1.23, the interpretation of the 
estimated elasticity parameters proceeds with the model without-the-expected-
infrastructure-output-growth effect, to avoid confusion.  
1.7 Estimation Results 
1.7.1. The One-sector model 
Estimation results of the one-sector model are presented in Table 1.7 below.  The table 
presents estimation results from both equations (1.19) and (1.23).  Several results are 
worth mentioning. First, private capital stock plays a significant role in explaining 
growth in all the three regions under study.  The elasticity coefficients of dK/Y are 
found significant at 1 percent significance level in the case of East Asia and Africa 
while it is significant at 10 percent in Latin America. This confirms the findings of 
many growth accounting models in developing countries [see Wang, 2002; Wang and 
Yao, 2002; and Young, 1995]. The results illustrate that a one percent increase in the 
stock of private capital leads to a 0.24 percent, a 0.17 percent and a 0.18 percent 
increase in real GDP in East Asia, Africa, and Latin America, respectively.  Second, 
labour input is found significant only in the case of East Asian countries.  The latter  
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    Table 1-7:  One-sector Model with Infrastructure Capital Stock 
  
Without Externalities from 
Expected Infrastructure Output 
Growth 
With Externalities from Expected 
Infrastructure Output Growth 
  East Asia Africa 
Latin 
America East Asia Africa 
Latin 
America 
dK/Y 0.243*** 0.173*** 0.182* 0.172*** 0.164*** 0.055 
  (7.450) (3.483) (1.795) (6.123) (3.179) (0.437) 
dL/L 0.495** -0.060 -0.159 0.434*** -0.062 -0.187 
  (1.968) (-0.451) (-0.591) (2.819) (-0.463) (-0.725) 
dGF/Y -0.243** 0.199*** -0.122 -0.226*** 0.201*** -0.092 
  (-2.469) (2.730) (-0.917) (-2.928) 2.710 (-0.5463) 
dYt/Yt-1       0.205*** 0.070 0.095 
        (3.859) (0.968) (1.523) 
Constant 3.340*** 1.222 1.366 3.229*** 1.079 3.080 
  (3.992) (1.465) (0.738) (6.010) (1.282) (1.418) 
DUMM_83     -8.294***     -8.254*** 
      (-3.431)     (-3.201) 
DUMM_84   -10.723     -11.044   
    (-1.550)     (-1.568)   
DUMM_93   -13.557     -13.942   
    (-0.878)     (-0.897)   
DUMM_94   
-
26.178***     
-
26.993***   
    (-7.441)     (-7.436)   
DUMM_97 -2.526*     -2.581**     
  (-1.870)     (-2.001)     
DUMM_98 -7.741***     -7.592***     
  (-3.927)     (-3.733)     
Obs. 177 221 125 177 221 122 
Adj. R2 0.374 0.257 0.165 0.410 0.264 0.166 
implies that labour provides no constraint on output as it might be in surplus in Africa 
and Latin America. . 
     Third, infrastructure capital accumulation has a positive and significant direct effect 
only in the case of Africa with an elasticity of 0.20.  A one percent increase in 
infrastructure capital stock leads to a 0.2 percent increase in aggregate output.  This 
implies that public infrastructure capital accumulation has a strong direct effect on 
economic growth in Africa. This result supports the findings of Calderon and Serven 
(2003) who argue that infrastructure is under-provided in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, as the model does not capture the indirect contribution of infrastructure 
capital, i.e, the provision of its services to private sector output, the model cannot 
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answer weather the underprovisioning is in terms of underinvestment in new 
infrastructure networks or poor infrastructure services.   On the other hand, a puzzling 
result is found for East Asia. In the latter, the direct contribution of infrastructure is 
found to be significant but negative.  It implies a one percent incremental spending on 
new infrastructure investment might result in a 0.23 percent reduction in the national 
output. Using a pooled data analysis of five newly industrialized countries (NICs), 
namely Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan, covering 
the period 1979-1998, Wang (2002) found an insignificant coefficient for public 
infrastructure capital.  However, in the individual country estimations, Wang (2002) 
found negative, but insignificant, coefficients for public infrastructure capital in the case 
of Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. He argues that the results might imply inefficient 
utilization of infrastructure capital in the region
22
. In the Latin America region, the 
direct contribution of public infrastructure capital is found insignificant.   
     Finally, the low overall fit of the model across all the three regions, as measured by 
the adjusted R
2
, indicates that the direct contributions of factor inputs, including public 
capital stock, in explaining variations in aggregate output, is limited.  The overall fit of 
the model is only 25.7 percent in Africa, 37.4 percent in Asia and 16.7 percent in Latin 
America.   This implies that much of the variations in growth are explained by the 
respective residuals [Agenor and Montiel, 1999]. 
1.7.2 The Three-Sector Model 
Table 1.8 presents the estimation results of the three-sector model.  The major findings 
of the three-sector model, compared with the conventional one-sector model, are: first, 
what matters for private sector output and economic growth is the efficient provisioning 
of infrastructural services rather than a simple accumulation of infrastructure capital. 
For instance, infrastructure spillover variables (dF/F*X/Y) and (dF/F*R/Y) are found 
significant at one percent level in East Asia with elasticity coefficients of 0.21 and 0.22, 
respectively.  This has solved the puzzle in the one-sector model.  Getting a significant 
but negative coefficient for GF/Y in the one-sector model was puzzling because, 
                                                          
22 Wang (2002) argues that one reason for the inefficient utilization of public capital is that a large portion of the 
infrastructure sector is operated either monopolistically or by the government.  
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recently, consensus seems to emerge in the empirical literature that infrastructure has 
played a prominent role in enhancing growth in the East Asia region [see Chen, 1997;  
Table 1-8.  Three Sector-Infrastructure and Export Spillover Models 
  
Without Externalities from Expected 
Infrastructure Output Growth 
With Externalities from Expected 
Infrastructure Output Growth 
East Asia Africa 
Latin 
America East Asia Africa 
Latin 
America 
dK/Y 0.201*** 0.178*** 0.222*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.101 
  (8.624) (4.055) (2.533) (7.422) (4.109) (0.821) 
dL/L 0.398*** -0.162 0.031 0.395*** -0.106 -0.019 
  (2.934) (-1.501) (0.161) (2.942) (-0.931) (-0.105) 
dGF/Y -0.281** 0.050 0.042 -0.283** 0.112 -0.017 
  (-2.171) (0.606) (0.214) (-2.129) (1.262) (-0.091) 
dF/F*X/Y 0.213*** -0.164 0.176 0.214*** -0.215* 0.198 
  (2.768) (-1.419) (0.512) (2.665) (-1.780) (0.637) 
dF/F*R/Y 0.218*** 0.129*** 0.175 0.223*** 0.115*** 0.180 
  (3.753) (3.229) (0.890) (3.441) (2.589) (0.977) 
dX/X*R/Y 0.015 0.009 -0.070 0.016 0.027 -0.064 
  (0.618) (0.407) (-1.497) (0.482) (1.051) (-1.417) 
dX/X*X/Y 0.107** 0.139* 0.555*** 0.107** 0.048 0.550*** 
  (2.396) (1.720) (3.517) (2.281) (0.507) (3.539) 
dYt/Yt-1       -0.007 -0.030 0.117* 
        (-0.122) (-0.730) (1.706) 
Constant 1.554 2.107*** -1.437 1.561 1.409 0.629 
  (1.154) (2.504) (-1.122) (1.309) (1.532) (0.418) 
DUMMY_83     -8.348***     -8.208*** 
      (-4.380)     (-4.258) 
DUMMY_84   -8.770**     -8.852**   
    (-2.074)     (-2.131)   
DUMMY_93   
-
13.830**
*     -13.302***   
    (-2.693)     (-2.633)   
DUMMY_94   -28.722     -38.029   
    (-1.349)     (-1.611)   
DUMMY_97 -3.128***     -3.141***     
  (-13.263)     (-13.312)     
DUMMY_98 -7.915***     -7.939***     
  (-26.999)     (-26.438)     
Obs. 163 207 114 163 207 114 
Adj. R2 0.586 0.718 0.316 0.583 0.743 0.329 
Todaro and Smith, 2009; and Feder, 1983]. The results from the one-sector model, 
however, seem to nullify the consensus. Now, by splitting the contribution of 
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infrastructure into direct (through capital accumulation) and indirect (through 
provisioning of infrastructure services), the puzzle seems to be solved in the three-sector 
model.  The results from the three-sector model confirm that, in fact, infrastructure 
plays a significant role in enhancing growth indirectly through its services, validating 
the consensus in the literature.    
     Moreover, in Africa, the fact the GF/Y is insignificant while dF/F*R/Y is found 
significant at one percent significance level, in the three-sector model confirms that it is 
the quality and availability of infrastructure services that matters most in the region 
rather than accumulation of infrastructure capital. On the contrary, the GF/Y is found 
significant and positive in the one-sector model simply because the model cannot 
separate the contribution of infrastructure services growth from that of infrastructure 
capital accumulation. It is important to note, however, that the results do not necessarily 
imply infrastructure capital accumulation does not contribute to economic growth 
because it is difficult to think of growth in infrastructure services without infrastructure 
capital accumulation, at least in the long run. It only implies, in terms of the long-term 
dynamics, the direct contribution of infrastructure is insignificant compared with 
availability of its services because it tends to be either oversupplied or inefficiently 
utilized. 
     Second, finding positive and significant coefficients for the infrastructure spillover 
variables (dF/F*X/Y) and (dF/F*R/Y) in East Asia confirm the presence of 
complementarities between public infrastructure and the exports sectors, and between 
the infrastructure and the non-export private sectors in the region. On the other hand, in 
Africa, the infrastructure spillover is found significant only in the case of private sector 
production to the domestic market. These results indicate the presence of a market 
failure in developing countries.  Infrastructure seems to play little role in enhancing 
exports in Africa. This might be because most African countries depend on the exports 
of primary commodities, which are less integrated with domestic economic activities. In 
Latin America, the infrastructure spillovers are found to be insignificant.  The 
implication of these findings is that developing countries need a well-devised 
infrastructure development strategy to enhance economic growth.  
     Third, presence of marginal productivity differences between the export sector and 
the non-export sector is confirmed across all regions. The dX/X*X/Y variable is found 
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to be significant and positive in all the three regions. The results imply that a 
reallocation of factor inputs from the non-export sector to the export sector makes them 
more productive, which suggests that, in developing countries, an export-oriented 
development strategy produces an optimal growth than the inward-oriented one.    
     Fourth, the export spillover to non-private export sectors (dX/X*R/Y) is found 
insignificant across all the three regions. This implies that the economy is benefiting 
little from the export spillover effect that is expected to enhance productivity and help to 
introduce internationally competitive modern management system in the non-export 
sector [Feder, 1983], apart from the resource reallocation effect.  For the African 
counties, high dependency on exports of primary products, which have little 
contribution to vertical and horizontal integration in the domestic economy, could be 
one of the reasons for the lack of export externalities.         
     Fifth, private capital accumulation remains the main determinant of growth in all the 
three regions with elasticities between 0.18 and 0.22. On the other hand, except in East 
Asia, labour input and public infrastructure capital stock are found insignificant, 
confirming the result in the one-sector model.  
Sixth, the power to explain variations in aggregate output has improved significantly in 
the three-sector model.  For instance, in Africa, the overall fit of the model, as measured 
by adjusted R
2
, increased from 25.7 percent in the one-sector model to 71.8 percent in 
the three-sector model; in East Asia, it increased from 37.4 percent to 58.6 percent; and, 
in Latin America from 16.5 percent to 31.6 percent.   
     Table 1.9 presents the spillover parameters and the marginal productivity difference 
parameter, which are computed from the estimated coefficients of the model.  The 
spillover from infrastructure to the export sector parameter ‘v’ indicates that, in East 
Asia, a one percent increase in infrastructure output leads to a 0.27 percent increase in 
national output. This would happen by enhancing productivity of the export sector, 
creating economies of scale and/or reducing transaction costs in the export sector.  In 
Africa and Latin America, the parameter is found insignificant illustrating the fact that 
these regions have given weak policy emphases on the link between infrastructure 
investment and exports.  
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     On the other hand, the spillover from infrastructure to the domestic private sector 
parameter ‘z’ reveals that a one percent increase in infrastructure output increases 
national output by 0.26 percent in East Asia and by 0.13 percent in Africa by enhancing 
domestic private output growth.  In Latin America, the domestic sector does not seem to 
benefit from investment in infrastructure spillover similar to the export sector.      
   Table 1-9.    Spillover Effects of Public Infrastructure and Export Growth, and 
Marginal Productivity Differences
23
 
  
Spillover from 
infrastructure 
(F) to the 
export sector 
(X) 
Spillover 
from 
infrastructure 
(F) to the 
non-export 
private 
sector (R) 
Spillover 
from export 
(X) to the 
non-export 
private 
sector (R) 
Marginal 
productivity 
difference 
between export 
and non-export 
private sectors 
  
Without Externalities from Expected Infrastructure Output 
Growth 
  v z ω δ 
East Asia        0.273*** 0.262*** 0.016 0.142*** 
Africa -0.190 0.129*** 0.009          0.161* 
Latin America 0.395     0.175 -0.070 1.247*** 
  With Externalities from Expected Infrastructure Output Growth 
  (v) (z) ω δ 
East Asia   0.273*** 0.262*** 0.012 0.142** 
Africa     -0.219* 0.112*** 0.026           0.049 
Latin America      0.595     0.204 -0.072  1.652*** 
The fourth column, in Table 1.9, reports the spillover effects of exports to non-private 
export sectors ‘ω’.  The parameter is found to be insignificant across all three regions. 
On the other hand, the estimated marginal productivity difference ‘δ’ reported indicates 
that factor inputs are more productive in the export sector than the rest of the economy 
across all the regions.  The marginal productivity difference, as measured by ‘δ’, ranges 
between 14.2 percent in East Asia to 165 percent in Latin America. The relatively low 
productivity difference in East Asia compared with that in Africa and Latin America 
reflects the higher share of exports in aggregate economic output in the East Asian 
region.  As the share of exports in aggregate output increases, the productivity gap 
between the export and non-export sectors narrows [Wang, 2002].  In Africa, the export 
                                                          
23 The standard errors and t-ratios for the parameters are derived using the general property of variance: Var(β1*β2) = 
β1*
2 Var(β2)  Var(β2) = Var(β1*β2)/ β1*
2 
            Standard deviation:  Se (β2) = Var(β1*β2)/ β1*
2; and t-ratio: β2/ Se (β2) 
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sector is 16 percent more productive than the non-export sector, implying that a 
reallocation of factor inputs from the non-export sector to the export sector makes them 
0.16 percent more productive than when they are employed in the non-export sector. 
The result reported for the Latin American region, however, is surprising. The estimated 
‘‘δ’ indicates that a shift of factor inputs from non-export to the export sectors increases 
the marginal products of those factor inputs by about 1.7 times
24
.  Although this merits 
further investigation, the result might indicate the presence a strong dichotomy between 
the export sector and the rest of the economy in the region.   
1.8   Summary and Policy Implication 
In recent years, the role of infrastructure capital accumulation in enhancing economic 
growth has gained increased acceptance due to the increasing number of positive 
outcomes from studies on the area. However, literature still debate on the presence of 
long-term effect on economic growth. Some literature argue that infrastructure 
accelerates economic growth during the transitional dynamics towards the steady state. 
They associate the higher economic growth related to the period marked with 
acceleration of infrastructure capital accumulation to the transition dynamics. Others 
argue that infrastructure generates positive externalities to the rest of the economies 
through different channels. So, they argue that, it clearly affects long-term growth.   
     The source of such controversies has been lack of a well-designed analytical 
framework that captures the different channels through which infrastructure capital 
accumulation affects economic growth. The one-sector growth model captures only the 
direct effect.  This channel is expected to produce positive coefficients as long as 
infrastructure capital is underprovided.  The coefficient of infrastructure capital stock is 
found to be negative in Asia which suggests that it may be overprovided (Wang 2002) 
while it is found significant and positive in the case of Africa where it is believed to be 
underprovided [Calderon and Serven, 2003].  Hence, based on these results, the advice 
to Asian countries would be to pay more attention to the effective and efficient 
utilization of the existing infrastructure capital. On the other hand, the African countries 
should not to pay less attention to the quality and effective utilization of the existing 
                                                          
24This implies labour and capital productivities are higher by 2.6 times in the export sector compared to those in the 
non-export sector.    
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infrastructure resources while continuing to accumulate new public infrastructure 
capital.    
     The three-sector model developed in this chapter is able to solve the above puzzle by 
further splitting the private sector production function into exports, and non-export 
sectors and investigating if differences in the trade openness of countries determines the 
optimal long-term contribution of infrastructure capital accumulation on economic 
growth.  The findings confirm that export-orientation of most of the Asian countries 
helped these countries to optimize the contribution of infrastructure capital 
accumulation on growth.  The three-sector model identifies two more channels of 
infrastructure externalities, bringing the number of channels through which 
infrastructure affects growth increases from two to four.  The first two channels are the 
capital accumulation and spill-over effect of infrastructure through which the latter 
affects growth directly.  These channels are already identified in the two-sector model.  
The two newly identified channels are those through which infrastructure affects growth 
indirectly through capital accumulation and spillover effects of export growth.  
Therefore, this chapter finds that infrastructure capital accumulation and export 
development strategy are complementary to each other.  This confirms the studies by 
Eastely and Serven (2003) and Rodriguez (2006) which argue that, in the 1980 and 
1990s, African and Latin American countries failed to recognize importance of 
infrastructure development for the success of a strategy to open up their economies.  So, 
one of the most important policy lessons to be drawn to Ethiopia from this chapter is 
that if the country wants to realize the optimal long-term effects of infrastructure 
investment on economic growth, infrastructure investment strategy must be supported 
by export-oriented policies or vice-versa.    
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Chapter 2 
Stability and Determinants of the Demand 
for Money in Low Income African 
Countries with Structural Transformation:  
Theory and Evidence (A Co-integration 
Analysis) 
2.1 Introduction 
Stability of the demand for money is crucial to monetary policy making.  Ethiopia’s 
five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I), which was launched in 2011, 
assigns monetary policy a crucial role in ensuring macroeconomic stability and 
enhancing domestic saving mobilization.  The plan envisaged to raise domestic savings 
by 5.5 percentage points of GDP within five years from 9.5 percent in 2010 to 15 
percent in 2015 [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010].  In an agricultural 
economy where more than 80 percent of the population makes a living in rural 
activities, particularly in farming, the success of this program depends on how fast the 
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structure of the economy changes from a consumption driven to a saving oriented one, 
and the speed of integration of the rural economy with the modern (monetized) 
economy.  
     Arize et al (1999, p.400) argues, “a theoretically coherent and robust money demand 
function is crucial for sound monetary policy formulation in less developed countries 
(LDCs) yet empirical work in this area is extremely sparse”.  Today, the importance of 
structural transformation, particularly in the production and trade sectors, is a burning 
issue in Africa.  However, little attention has been paid regarding the implication of 
structural transformation process for macroeconomic policies, particularly on monetary 
policy. When countries are undergoing a structural transformation process, the latter is 
expected to be accompanied by a rapid monetization of the economy.  Evidence from 
fast growing East Asian economies indicates that structural transformations in the 
production and trade sectors have been followed by a rapid monetization process, which 
led to an increase in the demand for money faster than the rate of growth of the 
economy (measured in nominal GDP). For instance, during the last three-and-half 
decades, from 1975 to 2011, the ratio of broad money supply to GDP (M2/GDP) has 
risen by 235 percent, from 38.3 percent in 1975 to 128.2 percent in 2011 in Thailand,; 
in Malaysia from 67 percent to 138 percent (a 106 percent increase), in Singapore from 
59.5 percent to 128.6 percent (a 116 percent increase) and in South Korea from 28.5 
percent to 131percent (a 360 percent increase)
25
.  
     Similarly, in the nine fast growing African countries, evidence indicates that a 
structural transformation process has resulted in a rapid monetization, and has boosted 
the contribution of the financial sector to the national output.  In these economies, the 
average   M2/GDP ratio jumped from 18.2 percent in 1990 to 32.2 percent in 2013
26
.   
The fastest increases were registered in Ghana, which increased from 6.8 in 1990 
percent to 24.5 percent in 2013 (increased by 260 percent), in Kenya from 24.5 percent 
to 55.8 percent (increased by 128 percent) and Uganda, from 8.4 percent to 24 percent 
(increased by 186 percent).   
                                                          
25
 The figures are computed from World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
26
The nine countries include Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
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     During a structural transformation process, the challenges to the financial sector are 
multifaceted.  First, the central bank needs to have control over the stability of the 
demand for money during the entire transformation process and should have adequate 
knowledge of the types and magnitudes of the variables that affect it.  Second, financial 
institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions and insurance agencies need to be 
made ready to respond to the demands of the changing dynamics in the production and 
trade structures of the economy [Chenery, 1986]. What makes the recent growth 
episodes in Africa particularly interesting is that, in line with the UN Millennium Goals, 
pro-poor and inclusive growth objectives have been given especial focus in the 
countries’ development strategies.  Governments in these countries have strong 
commitments to integrate the rural poor through massive investment in public 
infrastructure and human development.  The expansion in infrastructure networks 
enhances the monetization process as it facilitates integration of  the less monetized 
section of the society into the modern one, by creating easy access to the product and 
money markets and, consequently, enhancing specialization and division of labour in 
rural areas.  
     Ignoring the potential impact of the structural transformation process on the money 
market has at least two implications. First, monetary policy could potentially 
underestimate the extent of the demand for money in the long run, and the economy 
could be underprovided with the necessary long-term liquidity.  The latter restrains 
long-term investment and growth by constraining economic activities and potential 
change in the structure of the economy. Second, the economy would also miss the 
opportunity to speed up the structural transformation process and create favourable 
conditions to enhance domestic savings
27
.  Monetization could be speeded up through 
active government policies that aim at ensuring macroeconomic stability so that people 
could develop confidence on the value of money [see McLoughlin and Nariaki, 2012]; 
enhancing access to finance, particularly to the rural people where economic activities 
are less monetized; and introducing new financial instruments (to encourage financial 
savings).   
                                                          
27
 Reluctance to recognize the effect of monetization could have high costs on the economy by making policy makers 
miss the opportunity to boost domestic savings, which is crucial to sustain economic growth (see McLoughlin and 
Nariaki, 2012).    
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     The objective of this chapter is to analyze the implications of the current structural 
transformation process in rapidly growing countries in Africa, on the stability of the 
demand for money, using a panel data cointegration analysis and draw policy lessons 
for Ethiopia.     Moreover, the chapter tries to fill the existing gap in the literature 
regarding the role of structural transformation on the demand for money and the 
conduct of monetary policy in rapidly growing least developed countries.   To this end, 
the chapter devotes a section to a brief theoretical background on the link between 
structural transformation and the demand for money in LDCs.  The chapter also 
explores the significance and limitations of both the conventional and non-conventional 
theoretical models in the literature review section.    
     The chapter employs a panel cointegration technique for the empirical analysis.  As 
many African countries lack extended time series data, panel cointegration technique 
helps to exploit joint cross-section and time series variations, and is expected to lead to 
a better statistical inference [Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silverstre, 2011].   Individual 
country estimations are also conducted on two countries, namely Kenya and Rwanda, 
from the panel for which time series data is available from 1971 to 2011.  The 
estimation on the Ethiopian data is postponed to Chapter 3 to avoid redundancy. 
     The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 deals with motivation of 
the chapter; and section 2.3 presents a brief review of the literature on alternative 
theories and formulations of the demand for money.  Section 2.4 discusses the 
theoretical background of the new model.  Section 2.5 provides a brief analysis of the 
link between the structural transformation process and the demand for money.  In 
section 2.6, the chapter outlines data and methodology.  Panel data estimation results 
are presented in section 2.7. The chapter concludes in section 2.8 by giving a brief 
summary and policy recommendations.  
2.2 Motivation of the Paper 
Since the 1990s, many African governments have renewed their commitments to 
eradicate poverty and decided to take ownership of economic policies and growth 
strategies.  Consequently, the economic growth dynamics have witnessed a rapid 
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change in many African countries
28
.  Evidence suggests that quite a number of African 
countries are in a rapid process of structural transformation, which is reflected in a shift 
in the structure of production and trade in the economy.  In many African countries, the 
share of agriculture has been falling while per capita rural income has been witnessing a 
rapid growth in recent years. For instance, between 1996 and 2011, the share of 
agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) declined from 61.9 percent to 45.3 percent 
in Ethiopia and from 47.2 percent to 32.3 percent in Rwanda.  On the other hand, real 
per capita rural output increased by about 55 percent in Ethiopia and by 65.5 percent in 
Rwanda during the same period.  Rapid economic growth and the expansion of road, 
electricity, telecommunication, health, and education infrastructure into the rural areas 
have transformed the lives of a significant number of rural families.  Year on year, the 
number of rural families who are able to afford paying for hired labour, transport, 
telephone bills, health expenses, education services, and consumption of industrially 
processed food and drinks is increasing.  
     The motivation of this chapter is, therefore, to investigate the impact of structural 
transformation on the monetization process in rapidly growing African countries with 
similar production and trade structure, and analyse its implication on the stability of the 
demand for money functions, using a panel cointegration analysis, and draw lessons to 
Ethiopia.  Moreover, absence of adequate literature on the area with a focus on the 
African economies has also motivated the study. Existing literature on the demand for 
money focuses on advanced as well as East and South East Asian countries [Banafea, 
2012; and Kumar, 2011].   Only limited amounts of research have been published on 
Sub Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa.   The few studies available include Anoruo 
(2002) on Nigeria, Dagher and Kovanen (2011) on Ghana and Aschheim, et al (1989) 
on Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Morocco.   Moreover, these studies focus on the 
conventional determinants of demand for money.  As a result, they fail to deal with the 
                                                          
28
 Following economic and financial sector reforms in the 1990s, many African countries achieved 
macroeconomic stability, particularly low inflation.  As a result, interest rates are generally lower from 
the pre-1990 level, permitting private investment to flourish, and misalignments in exchange rates were 
also by and large corrected (McLoughlin and Nariaki, 2012) improving the external sector position.   The 
surge in demand for primary commodities following the resurgence of the East and South East Asian 
countries has also contributed to improvement in the external sector position of many African countries.  
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particular challenges of structural transformation on the stability of money demand and 
the conduct of monetary policy. 
2.3 Literature Review 
The stability of the demand for money is crucial for monetary policymaking.  The 
effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the stability of the money demand function 
and the ability to influence movements of the variables that determine it.   Despite the 
fact that there are extensive volumes of theoretical literature on the area, consensus has 
not emerged yet on the factors that affect the demand for money.  Moreover, the 
empirical literature is concentrated in advanced economies, not in countries where the 
production and trade structure is subjected to a rapid change. Therefore, the debates on 
the demand for money focus on three issues: one, the general functional form of and the 
determinants of the demand for money; two, endogeneity of money supply; and three, 
the stability and importance of the demand for money [for the detailed discussions 
please see Harris, 1985; Laidler, 1985; and Judd and Scadding, 1982].  
2.3.1  The Mainstream Theories of the Demand for Money 
2.3.1.1 The General Functional Form and Determinants of the 
Demand for Money 
The literature on the general functional form of the demand for money could be grouped 
into two parts: transaction theories and portfolio or asset theories (Judd and Scadding, 
1982)
29
.  Transaction theorists argue that individuals’ decisions to hold money are 
mainly determined by money’s special use as a medium of exchange, i.e., its purpose to 
facilitate transactions (Laidler, 1985).
30
 On the other hand, portfolio or asset theorists 
consider money just like any other assets such as gold, durable and non-durable goods 
and also financial assets such as bonds and equity such that the demand for money is 
                                                          
29
 This categorization helps to easily identify, one, which classes of theories are in favour of current 
income or wealth as a scale variable, and, two, which theories support the inclusion of opportunity costs 
in the demand for money function.   
30
 Laidler (1985) argues, “Two peculiar and interrelated characteristics of money are usually emphasized 
in theories that set it apart from other goods.  The first is that money is acceptable as a means of exchange 
for goods and services, and the second is that its market value is, if not always stable, then at least 
generally highly predictable, over short time period at least” [Laidler, 1985 p.41]. 
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determined, not only by its own price, but also by the prices of such other assets [Judd 
and Scadding 1982; Friedman, 1970; Harris 1985 and Laidler, 1985].   Judd and 
Scadding (1982) describes that the transaction theorists are led by the inventory 
theoretic models of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), and the asset or portfolio theorists 
are led by monetarists and new Keynesian.   
2.3.1.1.1   The General Functional Forms of the Demand for Money 
In the general functional forms of the demand for money, the two groups are known to 
differ on two issues, i.e., on the definition of money and factors that determine the 
demand for money.   In a search for the best functional form of the demand for money, 
selecting the appropriate definition of money is important.  Transaction theorists argue 
that the reason why individuals prefer to hold money over other assets is that money is 
universally acceptable as a medium of exchange in the exchange of goods and services 
(Laidler, 1985).   So, only financial assets such as cash and checks that could directly be 
exchanged for goods and services would qualify as money.  The transaction theorists 
consider financial assets such as saving and time deposits as near monies, but, they 
argue that these assets do not qualify to be defined as money because one cannot 
directly use them to pay for goods and services without first converting them into cash 
or checks, which involves transaction costs (both in time and finance). Hence, 
individuals prefer to hold the amount of money that is only enough to conduct 
transactions in a given period.  According to this theory, a stable relationship exists only 
between narrowly defined money (M1), which includes only cash and checks, and 
economic activities [Tobin 1956 and Harris, 1985].      
     On the other hand, the asset (portfolio) theorists argue that money is like any other 
assets and the demand for it is similar to the demand for other financial and real assets, 
and individuals hold money not only to conduct transactions but also as a temporary 
abode for purchasing power.   For instance, if the return on money is higher than the 
returns on other assets such as equity, bonds or durable goods which themselves serve 
as a temporary abode for purchasing power, individuals would prefer to hold money.   
Therefore, according to asset theorists, the decision to hold money is part of individuals’ 
utility maximization problem.  It is therefore highly likely that individuals could hold 
more money than they need for transaction purposes.  Judd and Scadding (1982, p.994) 
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state, “money and other assets were viewed as alternative ways of holding wealth, each 
yielding some mix of explicit income and implicit, or non-pecuniary, services flows.  In 
the case of money, these services presumably included the ease of making transactions 
that is at the heart of the transactions model.”  Hence, for asset theorists a stable 
relationship exists between broadly defined money, which includes time and saving 
deposits at the minimum (M2), and economic activities. 
2.3.1.1.2   Factors Determining the Demand for Money 
The second point of debate is what factors determine the demand for these monetary 
aggregates (M1 or M2).    Transaction theorists emphasize on the flow side of money.  
They argue that current income or total volume of transaction is the principal 
determinant of the demand for money, serving as a scale variable.   Regarding the 
opportunity cost of money, they argue that only short term interest rates, particularly 
interest income on short-term financial assets such as Treasury bills, serves as an 
opportunity cost of money [Tobin, 1956; Laidler, 1985; Judd and Scadding, 1982].  
Tobin (1956), for instance, argues that when individuals perceive that the disadvantage 
of holding transaction balances exceeds the advantage of holding it due to high interest 
rates, they decide to hold less money than average and make more frequent transactions.  
The general form of transaction theorists’ demand for money equation could be 
specified as follows: 
Md= f(y, r)P ……………………………........................................…….....…......….. 2.1 
where Md is the demand for narrow money, y is measured (current) income, r is the 
nominal interest rate for short term financial assets such as treasury bills and P is the 
general consumer price index. 
     On the other hand, the asset or portfolio theorists take the demand for money from 
the stock or the balance sheet perspective.  They argue that individuals hold money not 
only to facilitate payment but also as part of assets or wealth portfolio.  So, they prefer 
the scale variable to be some measure of wealth or permanent income (Friedman, 1970).  
With respect to opportunity costs, the asset theorists argue that the demand for money is 
affected by a variety of factors that influence individuals’ decisions to allocate their 
wealth among competing assets, money being one of them.   The decision to hold 
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money is, therefore, part of the utility maximization problem.  This implies that, not 
only the short term interest rate but also the long term returns to assets such as equity 
and bonds and expected return on durable goods are considered as opportunity costs.  
For instance, Friedman, one of the prominent portfolio theorists, formulates the demand 
for money function as follows [Friedman, 1970].   
Md= f(W, rm, rb, re, П
e, h; u)P ………… …………..................……...……................ 2.2 
where Md is the demand for money in nominal terms; P is the general price level; W is 
wealth; rm is the expected nominal rate of return on money; rb is the expected nominal 
rate of return on fixed-value securities; re is the expected nominal rate of return on 
equities; Пe is the expected rate of change in prices,  which is defined as [1/p][dp/dt]; h 
is the ratio of human to non-human wealth; and u is “a portmanteau  symbol standing 
for whatever variables other than income may affect the utility attached to the services 
of money” [Friedman, 1970 p. 204].  However, regarding the various interest rates, 
Friedman (1970) argued that since all of them move in the same direction, they can be 
represented by one rate ‘r’.  For empirical estimation, Laidler (1985) specifies 
Friedman’s demand for money function as follows.  
M= f(W, [r-r
f
], Пe, h; u) P ………………..................................…………………….. 2.3 
where M, P, h and W are as defined in equation (2.2), r is the representative interest rate 
and r
f
 is expected interest rate, which is defined as  1/r(dr/dt).   
2.3.1.2 Exogeniety of Money Supply 
The effectiveness of monetary policy also depends on the determinants of money 
supply.   A study of the demand for money is mainly to make predictions about the 
consequences of a change in its supply (Laidler, 1985).  So, exogeneity of money 
supply is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Keynesians 
argue that money supply is endogenously determined by government borrowing, and 
this makes it an ineffective monetary policy instrument. To illustrate this argument 
using a portfolio approach, let us assume that central banks want to increase money 
supply and one of the principal sources of the increase in money supply is government 
borrowing.  However, according to Keynesians, government borrowing increases net 
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financial wealth of individuals, and the return for money will go down relative to the 
returns to other assets.    This makes a reallocation of wealth among competing assets 
necessary.  Consequently, individuals shift some of their wealth from money to other 
assets, and end up holding lower money balances than policymakers intended to, while, 
on the other hand, interest rate rises above what the policy makers targeted.  When 
banks observe that individuals’ net wealth has increased, they would be encouraged to 
create more money, pushing the money supply up while pushing the interest rate down.  
So, from the illustrations, it is clear that the endogeneity of the money supply makes the 
demand for money function unstable through the simultaneity effect
31
.   Keynesians also 
invoke the liquidity trap argument to make their case about the ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy.   Hence, Keynesians are in favour of targeting the interest rate using 
fiscal policy rather than using money supply as monetary policy instrument.   
     Monetarists admit that the money supply could be endogenous in the short run, as a 
change in the rate of growth of money supply would trigger an adjustment process from 
the old equilibrium of nominal income to a new equilibrium.  For instance, Friedman 
(1970) explains that when the rate of growth of money supply gets higher than the trend 
due to the action of government to borrow money from the central bank, the action 
would induce a new adjustment process that would result in higher rates of growth of 
prices resulting mainly from an increase in the desired velocity of money, and a 
reallocation of wealth away from money balances.  This would end up in a nominal 
income growth that exceeds the rate of growth of money supply. However, in the long 
term, a new equilibrium will be established for the nominal income growth at a new rate 
of growth of money supply, while the equilibrium rate of growth of real income remains 
unaffected.  Hence, the monetarists argue that what is important for monetary policy is 
its long-term implication, as increase in money supply has a permanent effect on the 
stock of money [Friedman, 1970].  Currently, a general consensus seems to emerge on 
the long run exogeneity of money supply.     
                                                          
31
 Tobin argues that if government deficit financing occurs through money printing (called outside 
money), it would create new wealth of the private sector as long as it increases the stock of financial 
assets that are liabilities of the government.  An increase in wealth, in turn, would have portfolio 
allocation effect.  In addition, government spending would affect the demand for goods and services and 
therefore, it affects output. Others however argue that the effect of government borrowing on net wealth 
depends on how much government levied tax liabilities on individuals to repay interest expense.  If 
government debt is non-interest bearing, the effect of government borrowing on net wealth is full. If on 
the other hand it is interest bearing the effect will be partial [Laidler, 1985]. 
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2.3.1.3 The Stability and Importance of the Demand for Money 
Function 
The debate on the stability of the demand for money and the relative importance of the 
money supply over the interest rate as a monetary policy instrument is an empirical 
question and it all depends on two issues. One, how stable and predictable are the 
existing determinants of the demand for money:   for instance, if some of the factors that 
determine the demand for money are random and move unpredictably, the demand for 
money function becomes unstable.  Two, if money supply is endogenous, monetary 
policy becomes ineffective despite the fact that the existing determinants of the demand 
for money are stable and predictable because the newly introduced financial assets 
cause the money demand function to shift due to the new money substitutes. Judd and 
Scudding (1982) argue that the financial innovation in the 1970s, i.e., the introduction 
of a variety of money substitutes such as electronic money, debit and credit cards and 
improved capital mobility, created instability in the demand for money function of 
advanced countries.  As a result, some central banks re-examined the definition of 
money and tried to incorporate new monetary substitute in the monetary aggregate 
while others totally abandoned the use of monetary aggregates, and shifted to the 
interest rate as a monetary policy instrument 
32
[Kumar et al, 2010].    This claim has, 
however, been questioned by Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005), Rao and Kumar 
(2009b), Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2009) and Yu and Gan (2009).  Using the data 
from Asian countries, these authors have found no instability in the demand for money 
function, including the 1970s, using alternative estimation methods” [Narayan, et al, 
2009 p.1]. 
                                                          
32
   Poole (1970) suggests that central banks should target interest rate when the demand for money is 
unstable.  So, according to Poole (1970) “the selection of monetary policy instrument should depend on 
the stability of the demand for money” (Kumar 2011)  
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2.3.2 Criticisms of the Mainstream Theories of the 
Demand for Money 
Critics say that all mainstream theories on the demand for money are based on common 
assumptions that the markets for goods and finance are well developed.  So, deviations 
from full employment is a result of short run frictions such as price or wage rigidity, and 
mainly emanating from demand side of the equation.  The reality however is that in 
least developed countries, the labour and financial markets are underdeveloped and the 
goods market is less organized [see Agenor and Monteil, 1999].  So, during the period 
of rapid growth, the consequent structural transformation is expected to affect the 
organization of the labour and financial markets. The change in the organization of 
markets would be reflected in the expansion of banking services, introduction of new 
financial instruments, and integration of the less-monetized sectors into the monetized 
ones.   However, if governments of LDCs fail to recognize the reality on the ground and 
hence fail to take the necessary policy actions that could match the implications of the 
process of structural transformation on the structure of production and trade,  monetary 
policy could be less optimal and, consequently, economic growth could be impaired.
33
   
     Ignoring the effect of monetization implies that: one, in the long run, monetary 
policy could potentially underestimate the extent of the demand for money, and the 
economy could be underprovided with long-term liquidity, which could potentially be 
translated into real assets. Second, the economy would also miss the opportunity to 
speed up the process and create favourable conditions to enhance domestic savings.  
Mishra et al (2010) argue that weak institutional frameworks and a reduced role of 
securities markets weakens the effectiveness of traditional channels of monetary policy 
such as the interest rate, bank lending, and asset price in low income countries. 
      As discussed in the previous paragraph, during structural transformation, 
governments would get the opportunity to speed up the monetization process through 
such policy actions  as creating favourable conditions for increased access to finance 
and introducing new financial instruments (to encourage financial savings).  Reluctance 
by policy makers to recognize the effect of monetization costs those countries which 
                                                          
33
Khan (1980, p.37) argues that “Monetization of the economy is continuously expanding in developing countries.  It 
should therefore be an important determinant of growth in the demand for money over time. 
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aspire to achieve sustainably high economic growth as they miss the opportunity to 
deploy an optimal monetary policy that could further enhance growth and help sustain 
macroeconomic stability
34
[McLoughlin and Noriaki, 2012].   
     The other criticism is that the mainstream monetary theories place much emphasis on 
the utility side of money, which limits modellers from considering other potential 
determinants of the demand for money [Banafea, 2012].  Recent empirical research has 
identified at least three more important determinants of the demand for money – the 
exchange rate, the inflation rate and the foreign interest rate [Bahmani-Oskooee and 
Malixi, 1991 and Banafea, 2012].   For instance, Laidler (1985, p.118) argues “for open 
economies such as Britain and Canada, foreign interest rates appear to be relevant 
measures of the opportunity cost of holding money”.  Second, the exchange rate (and 
expectation about it) is found to be one of the most important determinants of the 
demand for money function in developing countries.  Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi 
(1991) argue that as many of developing countries pegged their currencies to one or a 
basket of major international currencies, their currencies fluctuate along with the major 
currencies as long as major currencies fluctuate against one another
35
.  Third, expected 
inflation rate is also found to be a significant determinant of the demand for money 
particularly in countries with history of high inflation [Laidler, 1985 and Bahmani-
Oskooee and Malixi, 1991].  Recently, a number of studies including Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Rehman (2005), Narayan, et al (2009), Arize, et al (1999) and Abdullah, et al 
(2010) specify the demand for money equation based on non-conventional theory that 
focuses on the services of money as shown in equation (2.4). 
 M= f(y, rd, rf, e, П)P ………………..………………………………….…….…..….. 2.4 
where M, P and y are as defined in equation 2.1; rd is domestic rate of interest, rf is 
foreign rate of interest, e is the exchange rate and П is the expected inflation rate. The 
                                                          
34 Wrong monetary policy would ultimately cost long term economic growth and macroeconomic stability. Similar to 
the 1970s in advanced countries, structural transformation might have started to affect the stability of demand for 
money in African economies.   Nonetheless, there are no studies in these countries particular on the determinants of 
the demand for money in the context of rapid structural transformation and monetization. 
35“The relationship between exchange rate and money demand was originally conjectured by Mundell (1963, p.484) 
who wrote ‘The demand for money is likely to depend upon the exchange rate in addition to the interest rate and the 
level of income.’ There are two major implications of this link, first, as discussed by Mundell (1963), if demand for 
money depends on the exchange rate, effectiveness of monetary policy could be reduced and that of fiscal policy 
could be increased”  [Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi, 1991 p.1378]. 
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relationship between the exchange rate and real money demand is indeterminate
36
. It 
could be negative or positive depending on how strong the forces of currency 
substitution are over the real balance adjustment
37
. For instance, when individuals 
perceive that the rate of depreciation is mild and it is intended to correct differences 
between domestic and foreign inflation, the demand for money could increase despite 
depreciation of the currency. On the other hand, when individuals perceive that the rate 
of currency depreciation is high and unpredictable, then they may prefer to hedge the 
value of their wealth by shifting to foreign currencies.  In the latter case, the demand for 
money and exchange rate would have negative relationship. The coefficient of the 
foreign interest rate (Rf) variable is expected to have a positive sign implying that an 
increase in foreign interest rate decreases the opportunity cost of holding money. On the 
other hand, the inflation rate (П) is expected to have a negative sign. During high 
inflation, agents quickly move away from holding money and prefer to buy durable 
goods as a hedge to inflation.  
2.4 The Theoretical Framework of the Augmented 
Model 
In section 2.3.2, we have seen that the major criticism of conventional theories and non-
conventional models is that they take markets as given. Individuals’ demand for money 
is determined either by a scale variable, which represents the transaction demand for 
money, or by the opportunity cost variables, which represent individuals’ willingness to 
sacrifice returns from holding other financial or real assets to hold money. Hence, it is 
possible to summarize these models by the following functional relationship. 
M/P = F(S, OC)……………………….....……………................................……..….. 2.5 
where M/P is the demand for real balances, S is the chosen scale variables (which is 
usually represented by current income (Y) or permanent income (Y
P
) in the literature, 
and OC is a set of opportunity costs of money such as the interest rate, inflation, the 
                                                          
36However, based on their empirical studies on 13 developing countries, over the period 1973I-1985IV, Bahmani-
Oskooee and Malixi (1991, p.1383) argue that “whereas short-run effects of a depreciation could be in either 
direction, its long-run effect are negative in most cases indicating that in most LDCs, depreciation causes a decrease 
in the demand for domestic currency”. 
37
It is to be noted that the exchange rate is defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency.   
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exchange rate. This approach fails to take into account the dynamics of monetary 
development in least developed countries during a rapid transition from a state of less 
monetized to more monetized economy. During a transition period, new individuals join 
the monetized economy on continuous basis and the demand for money is expected to 
see rapid increases.   
     The existing scale variables, such as in equation 2.5, do not capture the dynamics in 
its entirety for two reasons.  One, the scale variable is usually proxied by such macro or 
aggregate variables as measured income or permanent income, which fails to capture 
the change in the structure of the economy between sectors.  The argument is that as 
per-capita income of the rural people increases, people want to spend money on new 
goods and services that improve the quality of their lives.  In the rural areas, the 
improvement in the quality of life is mostly reflected in increased use of hired labour 
instead of own labour, use of modern transportation system instead of horsebacks, use 
of modern communication systems and electric power, and a tendency to include a 
variety of manufactured goods in their consumption baskets.   For instance, public 
investment in new road, telecom and electric power networks has made the services of 
these activities easily available to people, in the rural area, who can afford to pay.  As 
these goods and services are new, which were not parts of their consumption baskets, it 
implies an increase in demand for money, for a given income (in the rural area).  Hence, 
in this particular case, the decision to hold money is determined not by the level of the 
scale variable or the opportunity cost of money, but by the extent of transformation in 
the quality of life of this group of people.   Therefore, in the absence of a demand for 
money function that could capture the effects of the structural transformation process, 
the magnitude of the demand for money tends to be underestimated in LDCs.    Two, 
when countries are in a rapid economic growth dynamics, the process of structural 
transformation is so rapid that the model might be subjected to structural breaks, and, 
therefore, the demand for money function turns out to be unstable.   
     To this end, I have introduced a new variable that is meant to capture the structural 
transformation information in LDCs into the demand for money function.  This variable 
is expected to capture the effect of a rapid shift in the importance of the less-monetized 
sector (rural sector) in the determination of demand for money
38
.  Equation 2.6 below is 
                                                          
38 The rural sector used to have marginal effect on the demand for money. 
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the proposed augmented money demand function that incorporates the structural 
transformation information variable.  
M/P = F(S, ST, OC) ………………………………........…………..............…...……. 2.6 
where M/P, S, and OC are as defined in equation 2.5; and ST is a proxy to capture the 
effects of the structural transformation process in LDCs. 
2.5 The Link between Structural Transformation 
and the Demand for Money 
Since the 1990s, particularly in the last ten years, many African counties have been 
undergoing a rapid structural transformation: average rate of economic growth between 
2000 and 2011 exceeded 6 percent in the nine African countries
39
.  Moreover, the share 
of agriculture in GDP dropped significantly; urbanization has speeded up; and a 
significant part of the rural population has integrated into the modern way of life.  
Investments in infrastructure (including telecom, power and transport), education and 
health accelerated the integration process.   
     Structural transformation affects the demand for money in three ways.  One: the 
urbanization impact and shrinking of the information gap between the urban and rural 
people. First, urbanization process leads to a continuous decline in the share of national 
output which is produced by family labour (in subsistence agriculture), and replaces it 
with a monetized production system.
40
 Laidler (1985, p.47) argues that “the proportion 
of income actually involved in market transaction can change over time as economic 
units become more and more specialized and hence interdependent, producing less and 
less for their own consumption and more and more for the market.”  Second, having 
easy access to telephone, particularly mobile telephone, and road transport services have 
revolutionized the marketing strategies of the rural people. For instance, since the 
expansion of the mobile telephone services into rural areas, farmers in Ethiopia have 
begun to access up-to-date information about market prices of their main products.  As a 
                                                          
39 The nine countries include Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
40 Rapid economic growth intensifies the influx of rural labour to the cities attracted by wage (income) differences 
with the increase in the demand for unskilled labour in the construction sector, housemaids, manufacturing and 
services sectors (Lall, et al, 2006). 
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result, they have changed their marketing strategies substantially, particularly in terms 
of the timing of selling of their produces.  Hence, in the domestic market, relative prices 
have increasingly shifted in favour of agricultural products
41
. Two: the increase in the 
per-capita income of the rural people and better access to public infrastructure 
services
42
.  With the increase in per capita income, rural families begin to afford paying 
for hired labour, transport, telephone bills, health, and education.   The number of rural 
families who use hired labour during harvest and/or sow seasons is increasing.   Also, 
the number of people who use mobile telephones is growing fast in rural Africa.   
     Third: an increase in the importance of financial institutions in rural families.  As the 
importance of money for everyday transactions increases, the number of rural people 
who have savings accounts in the formal financial institution and rural microfinance 
institutions grows. For instance, in Ethiopia, the strategy to enhance access to finance to 
the rural population, particularly through expansion of microfinance services, has 
encouraged farmers to monetize their produces and deposit the surplus proceeds in 
monetary terms in formal financial institutions such as banks and MFIs. Moreover, the 
expansion of financial institutions has created the opportunity to access loans from 
formal financial institutions.  This has substantially changed the household financing 
strategy of most farmers, particularly by monetizing future produce during slack 
seasons. For instance, in Ethiopia, about 2.4 million individuals in rural areas were 
customers of MFIs and were confirmed to have savings accounts in the same in 2013 
(Borga, 2013). In Kenya, mobile banking is widely used to transfer money and pay bills 
in rural areas (Mbiti and Weil, 2011). These are all reflected in a rapid monetization 
process. Consequently, the rates of growth of the demand for money have been faster 
than the rates of growth of nominal GDP in most fast growing economies in Africa.  For 
instance, average M2/GDP ratio jumped from 18.2 percent in 1990 to 32.2 percent in 
2013 in the nine fast growing economies in Africa. Among the latter, the fastest 
increases in the ratio were registered in Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, in which the ratio 
jumped from 6.8 percent, 24.5 percent and 8.4 percent to 32.7 percent, 55.8 percent and 
24 percent, respectively. 
                                                          
41 For instance, starting 2006, seasonality of agricultural prices has disappeared. 
42 Expansion of road, electricity, telecommunication, health, and education infrastructure in semi-urban towns and 
rural areas integrated a significant portion of the rural families into the modern sector, which uses money in its 
everyday life.   
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Getting a proxy for Impact of Structural Transformation 
Getting a good proxy for the impact of structural transformation (ST) that fits into the 
demand for money function is a challenge.  The proxy should fulfil at least two criteria.  
One, it must be a variable that captures the change in the structure of the less modern 
part of an economy, relative to the modern one, i.e., transformation of part of an 
economy  from less monetized state to a more monetized one. Two, the variable must be 
measurable and predictable so that it could have policy relevance.   
     There are at least three candidates: one, the number of bank branches and 
microfinance branches operating in rural and small urban towns or the number of saving 
accounts by rural families; two, the ratio of agricultural GDP to non-agricultural GDP; 
and three, per-capita agricultural income (GDP). The number of bank and microfinance 
branches in rural and small urban towns could be a good proxy for monetization process 
because these are the institution that intermediate finance in the rural areas. People 
deposit their money, make payments, receive or transfer money through these 
institutions. The limitations, however, are that: first, getting a time series data for bank 
branches, disaggregated by rural and urban areas is difficult. For most African 
countries, the data for total bank branches, which is not even disaggregated, is available 
for less than ten years (see WDI database). Second, bank branch expansion could 
endogenously be determined by the demand for money itself. 
     The second potential proxy is the ratio of agricultural GDP-to-non-agricultural GDP.  
This indicator is expected to capture the growth in rural income relative to urban 
income.  The rise in rural income relative to urban income potentially indicates the rise 
in productivity in rural activities and/or increase in the demand for agricultural produces 
more than non-agricultural ones.   This implies rural lives are getting better and the rural 
people can afford to save and pay for transactions such as transport services, telephone, 
electricity, private schooling and also can afford to consume more and more 
manufactured goods such as clothing and processed food items.  Moreover, a long time 
series data is available at the UN statistical and the World Bank WDI databases.  One of 
the limitations of this indicator, however is, that since the numerator and the 
denominator are subject to different sets of shocks in different countries, it is difficult to 
identify whether the ratio has changed due to differences in relative sectoral growth 
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rates (a structural transformation process) or due to exogenous shocks such as drought 
and international price shocks. For instance, the effect of drought is more severe in 
agriculture than in industry or services.  
     The third potential proxy is per-capita rural income.  Rural per capita income 
measures how rapidly average income of the rural people evolves over time during the 
structural transformation process. This is a better proxy than the agriculture-to-non-
agriculture GDP for the following reasons.  One, since the chapter is interested to model 
the impact of the structural transformation process on the demand for money, rural per-
capita income carries such information that indicate the transformation of peoples’ life 
styles from a backward to a modern one, i.e., the transition process  from being a 
subsistence to self-sufficient and then to becoming a surplus economic agent.  The latter 
affects the demand for money in the process as new items begin to be incorporated in 
the rural people’s consumption baskets.   For instance, when rural income is at a 
subsistence level, the role of money is limited because there is less hired labour, less 
integration to the modern way of life, and also limited use of cash to pay for services 
such as telephone bills, electricity bills and transport fees, if these services exist at all.  
On the other hand, when rural people’s income increases, and people graduates to self-
sufficient and then to becoming a surplus economic agent, the demand for money is 
expected to exhibit continuous upward shifts, for a given income.  This is because the 
demand for money to acquire new items in their consumption baskets, such as to buy 
manufactured (processed) goods, to pay taxes, to pay transport fees, to pay telephone 
bills and to pay for labour services, continues to grow.   
     Two, the shocks to agricultural income are almost similar in most countries in Africa 
compared to the shocks to the non-agriculture sectors’ income. The most common 
shock to agriculture in Sub-Sahara African counties is drought.  In addition, 
international price shocks have similar effects in Sub-Sahara African countries, as most 
producers are price takers in the world market.  Hence, for this chapter, rural per capita 
income is used as a proxy variable, and the newly proposed augmented non-
conventional demand for money function with a structural transformation information 
variable, takes the following form:   
M= f(y, ST, rd, e, П)P …………..……………….....………………......................….. 2.7 
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where ‘ST’ is structural transformation information (monetization) variable, which is 
proxied by real per-capita rural income.  The other variables are as defined in equation 
2.4 above. 
2.6 Data Description and Analysis 
2.6.1 Description of Data 
For the empirical estimation, the panel incorporates nine African countries, which are 
selected based on the following four criteria.  One, the country must have registered at 
least 5 percent annual average economic growth in the recent 10 years (between 2002 
and 2011).     Second, the country must not be a member of a monetary union, and the 
monetary authorities are solely responsible to any monetary decision in the country. 
Third, the country has been categorized as a less developed country, by the United 
Nations, at one stage in the last 30 years, i.e., during the sample period. Finally, yet 
importantly, is the availability of sufficient data for a balanced panel data analysis.  
Accordingly, the following nine countries are included in the panel: Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.  
     The panel data covers the period between 1980 and 2011.   Annex 2.1 presents the 
definitions and sources of date used for empirical analysis.  For instance, data on real 
gross domestic product (Y) (and its components) and the GDP deflator (DEF) are 
obtained from United Nations National Accounts Database.  On the other hand, narrow 
money supply (M1), broad money supply (M2), and the consumer price index (P) data 
are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The chapter 
also uses the United Nations National Accounts Database to compute real per capita 
rural output (RUROUT).  RUROUT is computed as a ratio of real agricultural output 
(Yag) to rural population (RURPOP). On the other hand, the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database is used to obtain the real effective exchange rate (REER) and 
the domestic interest rate (r) data series.  
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2.6.2 The Choice between Permanent and Measured 
Income 
One of the controversial issues in the specification of the demand for money is whether 
it is plausible to use permanent income or measured income as a scale variable.  Hence, 
before proceeding to the different procedures of panel co-integration analysis, the 
chapter finds it appropriate to settle this question first.    
Permanent income (Y
P
) series is derived using the following adaptive expectation type 
model employed by Harris (1985) and Laidler (1985).     
Y
P
 =   β0 + β1Yt-1+ β2Yt-2+ β3Yt-3+ β4Yt-4+ β5Yt-5+ β0t ……......................….. 2.8 
where per capita real GDP is used as a proxy to real per capita income (Y) and and ‘t’ is 
time.  β0 and βi are constant and slope coefficients, respectively.  The subscript ‘t-i’ 
refers to the lag length.   Estimation results of equation (2.8) is presented in Annex 2.3. 
     Table 2.1 shows that the income and interest-rate elasticities possess the expected 
signs and the coefficient of Ln(Y) and Ln(Y
P
) are significantly different from zero.  The 
estimation results also indicate that, in terms of magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients, there are no major differences between the permanent income and 
measured income elasticities in both narrowly and broadly defined demand for money 
models.  Such a result is expected in least developed countries because personal savings 
are very low and consumption is mainly constrained by current income flows. 
Therefore, the rest of the chapter will proceed to use income (Y) as a scale variable.   
Table 2-1: Estimation Results of the Long run equation of the Conventional Model 
     Dependent Variable: Ln(M1/P)it Dependent Variable: Ln(M2/P)it 
  
Measured income 
(Y)  
Permanent Income  
(Y
P
) 
Measured income 
(Y)  
Permanent Income  
(Y
P
) 
Ln(Y)it 1.315 21.7*** 1.322 22.5*** 1.369 25.6*** 1.399 26.3*** 
rit -1.238 -4.241*** -1.286 -4.502*** -0.985 -3.388*** -1.019 -3.640*** 
Ln(REER)it -0.194 -3.845*** -0.210 -4.336*** -0.279 -6.168*** -0.282 -6.611*** 
ci -3.921 -2.466** -3.992 -2.591*** -4.248 -3.024*** -4.933 -3.555*** 
Obs. 269   269   274   274   
R
2
 0.983   0.985   0.985   0.987   
         * significant at 10 percent level 
       ** significant at 5 percent level 
     *** significant at 1 percent level 
67 
 
 
2.7 Structure of the ARDL Models and 
Estimation Results 
Having settled the choice of the scale variable between permanent and current income, 
the next step, before proceeding to conduct a cointegration analysis, is to confirm the 
time series properties of the variables.  As depicted in Annex 2.2, the unit root tests 
show that all the variables in the model, except the inflation rate (Infl), are found to be 
non-stationary in levels while, on the other hand, they are all  found to be stationary in 
first differences.        
2.7.1 The Economic Estimation Procedure 
The presence of a stationary series in the non-conventional models prevents the use of a 
residual based cointegraion technique. Therefore, for the empirical estimation, I will use 
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach, which is proposed by Pesaran et al 
(2001) for a long-run cointegration model in a situation where there are one or more 
stationary variables in the model.   A study by Gerrard and Godfrey (1998, p.235) finds 
that the ARDL approach provides not only better estimators of the long-run coefficients 
but also more reliable diagnostic procedures for the derived ECM than the Engle-
Granger variant. They also argue that although both Engle-Granger and ADL methods 
yield super-consistent estimators of long-run coefficients, because of small sample 
biases, the LM test for autocorrelation and the RESET test may be severely oversized 
when applied to the equation of the Engle-Granger variant.  
     The asymptotic theory that Pesaran et al, (2001, p.315) developed offers ‘a simple 
univariate framework for testing the existence of a single level relationship between the 
regressand and the regressors when it is not known with certainty whether the regressors 
are purely I(0) or purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated’. Therefore, following Peresan et 
al (2001), the theoretical demand for money models in equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.6) 
are estimated one-by-one using a short-run dynamic error correction method, which is 
specified as a single equation autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) format as follows: 
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∆Ln(Md/P)it = ∑α1j∆(Mdk/P)ijt-z-1 + ∑α2j∆Yijt-z+ ∑α3j∆Ln(PC_RUROUT)ijt-z + ∑α4j∆rijt-z+ 
∑α5jLnREERijt-z +∑α6jInfijt-z + α7[Ln(Mdk/P)it-1 + β0 + β1LnYit-1+ 
β2Ln(PC_RUROUT)it-1 + β3rit-1+ β4LnREERit-1 + β5Inflit-1]+ uit  ......................... 2.9 
where Md is nominal money demand; k is level of aggregation of money supply (either 
M1 or M2); P is the consumer price index; Y is a scale variable representing real GDP 
at market price; PC_RUROUT is real per capital rural output which is derived by 
dividing real agricultural output by rural population; and r is the nominal interest rate 
representing the opportunity cost of holding money.  Since the bond or equity markets 
are underdeveloped or non-existent at all in countries in the panel, the nominal short-
term interest rates such as central bank discount rates or short-term deposit rates are 
used.   u is the error term which is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2, i.e., iid(0, σ2).  REER is real effective 
exchange rate. The use of REER, instead of bilateral nominal exchange rate, in the 
demand for money function, was first forwarded by Bahmani-Oskooee and Malixi 
(1991). The subscript ‘i’ refers to country and j = 1 … n stands for explanatory variables 
included in the equation and z = 0…. Z counts over time-periods, with Z equal to the 
maximum lag.  α1j – α6j are the short-run coefficients, and βj are the long-run 
coefficients.  α7 is the speed of adjustment or the error correction term and the 
expression in bracket represents the long-run vector.   
     The null hypothesis, in equation (2.9), is defined as H0: α7 = 0, that is no level 
relationship or no cointegration, and is tested against the alternative that H0: α7 ≠ 0, 
using an F-test.  Pesaran et al’s (2001) bound testing approach provides lower bound 
and upper bound critical values for the F-statistics.  The lower bound assumes that all 
variables are I(0) and the upper bound that all variables are I(1). Accordingly, testing 
the error correction term, α7, against the critical values using a F-statistic tabulated in 
Pesaran et al, (2001) provides the answer as to whether there is a long-run relationship 
or not.  If the calculated t-statistic lies above the upper bound, the null will be rejected, 
and confirm the  presence of the long-run cointegrating vector in the model [Bahmani-
Oskooee and Rehman, 2005].   
     In the long-run vector, the slopes of real income (β1) and rural per capita income (β2) 
are expected to be positive while the slopes of the nominal interest rate (β3) and 
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inflation expectation variable (β5) are expected to be negative.  On the other hand, the 
sign of the REER coefficient is indeterminate.  It could be positive or negative 
depending on the extent of public confidence on monetary policy regime and the 
strength of the domestic currency in the respective countries.  If the public is confident 
about the intention and effectiveness of monetary policy and feel that the current 
depreciation is part of an  adjustment process to the long-run equilibrium, the demand 
for domestic currency increases following a depreciation of the currency.  This implies 
that the transaction demand effect outweighs the currency substitution effect in that 
country.   On the other hand, if people expect that deprecation of the currency is a move 
away from the long-run equilibrium and continues to lose confidence of the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, depreciation of the currency is expected to lead to a 
decline in the demand for money.  Except the nominal interest rate and inflation rate 
variables, all the other variables in the model are transformed into logs. The interest rate 
and inflation rate are expressed in percentage forms.     
     On the other hand, one of the drawbacks of estimating single-equation ECMs is that 
the approach is built on the assumption that all explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous. Particularly, since the model uses annual data, it is reasonable to suspect 
contemporaneous correlations.  Banerjee (1998, p.274) states that the weak exogeneity 
assumption is fairly well used in practice and allows for the presence of lags of the 
dependent and explanatory variables in the data generation process of the ARDL 
conditional model.  Durevall, et al (2013) argues that if the estimated coefficients are 
confirmed to be stable, we can use this fact as an indirect support for the use of single-
equation ECMs. 
     Equation (2.9) is estimated using panel cross section fixed effect model, with GLS 
weights assuming that the initial conditions in each country in the panel differs.  To find 
the parsimonious model with the appropriate lag length, I rely on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC).  In addition, due to the absence of a sufficiently long data 
series, the maximum lag length is pre-determined.  The lag length is set at 3 as the 
money demand equations are expected to have relatively quick convergence to 
equilibrium and have relatively large number of explanatory variables.     
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     Equation 2.9 is a nested model, which encompasses both the conventional model 
(equation 2.1) and the non-conventional model (equation 2.2). 
1/ If β3 = β4 = β5 = 0, equation (2.9) turns into the conventional money demand 
model (equation 2.1) 
2/ If β3 = 0, equation 2.9 turns into the augmented non-conventional money demand 
model (equation 2.2). 
2.7.2 Panel Co-integration Results  
2.7.2.1   The Augmented Non-conventional Model  
Table 2.2 presents the estimated coefficients and their respective estimated t-ratios of 
the short-run variables (αij) and long-run cointegrating vector variables (βj) of equation 
2.9. The table depicts that the error correction terms of both the narrowly defined demand 
for money model (Ln(Md1/P)it and broadly defined demand for money models 
(Ln(Md2/P)it are significant at 1 percent level and the overall fit of the models, as 
measured by the adjusted R
2
, are between 0.44 and 0.52. Moreover, all the explanatory 
variables of the long-run part of the model, including the structural transformation 
information variable – PC_RUROUT - are found significant at 1 percent, and all the 
variables are found to have the expected signs.  The speed of adjustment coefficient 
indicates that about half the deviation from long-run equilibrium would be corrected 
within one year in the case of broadly defined money demand.    
     Table 2.3 presents the normalized coefficients of the long-run money demand vector.  
The normalized coefficients of the explanatory variables are derived dividing the 
estimated coefficients of the respective long-term explanatory variables in the co-
integration vector by the coefficient of the error correction term in Table 2.2.    The 
table shows that the coefficient of the structural transformation variable (PC_RUROUT) 
is estimated to be 0.30 in the case of the narrowly defined demand for money model and 
0.43 in the case of the broadly defined model. This implies that a one percent increase in 
per capital income of the rural population  is expected to produce a 0.3 percent increase 
in the demand for narrow money while, in the case of broad money, it is expected to 
generate a 0.43 percent increase in the demand for money. This confirms the argument 
of the chapter that structural transformation is one of the important determinants of the 
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Table 2-2:  Short Run Dynamic  Cointegration Estimation Results of the Augmented 
Non-Conventional Model 
  With Structural Transformation Information 
  ∆Ln(M1/P)it ∆Ln(M2/P)it 
  Coeff. t-ratios Coeff. t-ratios 
Short run dynamics         
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-1 0.210 (2.166)** 0.198 (2.098)** 
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-2 0.052 (0.528) 0.079 (0.816) 
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-2 0.047 (0.483) 0.060 (0.647) 
∆LnYit 0.306 (1.280) 0.407 (1.951)* 
∆LnYit-1 -0.274 (-1.042) -0.360 (-1.584) 
∆LnYit-2 -0.465 (-1.776)* -0.156 (-0.695) 
∆LnYit-3 0.419 (1.541) 0.025 (0.109) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit -0.168 (-1.418) -0.118 (-1.095) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-1 -0.273 (-1.973)** -0.221 (-1.795)* 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-2 0.041 (0.298) -0.073 (-0.604) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-3 -0.107 (-0.826) -0.017 (-0.153) 
∆Rit -0.208 (-0.804) -0.078 (-0.496) 
∆Rit-1 0.557 (1.962)** 0.500 (2.620)*** 
∆Rit-2 0.419 (1.621) 0.413 (2.400)** 
∆Rit-3 0.066 (0.282) 0.142 (0.934) 
∆LnREERit -0.146 (-1.673)* -0.233 (-3.478)*** 
∆LnREERit-1 -0.003 (-0.041) 0.055 (1.022) 
∆LnREERit-2 0.024 (0.380) 0.085 (1.854)* 
∆LnREERit-3 0.024 (0.372) 0.030 (0.685) 
∆INFLit -0.471 (-5.790)*** -0.439 (-6.598)*** 
∆INFLit-1 0.155 (1.645)* 0.191 (2.248)** 
∆INFLit-2 0.122 (1.404) 0.152 (1.974)** 
∆INFLit-3 0.092 (1.197) 0.107 (1.669)* 
Conintergation Vector     
 
  
Ln(Md/P)it-1 -0.454 (-7.766)*** -0.510 (-8.426)*** 
LnYit-1 0.470 (5.983)*** 0.542 (7.276)*** 
LnPC_RUROUTit-1 0.137 (1.667)* 0.221 (3.098)*** 
rit-1 -0.928 (-3.027)*** -0.797 (-3.680)*** 
LnREERit-1 -0.191 (-3.875)*** -0.273 (-6.368)*** 
Inflit-1 -0.389 (-4.917)*** -0.467 (-6.698)*** 
Ci 1.152 (0.851) 1.105 (1.089) 
R
2
 0.538   0.605   
Adj.R2 0.435   0.519   
Obs. 204   209   
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demand for money models in fast growing African countries.  It implies that, assuming 
all the other variables in the model remain unchanged, on average, countries in the panel 
need to increase the broadly defined money supply by 0.43 percent for a one percent 
increase in real per capita income of the rural population to keep the money market in 
equilibrium.  
       Table 2-3:  The Long-run Coefficients of the Augmented Non-Conventional 
Model 
           * significant at 10 percent level 
          ** significant at 5 percent level 
        *** significant at 1 percent level 
     In line with the theory, the magnitudes of the income elasticities of demand for 
money are found to be near unitary, i.e., 1.03 in the case of the narrowly defined money 
demand model and 1.06 in the broadly defined one. The interest rate is also found to 
have the expected sign with a one percent level of significance.  Accordingly, a one-
percentage point increase in nominal interest rate is expected to lead to a 2 percent 
decline in money demand in the case of the M1 model, while a percentage point 
increase in interest rate is expected to decrease the demand for broadly defined real 
balance by 1.6 percent, in the broadly defined money demand (M2) model.   
     In general, the broadly defined model seems to perform better than the narrowly 
defined one.  For instance, the magnitude of the speed of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium increases significantly, from -0.45 in the M1 model to -0.51 in the M2 
model.  Moreover, the overall fit of the models, again as measured by adjusted R
2
, 
improves from 0.44 to 0.52.  This indicates that M2 is correlated with economic 
activities better than M1, in most of the African countries in the panel.     
  Narrow Money (M1) Broad Money (M2) 
Ln(M1/P)  1.000 
 Ln(M2/P) 
 
   1.000 
LnY  1.035*** 
 
   1.063*** 
LnPC_RUROUT  0.302***    0.433*** 
LnREER -0.421*   -0.535*** 
r -2.044***   -1.563*** 
Infl -0.857***   -0.916*** 
 C  1.152    2.167 
Speed of Adjustment -0.454***   -0.510*** 
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2.7.2.2 Comparison of the Three Models - The Conventional, 
Non-Conventional and Augmented Non-Conventional 
Models 
Table 2.4 presents estimation results of the three models, i.e., the augmented non-
conventional, non-conventional and conventional models. The results confirm that, in 
general, the non-conventional models perform far better than the conventional model in 
terms of overall fit, the expected signs, significance level of the coefficients and the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the long-run part of the 
model when compared with the theoretical motivations.   For instance, in the broadly 
defined money demand (M2) model, the overall fit of the model, as measured by 
adjusted R
2
, improves significantly from 0.16 in the conventional model to 0.50 in the 
non-conventional model and 0.52 in the augmented non-conventional model. With 
respect to the real income, which is the scale variable, the elasticity coefficient is found 
to be significant at one percent level in all the models.  However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is estimated to be 1.8 in the case of the conventional model while it turns out 
to be close to unitary in both the non-conventional and augmented non-conventional 
models in line with the theoretical arguments.  Interest rate is found to be insignificant 
in the conventional model while all the variables (including the interest rate) are found 
significant in the non-conventional models (with the expected signs).       
     On the other hand, a comparison between the two non-conventional models confirms 
that the augmented model, which has the structural information variable, performs 
better in many respects, including the magnitude of the speed of adjustment and overall 
fit of the model.  For instance, in the M2 model, the speed of adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium increases  
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Table 2-4:  Estimation Results of ARDL Based Short Run Dynamic Cointegration Models 
 Conventional Model   Non-Conventional Model  Augmented Non-Conventional Model  
 ∆Ln(M1/P)it ∆Ln(M2/P)it ∆Ln(M1/P)it ∆Ln(M2/P)
it 
 ∆Ln(M1/P)it ∆Ln(M2/P)it 
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-1 0.192 (2.469)** 0.208 (2.851)*** 0.195 (2.053)** 0.222 (2.261)** 0.210 (2.166)** 0.198 (2.098)** 
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-2 -0.058 (-0.747) -0.021 (-0.280) 0.056 (0.578) 0.081 (0.804) 0.052 (0.528) 0.079 (0.816) 
∆Ln(Mdj/P)it-2 0.011 (0.144) -0.002 (-0.022) 0.044 (0.459) 0.062 (0.643) 0.047 (0.483) 0.060 (0.647) 
∆LnYit 0.324 (1.826)* 0.403 (2.517)** 0.137 (0.784) 0.273 (1.903)* 0.306 (1.280) 0.407 (1.951)* 
∆LnYit-1 -0.202 (-1.025) -0.139 (-0.765) -0.417 (-2.208)** -0.330 (-2.115)** -0.274 (-1.042) -0.360 (-1.584) 
∆LnYit-2 -0.275 (-1.477) -0.025 (-0.147) -0.193 (-1.047) 0.015 (0.101) -0.465 (-1.776)* -0.156 (-0.695) 
∆LnYit-3 0.299 (1.695)* 0.137 (0.838) 0.341 (1.810)* 0.131 (0.849) 0.419 (1.541) 0.025 (0.109) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit         -0.168 (-1.418) -0.118 (-1.095) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-1         -0.273 (-1.973)** -0.221 (-1.795)* 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-2         0.041 (0.298) -0.073 (-0.604) 
∆LnPC_RUROUTit-3         -0.107 (-0.826) -0.017 (-0.153) 
∆Rit -0.168 (-0.760) 0.019 (0.133) -0.109 (-0.425) -0.005 (-0.032) -0.208 (-0.804) -0.078 (-0.496) 
∆Rit-1 -0.050 (-0.216) -0.133 (-0.814) 0.528 (1.871)* 0.419 (2.223)** 0.557 (1.962)** 0.500 (2.620)*** 
∆Rit-2 -0.070 (-0.313) -0.106 (-0.684) 0.397 (1.518) 0.325 (1.884)* 0.419 (1.621) 0.413 (2.400)** 
∆Rit-3 -0.342 (-1.618)* -0.328 (-2.347)** 0.001 (0.006) 0.055 (0.359) 0.066 (0.282) 0.142 (0.934) 
∆LnREERit     -0.134 (-1.709)* -0.201 (-3.439)*** -0.146 (-1.673)* -0.233 (-3.478)*** 
∆LnREERit-1     0.025 (0.365) 0.059 (1.195) -0.003 (-0.041) 0.055 (1.022) 
∆LnREERit-2     0.039 (0.636) 0.108 (2.466)** 0.024 (0.380) 0.085 (1.854)* 
∆LnREERit-3     0.042 (0.660) 0.036 (0.861) 0.024 (0.372) 0.030 (0.685) 
∆INFLit     -0.463 (-6.040)*** -0.519 (-7.885)*** -0.471 (-5.790)*** -0.439 (-6.598)*** 
∆INFLit-1     0.113 (1.224) 0.146 (1.628) 0.155 (1.645)* 0.191 (2.248)** 
∆INFLit-2     0.148 (1.699)* 0.118 (1.441) 0.122 (1.404) 0.152 (1.974)** 
∆INFLit-3     0.076 (1.008) 0.093 (1.424) 0.092 (1.197) 0.107 (1.669)* 
Conintergation Vector             
Ln(Md/P)it-1 -0.205 (-4.433)*** -0.161 (-4.247)*** -0.417 (-7.353)*** -0.429 (-7.426)*** -0.454 (-7.766)*** -0.510 (-8.426)*** 
LnYit-1 0.320 (4.495)*** 0.286 (4.129)*** 0.433 (5.905)*** 0.470 (6.661)*** 0.470 (5.983)*** 0.542 (7.276)*** 
LnPC_RUROUTit-1         0.137 (1.667)* 0.221 (3.098)*** 
rit-1 -0.165 (-0.707) -0.039 (-0.235) -0.810 (-2.682)*** -0.628 (-2.986)*** -0.928 (-3.027)*** -0.797 (-3.680)*** 
LnREERit-1     -0.139 (-3.219)*** -0.201 (-5.268)*** -0.191 (-3.875)*** -0.273 (-6.368)*** 
Inflit-1     -0.438 (-5.543)*** -0.494 (-6.368)*** -0.389 (-4.917)*** -0.467 (-6.698)*** 
Ci -2.111 (-2.416)** -2.372 (-2.842)*** 1.565 (1.213) 1.508 (1.614) 1.152 (0.851) 1.105 (1.089) 
R2 0.233  0.241  0.504  0.575  0.538  0.605  
Adj.R2 0.144  0.156  0.411  0.497  0.435  0.519  
Obs. 213  218  204  209  204  209  
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significantly, from -0.43 in the non-conventional model to -0.51 in the augmented non-
conventional one.  According to the augmented model, 51 percent of any deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium would be corrected within a year, while only about 43 percent of the 
deviation will be corrected within a year in the model without PC_RUROUT.  Relying on 
the demand for money model that does not have the structural transformation variable has 
at least two major implications. First, the model converges to the long-run equilibrium path 
less quickly than the one with the structural transformation variable. This might lead to a 
policy action that over-shoots or under-shoots the demand for money depending on the 
initial position of the disequilibrium, and therefore, has a monetary policy cost, potentially 
leading to demonetization of the economy, particularly the rural sector.  Second, without 
information about the magnitude of the impact, it is difficult for policy makers to determine 
or project ahead, the implication of the structural transformation process on the monetary 
policy.   In other words, for policy makers, it is difficult to estimate how much additional 
demand for money is created in a given year as a result of the structural transformation of 
the economy, which will particularly be reflected in increased specialization of the rural 
population in production and trade.  The latter enhances the role of money as a medium of 
exchange and as a store of value.    
2.8 Summary and Recommendation 
The chapter tries to provide theoretical arguments on how structural transformation process 
affects the stability of the demand for money.  It also tries to empirically test the 
significance of the variable, and analyze the magnitude of the impact on the demand for 
money using the selected nine African countries in the panel.  Estimation results confirm 
that monetization, measured by broad money-to-GDP ratio, is increasing fast in countries in 
the panel.   Therefore, countries that ignore the contribution of structural transformation 
process on the demand for money would fall into a less optimal monetary policy regime. 
The latter, in turn, is expected to affect the rate of growth of the economy due to a less than 
optimal rate of domestic savings mobilization and lower state of factor productivities. For 
instance, when the economy is monetized below optimal level, it constrains the rate of 
growth of specialization and division of labour in the less monetized economy.  
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Consequently, labour productivity will be lower.    Economies of the East Asian tigers such 
as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan were rapidly monetized during 
the periods of high economic growth, which were reflected in highest domestic saving-to-
GDP ratios in the world.    
     There are at least two lessons that we can draw for the African countries from the results 
of the panel estimations. One, governments of African countries should give proper 
attention to the possible implications of the structural transformation process on their 
countries’ demand for money functions, and consider them in their monetary policy 
frameworks [McLoughlin and Nariaki, 2012]. Two, it must be recognized that integration 
of the rural people to the modern production and trade system is unavoidable during the 
structural transformation process.   Hence, as this has a positive and significant contribution 
to the growth of demand for money, developing countries should try to create favourable 
conditions for easy access to modern financial instruments by devising a financial inclusion 
strategy that pays proper attention to the rural people.  
     In terms of the performance of models, conventional models are found to be less fitted 
to the African countries’ money markets.  Although the long run vectors are found to be 
cointegrated in the conventional model, the speed of adjustment is less than 0.21 in absolute 
terms in the M2 model.  Moreover, the conventional M2 model explains less than 16 
percent of the demand for money, as measured by adjusted R
2
.   On the other hand, the non-
conventional model is able to explain more about 50 percent of the variations of the 
demand for money.  The speeds of adjustments are also far higher than those in the 
conventional models (about -0.5 in the M2 model). 
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Chapter 3 
Evaluating Internal Consistency of Medium-
Term Growth Strategies Using a Modified 
Financing Programming Model: The Case of 
Ethiopia 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the medium-term growth strategy in Ethiopia 
using a financial programming framework.  Ethiopia has experienced a remarkably rapid 
and sustained growth in the past 10 years.  What makes its economic growth experience 
even more interesting is that the economy has not only been growing rapidly but has done 
so without experiencing income inequality, which is one of the biggest challenges of rapid 
growth episodes.  Few countries, mostly East Asian, have succeeded on the double criteria 
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of growth and equality [Todaro and Smith, 2009].  Between 2004
43
 and 2013, real GDP 
grew at an annual average rate of growth of 10.9 percent, and yet, according to World 
Development Indicators (2015), the country managed to keep the GINI coefficient stable at 
around 0.3 for the last 15 years since 1999.  Consequently, poverty incidence is reduced 
almost by half to 29 percent in 2011 from 56 percent in 2000 [UN, 2015].    
     Ethiopia experienced almost two decades of economic stagnation between 1975
44
 and 
1992.  The economy was barely growing at an average rate of 0.9 percent during the period.  
The first episode of growth acceleration started in 1993 when the country launched an 
economic reform program with the help of the IMF and the World Bank.  Between 1993 
and 2002, three successive reform programs were implemented.   As a result, average 
annual growth of real GDP jumped to 4.5 percent during period.  Since 2004, economic 
growth accelerated even further and the growth trajectory has shifted up to a double-digit 
growth path.  The government attributes the recent success to carefully designed growth 
plans and policies and its high commitment to eliminate extreme poverty. There were two 
development programs between 2003 and 2010. The first program, which was called the 
‘Three-year Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP)’ was 
launched in 2003.  This was followed by a ‘Five-year Poverty Reduction and Sustainable 
Development Program (PRSDP)’, which was launched in 2006 [Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2010 and IMF, 2011a and 2011b].  (Brief discussions of the programs 
are presented in section 3.3.3). 
     The successes of the first two development programs encouraged the Ethiopian 
government to launch a comprehensive development plan under the title of ‘the First Five-
Year Growth and Transformation Plan’ (GTP I) in 2011 to cover the period 2011-15 
[Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010 and IMF, 2011a, 2011b and 2011c].  The 
GTP envisages transformation of the economy from agriculture to a manufacturing base, 
and it is designed in line with the pressing objective of realizing the country’s aspiration to 
                                                          
43
All the years in this chapter refers to Ethiopian Fiscal Year.  For instance, 2004 means 2003/04, i.e., July 7, 
2003 to July 6, 2004.  
44
The year 1975 marks the fall of the imperial regime and takeover of power by the military junta, which was 
known as the Derg.  
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join the middle-income group the latest by the year 2025
45
.  GTP I sets an annual average 
real GDP growth target at 11 percent while containing inflation within single digits and 
gross international reserves coverage of not less than 2 months of next year’s imports of 
goods and services.  Although the economy managed to register double-digits growth rates 
with reasonably moderate inflation rates in the previous seven years (2004-2010), the 
government has realized that sustaining these achievements for the next five more years 
could not be taken for granted, as the economy already more-than-doubled during the 
period, and the macroeconomic policy challenges have become more complex.  
Particularly, the low level of domestic savings and shallow export base are expected to pose 
major challenges as the success of the plan heavily relies on investment in infrastructure 
and manufacturing sectors that require huge financing both in local and foreign currencies.  
In 2010, a year before the launching of the plan, domestic savings as a ratio of GDP 
amounted to 9.5 percent that covered less than half of the gross domestic investment 
[Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010].   Similarly, foreign exchange earnings 
from exports were barely enough to cover 41.3 percent of imports.  In the plan, domestic 
savings and exports of goods and services are targeted to reach 15 percent and 22.5 percent 
of GDP, respectively, by 2015.   
     To this end, the plan has laid out key macroeconomic and financial sector policy 
packages that give particular focus on domestic saving mobilization, export 
competitiveness and import substitution, curbing inflationary pressure, and maintaining the 
gross international reserves target.  For instance, among the main macroeconomic policies: 
the exchange rate is set to be kept close to equilibrium; the real interest rate is targeted to be 
positive or near positive, with ± 2 percentage points from headline inflation rate; and total 
government deficit financing is set not to exceed 3 percent of GDP.  Moreover, in the 
financial sector, new financial instruments such as saving bonds and additional contractual 
saving instruments such as private pension funds scheme are to be introduced, and policies 
                                                          
45 The broad objectives of the GTP are to (i) attain high growth within a stable macroeconomic framework; 
(ii) achieve the MDGs in the social sector; and (iii) establish a stable democratic and developmental state. To 
accomplish these objectives, the GTP identifies the following strategic pillars: (i) sustain rapid growth; (ii) 
emphasize agriculture; (iii) promote industrialization; (iv) invest in infrastructure; (v) enhance social 
development; (vi) strengthen governance; and (vii) empower youth and women [International Monetary Fund, 
2011 and Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010]. 
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are devised to encourage banks and microfinance institutions expand their branches to 
reach out communities in small urban and rural areas, respectively
46
.  
     Given the ambitious targets, the plan’s success depends on how well it is made 
internally consistent to deliver the desired outcomes [Khan and Montiel, 1989 and Bruce, 
1999], and whether it is possible to increase domestic savings by 5.5 percentage points of 
GDP within five years period.  Detailed discussions on the experiences of East Asian 
countries in raising the domestic savings rate to finance  investment and growth can be 
found in Kuijs (2005) and Jansen (2001) and He and Cao (2007).  Moreover, as the 
experiences of China and other fast growing East Asian countries indicate, sustaining the 
current double-digits growth for the next fifteen more years, 2011- 2025, by the end of 
which the country aspires to join the middle-income countries club, requires a substantial 
improvement in total factor productivity (TFP), in addition to factor accumulation [Chen, 
1997 and Wang and Yao, 2002].  World Bank (2009) finds that despite the substantial 
improvement in the business environment between 2002 and 2008, productivity remains 
very low in Ethiopia.  Hence, the question is whether   improving TFP is given due 
emphasis in the plan.   Wang and Yao (2002), Chen (1997), Young (1995), Arbache, et al 
(2008) and Islam (2006) discuss the role that TFP played to East Asian countries’ growth, 
including China in the last couple of decades.       
     The objectives of this chapter are therefore: first, to introduce a modified financial 
programming framework in the context of a developing economy that could simultaneously 
capture the major relationships between prices, the balance of payments and output.  
Second, using the modified framework, to analyze whether the announced plan targets in 
GTP I are achievable and the policy packages are internally consistent.  The choice of a 
financial programming model over the traditional macroeconomic model is for the 
following reasons:  First, unlike the traditional macro models, the financial programming 
framework, by design, works backwards from target to policies, following a standard 
planning approach, not the other way round.  Bruce (1999, p.2) says that “a projection 
model asks ‘what macroeconomic outcomes will result from a given set of policies?’ while 
a programming model asks, ‘what macroeconomic policies are required to achieve a given 
                                                          
46
The plan has also laid out other detailed sectoral policies. 
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set of outcomes? ‘The specified outcomes include targets for inflation and foreign exchange 
reserves, consistent with a commitment to macroeconomic stability.”   Hence, the FP 
framework is generally suitable for a planning exercise that assumes exogenously 
determined output and inflation targets
47
.  Second, the FP framework allows applying a 
technique similar to the incremental capital output relationship (ICOR) to identify the 
amount of investment required for the growth target. Third, the FP mode is built on the 
framework that links the financial sector with the balance of payments. Therefore, it 
comprises a set of behavioral and accounting equations that allows for drawing up analyses 
and forecasts of economic growth that are consistent with the whole macroeconomic 
framework.  This approach is commonly known as the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, and it is designed to ensure consistency between the monetary impact of policy 
changes and the desired balance of payments outcome [Khan, et al, 1990 p.156].  Fourth, 
the Model is convenient to solve for equilibrium values of alternative sets of policy 
instruments such as exchange rate, interest rate and tax rate consistent with plan targets, 
making discussion on alternative policy packages easy for policy makers. 
     The modifications of the model that are introduced in this chapter focus on two major 
limitations that the traditional IMF financial programming model is being criticized for, 
particularly in the context of developing countries.  Chapter 1 and chapter 2 of the thesis 
have dealt extensively with these limitations, and in view of addressing the shortcomings, 
alternative modeling frameworks are also proposed and estimated.  The first limitation of 
the traditional financial programming model that this chapter zeros in on is its reliance on 
the neoclassical assumption of constant returns to scale production function with capital 
assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns [Romer, 2006, Agenor and Montiel, 1999 
and Chen, 1997].  Second, the model also relies on the extreme assumption of constant 
income velocity of money based on the quantity theory of money [Reinhart, 1991].  
     Regarding the first limitation, the traditional FP framework assumes that long run 
growth is determined only by technological progress, which itself is determined 
exogenously outside the system.  Therefore, long-term variables such as population growth 
and savings growth would have only level effects on per capita output.  Moreover, the 
                                                          
47
In traditional macro models, long-term output and prices are endogenously determined within the model. 
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model assumes that government policies such as investment in public goods do not have 
growth effects. The main reason for these rigidities is that the neo-classical production 
function is built on the basic assumptions of absence of distortions such as positive 
externalities, economies of scale and monetization of the economy [Chenery, 1986 and 
Romer, 2006]. In the neoclassical model, factor inputs other than labor and capital are 
relatively unimportant in the production function, and labor and capital are paid according 
to their respective marginal returns.  As a result, there are no differences between the social 
returns and private returns of these factor inputs
48
. 
     A number of literatures however argue that, in developing countries, where a significant 
share of the labor stock is engaged mainly in low-skilled production activities in agriculture 
and service sectors, there is a room for continuous improvement in labor productivity - for 
instance, through specialization, education and training [Romer, 2006, Agenor and Montiel, 
1999, Chenery, 1986, and Feder, 1983].  They also argue that, government policies towards 
infrastructure development and export-led growth strategies generate positive externalities 
to the private sector by expanding the productive capacity of the economy, increasing the 
productivity of factor inputs - capital and labor, and creating economies of scale
49
.  Labor 
and capital earn less than their respective marginal products in those sectors that generate 
positive externalities such that the private sector would under-invest in them.  This implies 
that the equilibrium growth rate, in a competitive market framework without government 
policies (subsidies) such as investment in human capital and infrastructure output growth, 
would be smaller than the optimal growth rate
50
.  In other words, per-capita output growth 
is endogenously determined.  Therefore, in the modified framework, the production 
function is specified in line with an endogenous growth model that allows spillover effects 
                                                          
48
Romer (2006, p. 10) explains, “The assumption of constant returns can be thought of as a combination of 
two separate assumptions.  The first is that the economy is big enough that the gains from specialization have 
been exhausted.  In a very small economy, there are probably enough possibilities for further specialization 
that doubling the amount of capital and labor more than double output. … The second assumption is that 
inputs other than capital, labor and knowledge (technology) are relatively unimportant.” 
4949
Agenor and Montiel (1999, p. 679) argue, “The presence of externalities implies that if , say, one firm 
doubles its inputs, the productivity of the inputs of other firms will also increase.  Introducing spillover effects 
leads to a relaxation of the assumption of diminishing returns to capital”. 
50
Agenor and Montiel (1999 p.681) argues that proper government policies (subsidies)are important to 
address such market distortions and “to increase the equilibrium growth rate up to the level of the optimal 
growth rate”.  
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from growth in human capital, infrastructure services and exports as we modeled in Chapter 
1 above. 
     Second, in the money market, the constant income velocity of money assumption is 
relaxed replacing the quantity theory of the demand for money model with a modified cash-
in-advance model that incorporates a structural change, exchange rate and interest rate 
variables in line with the analysis in chapter 2 of this thesis. In high growth countries with a 
rapid monetization process, the income velocity of money exhibits a continuous decline 
[Reinhart, 1991 pp.22-23].  The implication of this modification is that, by taking proper 
policy measures, the government could enhance financial deepening and raise domestic 
savings rate taking advantage of the responsiveness of money demand to changes in the 
structural change, interest rate policy and/or exchange rate policy variables
51
 [McLoughlin 
and Noriaki, 2012 and Chenery, 1986].   
     The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows:  Section 3.2 presents motivation of 
the chapter followed by a brief historical background of the Ethiopian economy in Section 
3.3.  Section 3.4 discusses the basic theoretical foundation of a financial programming 
model.  The modified financial programming model is covered in Section 3.5.  This section 
presents a goods and services market, a money market, a foreign exchange market, and a 
model closure.  Section 3.6 describes data and methodology.  Estimations and interpretation 
of individual equations are presented in Section 3.7.  Section 3.8 presents model simulation 
and forecast results.  Finally, the chapter concludes by giving a summary and policy 
recommendations in Section 3.9. 
3.2   Motivations of the Research 
The last 10 years (2004 - 2013) economic growth performance seems to indicate that 
Ethiopia is well on track to achieve its ambition of joining the lower middle-income club in 
about 12 years, i.e., by 2025 by raising per capita income to about USD 1800.   The 
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Monetization implies that, on average, individuals and firms have seen increases in their holdings of real 
monetary assets per unit of income received.  This means monetization endogenously determines the savings 
rate.  Agenor and Montiel (1999, p.677) argues, “The assumption that the rate of growth of output is 
independent of the saving rates is also at variance with the evidence, which suggests that high-growth 
developing countries tend to have markedly higher saving rates (as well as higher investment rates and higher 
export volume growth rates) than middle- and low- growth countries.” 
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economy managed to grow by close to 11 percent annual average for a continuous 10 years 
and, consequently, per capita income was increased almost by three-fold from USD 114 to 
USD 340 at current exchange rate.  This has encouraged the government to declare that 
keeping the double-digit growth momentum is attainable.  Accordingly, the first Five-year 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) set annual average real GDP growth rate at 11.2 
percent, which is almost similar to the previous ten years’ achievements.  What is different 
this time however is the challenges that the economy is expected to face in keeping the 
growth momentum at the same level.   
     In the last ten years, double-digit growth was achieved without significant challenges in 
terms of both domestic and foreign financing because the investment programs were largely 
financed by booming exports and donor funds.  In addition, the financing need was not 
challenging, in terms of size, compared with the level of growth it generated, as a 
significant share of the growth comes from increase in agricultural productivity that needed 
much less financial resources, particularly foreign exchange.  A relatively small investment 
in smallholder farmers produced a big push in the sector.    
    When the GTP I was launched in 2011, however, the economy had already more-than-
doubled following seven years of continuous growth at 11.4 percent between 2004 and 
2010.  In addition, the ambition of the government to transform from agriculture to 
manufacturing-led economy changed the dynamics of the resource requirement.  
Transformation to manufacturing-led economy requires huge investment in industries, 
infrastructure and other services that facilitate production.  Foster and Morella (2011, p.1) 
argue Ethiopia’s “greatest infrastructure challenge lies in the power sector, where a further 
8,700 megawatts of generating plant are needed over the next decade, implying a doubling 
of the current capacity.  The transport sector faces the challenges of low level of rural 
accessibility and inadequate road maintenance.”  As a result, the plan projected the required 
investment-to-GDP ratio to rise to 28.2 percent by 2015 from 22.3 percent in 2010 (just to 
maintain the same level of growth registered in the recent seven years prior to the plan)
52
.  
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 Foster and Morella (2011) estimate that a sustained annual expenditure of USD 5.1 billion is required over 
the next decade (2011-2020) to address Ethiopia’s infrastructure deficit. 
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This pushes the resource gap from 12.8 percent to 18.8 percent given domestic-savings-to-
GDP ratio of 9.5 percent in 2010 [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010]. 
     Particularly, the foreign exchange demand seems to be the most challenging one.  In the 
five-year plan period, annual average foreign exchange demand to finance major 
manufacturing and infrastructure investment projects in the private and public sectors 
(excluding agriculture, services, other private manufacturing sectors and government 
budget)
53
 is projected at Birr 315.4 billion (USD 24.5 billion) [Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2010].  The latter is about four-fifth of the entire foreign exchange 
that the economy generated in the recent five years prior to the plan, i.e., 2006 to 2010
54
.  
To ease the foreign exchange constraint, the plan aims at increasing annual earnings from 
exports of goods by four-fold to USD 8.0 billion in 2015 from about USD 2.0 billion in 
2010 (which is 132 percent annual average growth).  However, based on the experiences of 
East Asian Tigers and China, not a few literatures argue that, accelerating export growth 
requires favorable initial conditions in terms of human capital and infrastructure, and the 
need to make continuous investment in these sectors, along with outward re-orientation of 
the economy [Todaro and Smith, 2009; Agenor and Montiel, 1999; Chen, 1997 and 
Easterly and Serven, 2003]
55
.  Therefore, accelerating export growth at such unprecedented 
rate is going to be very challenging for an economy, which has the weakest infrastructure 
network in Sub-Saharan Africa and which depends mainly on exports of agricultural 
commodities such as coffee, oilseeds and horticulture for more than 75 percent of its 
foreign exchange earnings
56
.  In 2010, total manufacturing exports accounted less than 5 
percent of GDP [NBE, 2014]. 
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The National Bank of Ethiopia forecasted additional foreign exchange equivalent to USD 54 billion the 
projected amount for major sectors is needed in GTP I period to finance agriculture sector, services sectors, 
government budget and other non-priority public investment projects [NBE, 2011]. 
54
During 2006-2010, the total foreign exchange generated, both through current and capital accounts of the 
balance of payments (including FDI), was estimated at USD 31.5 billion [NBE, 2011]. 
55
 Todaro and Smith (2009, p. 622) describes that “…for decades, Taiwan’s total exports grew at an annual 
rate of over 20%, and exports from South Korea grew even faster.  In both cases, this export growth was led 
by manufactured goods, which contributed over 80% of both nations’ foreign-exchange earnings”. 
56
 In between 2006 and 2010, mineral exports such as gold and tantalum accounted 15 to 20 percent and 
manufactured goods exports contributed less than 10 percent of the total foreign exchange earnings of good 
exports. 
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Therefore, this chapter is driven by the following three research questions: 
1. Are the declared policy targets, in GTP I internally consistent with the set of policy 
mixes announced in the plan? 
This question wants to check whether the announced growth target is achievable or not 
given the policy packages prescribed in the plan.   
2. Is it possible to raise domestic savings rate from 9.5 percent to 15 percent during GTPI, 
in a space of 5 years?  
Unlike the traditional FP model, the MFP framework is not bound by a constant savings 
rate assumption.  Therefore, the chapter wants to assess whether the savings target 
announced in the plan is achievable or the country faces unsustainable current account and 
fiscal financing gaps. 
3. Is it possible to sustain the accelerated growth scenario until 2025 when Ethiopia will 
achieve its vision of joining middle-income countries’ club?   
In 2010, the government announced its resolve to sustain the pace of economic growth 
registered in the last seven years until the vision to bring Ethiopia to the lower middle-
income status is achieved [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010].   Hence, going 
to the future, the chapter wants to assess potential challenges and opportunities, particularly 
in terms of financing of investment.  To this end, the chapter will simulate forecasts for the 
period (2014-2025). 
3.3   Brief Historical Background of the Economy 
3.3.1   The Socialist Regime (1975 – 1991) 
Between the second half of the 1970s and early 1990s, Ethiopia’s economy experienced 
abysmally low economic growth and severe macroeconomic imbalance since the country 
starts to produce national statistics.  When the educated section of the society led by the 
then Haile Selassie University students started to revolt against the imperial regime in the 
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late 1960s, the aim was to replace the backward feudalistic socio-economic system by a 
modern and progressive one.  However, at the height of the revolution, the military junta, 
known as the Derg, which was relatively organized and had military power hijacked the 
movement and declared a soviet-style socialist system in 1975.  All private land and private 
capital whose value worth greater than Birr 500, 000 (about USD 241,000
57
) were all 
nationalized.  Consequently, the production systems were organized in such a way that the 
main factors of production, land, labor
58
 and capital are allocated according to national 
plan.  The (then) Office of National Commission for Central Planning (ONCCP) centrally 
determined prices of labor, capital, financial services, and basic consumer items [Ayalew, 
2001].  For instance, farmers were obliged to sell a certain portion of their basic food items 
such as teff
59
to the government at fixed prices, which were set well below the market 
prices
60
.   
    Monetary and fiscal policies were relegated to supporting the centrally planned economy 
with financial institutions serving principally to meet the demand for credit by the central 
government and the public enterprises [Mohamed, 1996 and Geda 2001].  Monetary control 
was exercised directly, with bank credit allocated to accommodate plan targets.  Interest 
rates and other market related instruments played limited role as transmission mechanisms 
for monetary policy.  The private sector had been virtually denied access to credit.  This is 
because government and public enterprises had been given first claim on financial 
resources even though they were used mostly for unproductive purposes.  Increased 
reliance of the budget on central bank financing, injected record amounts of high-powered 
money creating liquidity overhang in the economy.  Consequently, inflation hit 21and 22 
percent in 1991 and 1992, respectively, despite the regime’s fixed commodity prices and 
fixed exchange rate policies.  Higher inflation also led the private sector to be engaged 
mostly in speculative activities rather than productive ones [Zeidy, 1994]. 
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Using the Birr/USD exchange rate of 2.07 in 1975. 
58
For instance, the ONCCP assigns university graduates to ministries and other government institutions 
irrespective of their will or type of trainings [Ayalew, 2001]. 
59
Teff is a kind of cereal which is also staple food in Ethiopia 
60
In general, almost all market incentives for investment and production were removed and replaced by 
central planning.   
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    Over the 17 years, the economy contracted in per capita terms by 1.9 percent on average 
per annum
61
.  Despite various subsidies to boost exports and excessive control on imports 
through quantitative and tariff barriers
62
, trade deficit continued to widen and reached -5.6 
percent in 1991as percentage of GDP from a surplus of 1.4 percent in 1974.  As a result, 
gross international reserves in months of next year imports of goods and services coverage 
went down to about three weeks by 1991. 
     As the foreign exchange and budget financing constraints intensified, the economy was 
forced to operate well below capacity. Towards the end of the Derg regime industries were 
estimated to operate less than 60 percent of their capacity due to shortage of imported raw 
materials and spare parts [Ayalew, 1994].  On the other hand, due to high share of recurrent 
expenditure in the budget, including on the military, roads, schools and hospitals barely got 
finance for maintenance let alone for investment in new infrastructure.    On the political 
front, the regime’s repressive and highly centralized system, in a country where there are 
more than 80 ethnic groups, led people to raise up arms and fight for their democratic 
freedom.  Finally, both the economic and political pressures forced the regime to collapse 
in 1991 and replaced by a new government.  
3.3.2   IMF Supported Economic Reform (1993 -2002) 
When the new government led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) 
took over power in 1991, despite its socialist background during its life as a guerilla-
fighting group, it did not take long to realize that the socialist economic policy did not work 
and that the economy needed strong overhaul.  In 1991, real GDP declined by 1.8 percent; 
annual headline inflation reached 22 percent; exports of goods and services declined by 
30.7 percent; and, gross international reserves were barely enough to cover 3 weeks of 
imports of goods and services.  Therefore, in the economic front, correcting the 
macroeconomic imbalance to curb inflationary pressure and boosting the country’s gross 
international reserves to a sustainable level and undertaking structural reforms to help 
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Real GDP was growing by an average annual rate of growth of 0.9 percent while population was estimated 
to grow by 2.8 percent on average. 
62
For some goods import tariffs exceeded 200 percent. 
89 
 
 
rebound economic growth became one of the long lists of priorities of the incumbent 
government.  Consequently, in October 1993, an IMF-World Bank led Three-year 
Structural Adjustment and Economic Stabilization Program was launched [The 
Government of Ethiopia, 1998].   
    As is customary with a Fund supported adjustment program, the first task was to stabilize 
the economy, i.e., lower the rate of inflation, restore international competitiveness, reduce 
the current account of deficit, and check the loss of international reserves [Dercon, 2002 
and Tashu, 2003].  Accordingly, a range of policy reforms was introduced.  For instance, in 
October 1993, the Birr was devalued by 142 percent and subsequently allowed to be 
determined by a direct weekly auction system; price controls on commodities were lifted, 
import tariff bands were narrowed and rationalized; the nominal interest rate was raised to 
10 percent from 6 percent.  Credit ceilings were imposed on banks to mop up liquidity 
overhang.  Moreover, measures to privatize selected loss-making public enterprises were 
introduced [Ayalew, 1994].   
     The reform program succeeded in bringing down inflation, improving the external trade 
balance by restoring international competitiveness, and rebuilding international reserves 
[The Government of Ethiopia, 1998].  At the end of the first year of the program, in 1993, 
annual average headline inflation was brought down to 7.7 percent from 21.9 percent in 
1992 even 4.3 percentage points lower than the program target.  Moreover, it declined 
further to 3.3 percent in 1994.  On the other hand, exports rebounded by an annual average 
rate of growth of 60 percent over the three-year program period against 9.8 percent annual 
average decline in the preceding three years (before the program).  During 1993-2002, the 
economy registered an average annual rate of growth of 4.5 percent.  
3.3.3   Pre-GTP-I Development Programs: 2003 – 2010 
As fiscal consolidation was given priority in almost all of the three successive IMF-led 
programs, implemented between 1993 and 2002, there was no explicit program that targets 
public infrastructure such as roads, power and telecom and/ or health and education.  As a 
result, the productive capacity of the economy, particularly in terms of the quality and 
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quantity of infrastructure, showed little change from where it was in 1992.   For instance, 
the total number of university graduates in 2001 was only 4,403, and net enrollment rate at 
primary level was 63.8 percent despite the rapidly growing population [Ministry of 
Education, 2015] while, in the physical infrastructure side, road density and total electricity 
installed capacity were only 30.3 per 1000 square km and 714 MGWs, respectively [IMF, 
2011].  Given the potential of the economy, the government did not find the 4.5 percent 
annual average growth of the economy registered during 1993-2002 something to celebrate 
for a country that had been contracting at an average rate of 1.9 percent per annum in per-
capita terms
63
 for almost two decades prior to 1993. 
     Therefore, the government openly criticized the belief in the IMF-led reform programs 
that economic stabilization and structural adjustment policies would have a strong 
trickledown effect on growth through efficient allocation of productive resources and 
attractive investment environment ensuing the stability of the macro economy.  The growth 
outturn did not satisfy its ambition to pull the economy out of abject poverty and embark on 
a high and sustainable economic growth path. Consequently, in 2003 government 
introduced a new three-year economic growth strategy called Sustainable Development and 
Poverty Reduction Program, and was subsequently followed by a five-year plan of Poverty 
Reduction and Sustainable Development Program (2006- 2010) [Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 2010 and World Bank, 2005].   
     The above two programs gave explicit focus on enhancing the economy’s potential 
growth rate through increased investment on building physical and social infrastructure and 
raising productivity in agriculture.  Annual average investment-to-GDP ratio jumped to 24 
percent between 2003 and 2010 from 20 percent in the last 7 years (1995-2002) prior to the 
plan.  Consequently, real GDP growth embarked onto a new trajectory. For instance, annual 
average real GDP growth reached 11.4 percent between 2004 and 2010
64
, and merchandize 
exports growth surged to 23.5 percent from the previous seven years’ average of 6.3 
percent. In the infrastructure area, a total of about 11,000 km of high way roads, excluding 
new rural roads, were added to the national road network and the number of state owned 
                                                          
63
Annual average population growth was estimated at 2.8 percent [Central Statistics Agency, Statistical 
Abstract, 1996]. 
64
Real GDP shrank by about 3 percent in 2003 due to the severe drought that happened in the country. 
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universities more than doubled from 9 to 22 in the space of the five years between 2005 and 
2010.  
     In the money market, however, the new high-growth scenario came with new challenges 
as pressure from the surge in domestic aggregate demand (resulting from continuous strong 
economic growth) built up. In combination with frequent changes in the dynamics of 
international food and fuel prices, it led to the annualized average national inflation 
jumping from 4.2 percent between 1997 and 2006 to 20 percent during 2007 to 2010.  
Despite the fact that the government succeeded in bringing inflation back to a single digit in 
2009 and 2010, it has continued to pose a significant challenge to the monetary authorities.  
Consequently, the real exchange rate appreciated forcing the government to devalue the 
Birr by about 40 percent in a space of two years, from Birr 9.24/USD in 2008 to Birr 
12.9/USD in 2010. 
3.3.4   The First Five-Year Growth and Transformation Plan: 
2011-2015 
Having the successful experience of the previous two development programs, this time the 
Ethiopian government has set out a clear vision for the country that tries to spell out clear 
macro and micro-level growth and transformation targets.  The first Five-year’s Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP I) envisages transformation of the economy from 
agricultural to manufacturing base, and consequently, realize the government’s vision of 
joining the middle-income group the latest by the year 2025.  In the plan, annual average 
real GDP growth target set at 11.2 percent; inflation to be contained within single digit and 
gross international reserves coverage in months of next year’s imports of goods and 
services is targeted not to go lower than 2 months.  Policy packages and strategies targeted 
to achieve the plan targets are also announced.   
     Industry is forecast to grow at an annual average rate of 20 percent followed by services 
(10.6 percent) and agriculture (8.6 percent) [Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010 
and IMF, 2011a and 2011b].  Recognizing the implication of these targets on the demand 
for power and other infrastructure, government plans to quadruple electricity generation 
92 
 
 
capacity from about 2000 MGWs in 2010 to 8000 MGWs, and extend the total length of 
roads from 48, 800 kilometers in 2010 to 64,500 kilometers (32.2 percent increase) by 
2015
65
.  During the same period, the railway network is planned to reach 2395 kilometers 
from zero
66
; mobile phone network access to grow from 8.7 percent to 45 percent; total 
drinking water coverage from 68.5 percent to 98.5 percent; primary school net participation 
rate from 87.9 to 100 percent and health service coverage from 89 percent to 100 percent.  
To this aim, the plan forecasts the required investment-to-GDP ratio to grow to 28.2 percent 
by 2015 from 22.3 percent in 2010.  Total foreign exchange demand in the five-year’s plan 
period (including private, budget and non-budgetary public sectors) is also forecast at about 
USD 78.5 billion.  The latter is almost 2.5 times the total foreign exchange that the 
economy managed to generate between 2006 and 2010.    
3.4  The Basic Theoretical Foundation of Financial 
Programming Model 
Khan and Montiel (1989)’s growth oriented financial programming model is borne out of 
IMF’s monetary approach to the balance of payments model originally developed by Polak 
(1957) and World Bank’s ‘two-gap growth’ model formally known as Revised Minimum 
Standards Model (RMSM).  IMF maintains the financial programming framework to help 
countries with inflationary pressure and balance of payments crises whereas the World 
Bank model focuses on establishing external financing needs in relation to medium-term 
growth targets
67
.  The merged model therefore has three policy objectives: international 
reserves, inflation and growth.  The model also employs a selected number of policy 
instruments such as domestic credit, exchange rate, tax, government consumption and 
availability of external financing (Bruce, 1999 and Khan and Montiel, 1989).  Khan and 
Montiel (1989, p.279) argue that “a healthy and sustained rate of economic growth is 
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 Rapid transformation of the economy from agriculture to manufacturing base along with the continued fast 
integration of the rural economy is expected to aggravate the existing gap in power and transport.  
66
The old railway network which extends from Djibouti to Addis Ababa has already ceased operation due to 
old age. 
67
The model identifies financing gap given the required level of investment and domestic saving capacity.  
Therefore, it helps to estimate the level of foreign assistance required.   
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central to an adjustment strategy intended to achieve long-term viability in the balance of 
payments and a permanent reduction in the rate of inflation.”  The main intention of the 
model is, therefore, to give a conceptual framework that incorporates the most important 
macroeconomic policy instruments and targets, and at the same time could be tailored to 
the circumstances and structural characteristics of the individual country.   
     During the 1980s and 1990s, financial programming was widely used by the IMF to 
design macroeconomic policies for countries with domestic macroeconomic instability and 
external shocks such as capital account crises [Bruce, 1999 and Allen, 2004a&b].  
Granville and Mallick (2005) ascribe the basis for the simplified framework to Polak 
(1957).  Since Polak , a number of other Fund economists have contributed to the 
development of the framework, including Khan and Montiel (1989), Khan, Montiel and 
Haque (1991), Mikklesen (1998), Allen (2004a and 2004b).  Polak (1957) squarely 
attributes balance of payments disequilibria to excessive domestic credit expansion.  This 
arises from the fact that consolidated balance sheet of the banking system (in flow) holds 
the basic relationships between change in money supply (∆MS), change in international 
reserves in foreign currency (∆R) and change in domestic credit (∆D) in its identities as 
follows: 
∆MS = ∆D + E∆R, 
where E is the nominal exchange rate, which is assumed fixed.  In the relationship, R and 
M are endogenous and D is a policy variable, exogenously determined by monetary 
authorities.  On the other hand, the flow of demand for money assuming velocity of money 
constant could be expressed as: 
∆MD = ʋ∆Y, 
where ʋ is the inverse of income velocity of money, MD money demand, Y is nominal GDP 
and ‘∆’ is the difference operator.  The money market is required to be in equilibrium in 
flow (not necessarily in stock) (Khan and Montiel, 1999) so that: 
∆MD = ∆MS = ∆M, 
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For this simple model, we assume real capacity output (Ῡ) is exogenously determined68, 
and we get the following expression: 
∆Y ≈ ∆PῩt-1 + Pt-1∆Ῡ, 
where P is domestic price index.  We can now substitute the real capacity output equation 
into equation the demand for money function.  Using the equilibrium relationship in the 
money market (∆MD = ∆MS), we arrive at the change in international reserves equation as 
follows:   
E∆R = ʋ∆PῩt-1 +ʋPt-1∆Ῡ - ∆D  
The change in international reserves is the fundamental equation of the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments.  The equation demonstrates that the balance of payments is 
expressed as the difference between the private sector’s flow of demand for money and the 
flow of domestic credit.  Hence, an increase in domestic credit, which is exogenously 
determined by the monetary authorities, would be offset by a decrease in international 
reserves. This implies domestic credit determines the fates of both domestic liquidity and 
balance of payments positions of a country [Granville and Mallick, 2005].  In addition, the 
government balance sheet, which is commonly known as the fiscal account, is also drawn 
into the relationship through its financing identity
69
.  However, there is a common 
misconception that the emphasis on money and monetary policy in determining balance of 
payments outcomes implies that adjustment programs are ‘monetarist’ in character.  Rao 
and Kumar (2009) argue that the concentration on monetary flow could arise at least from 
two grounds: one, the balance of payments is essentially a monetary phenomenon and two, 
the monetary identity contain important macroeconomic information. 
     Since Polak (1957), a number of Fund economists contributed to the development of the 
framework including Khan and Montiel (1989), Mikklesen (1998), Allen (2004a and 
2004b).  One of the acclaimed features of the financial programming model is its 
simplicity.  Reinhart (1991) points out that the model is sufficiently simple to allow its 
application where data are limited.  In addition, a programming exercise starts with the 
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In the merged IMF-World Bank model, real GDP is defined as a capacity-output determined by a fixed 
coefficient Harrod–Domar production function.  Discussion on the determination of capacity output is found 
in section 3.5. 
69
 In the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system, domestic credit is the sum of private credit (Dp) 
and government credit (Dg). 
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objectives and derives the corresponding policies, with an emphasis on consistency.
70
 In 
other words, unlike the traditional macroeconomic model, an FP model searches for the 
appropriate sets of policy instruments that helps to achieve the desired policy targets such 
as: long-term growth, inflation and international reserve.  On the other hand, traditional 
macroeconomic models search for a set of variables such as equilibrium output, inflation 
and international reserves given available resources and policy instruments.  In the latter 
case, potential growth rate, inflation and gross international reserves are treated as 
outcomes of the model, not as targets.  Explaining the difference between the two 
approaches Bruce (1999, p.2) says that “a projection model asks ‘what macroeconomic 
outcomes will result from a given set of policies?’ while a programming model asks, ‘what 
macroeconomic policies are required to achieve a given set of outcomes?’  The specified 
outcomes include targets for inflation and foreign exchange reserves, consistent with a 
commitment to macroeconomic stability.”  
     In this chapter, I follow the Mikkelsen (1998) approach of a financial programming 
model with structural equations.  Mikkelsen (1998) develops a structural equation based 
financial programming model using El Salvador’s data.  The model has a goods and 
services market, a money market, a foreign exchange market and short-term supply and 
price determination blocks.  Mikkelsen also applies the usual financial programming 
closures.  Potential GDP, long-term inflation and gross international reserves are pre-
determined targets in his model.  However, in line with the analysis in Chapter 1 and 2, I 
have made two major modifications to the standard IMF model.  First, in the goods market, 
I have replaced the neo-classical production function with an endogenous growth model in 
line with the model in Chapter 1.  Second, in the money market, a modified cash-in-
advance money demand model consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2 replaces the 
quantity theory of the demand for money model.  Hence, in the modified financial 
programming model constancy assumptions of saving rate and velocity of money are 
                                                          
70“The consistency conditions are manifest in an interdependent set of macroeconomic accounting identities, 
including national accounts, the balance of payments accounts, financial-sector balance sheets, and the 
government budget constraint. Values of the various model parameters also have to be consistent with the 
structure of the economy and the designated policy objectives” (Bruce, 1999 p.2)    
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relaxed.  The saving rate is assumed an increasing function of income whereas income 
velocity of money is a decreasing function of income. 
3.5   The Modified Financial Programming (MFP) 
Model 
The model is a simple macro model of a developing economy, with a goods and services 
market, a money market and a foreign exchange market.  The markets are presumed to 
clear based on demand and supply interactions.  However, unlike the traditional financial 
programming model in which equilibrium is instantaneous, in this model, by construction, 
the money and foreign markets are isolated from the effects of the goods market 
disequilibrium through endogenously determined financing gap variables, which are 
discussed below and, in addition, in section 3.5.2.3, section 3.5.4 and section 3.5.5 
[Mikkelsen, 1998 and IMF, 2007].  Any disequilibrium in the goods market is reflected as 
financing gaps, i.e., saving-investment and foreign exchange financing gaps, instead of 
directly affecting the money and foreign exchange markets.  That is, the model assumes the 
attainability of the planned growth target and ensures through the acquisition of additional 
foreign savings.  The money market is assumed to clear with a lag determined by the 
magnitude of the adjustment coefficient in the short-run dynamic error correction money 
demand equation.  On the other hand, the foreign exchange market is assumed to clear at all 
times.  In this model, the exchange rate is fixed. 
     The long-term supply of products in the goods and services market is determined 
according to an endogenous growth production function that allows spillovers from 
infrastructure output and export growth in line with Chapter 1 of this thesis.  Moreover, a 
spillover from investment in human capital is incorporated.  The extent of all these 
spillover effects is endogenously determined using the respective behavioral equations.  
The long-term supply curve is assumed to be vertical while the short-term supply curve is 
upward sloping, so that the short-term supply of goods and services can differ from the 
long-term supply, with a corresponding divergence between short-term inflation and the 
long-term inflation target. 
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     On the demand side of the goods and services market, private consumption, exports and 
imports of goods and services are defined by behavioral equations.  Government 
consumption and government investment are treated as exogenously determined by policy.   
Private investment is determined as a residual between total required level of investment, 
which is determined by incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) technique, and public 
investment.  The simple investment-output relationship, in the Revised Minimum Standard 
Model (RMSM), i.e., ∆Kt= ρ(Yt
T
 – Yt-1), where ρ is the ICOR ratio, Y
T
 is target output and 
Yt-1 is actual output one year lagged, could be traced back to earlier growth models of the 
Harrod-Domar variety[Khan, et al., 1986].  RMSM relies on a savings rate and a given 
capital-output ratio to determine feasible levels of growth.  If domestic saving is inadequate 
to meet the required investment needs of the economy for a target growth rate, that growth 
rate can be achieved only if foreign savings are available to make up the difference: if 
foreign savings fall short of the difference between domestic savings and the required level 
of investment, the target for growth cannot be achieved.   
     In financial programming models, a relatively general production function that allows 
for factor substitutions is allowed.  Hence, in the FP case, the constancy of the ICOR arises 
from the assumption that the ratio of wages to the return on capital remains constant
71
.  
Khan, et al (1986, p.25) argue, “Dropping the assumption of fixed factor proportion for a 
smoother neo-classical production function allows knife-edge solution to be less likely”.    
     Short run prices are determined in the money market through money demand and supply 
equilibrium.  The demand for money is a behavioral equation similar to the one specified in 
chapter 2 except that the inflation expectations variable is moved to the short-run price 
determination block.  The demand for money is subjected to a continuous monetization 
process with a declining income velocity of money.  On the other hand, the money supply 
is determined as a product of the money multiplier and the supply of high-powered money.  
In the long-term, the money supply is set to be consistent with the inflation target.  Given 
the money multiplier, high-powered money is determined endogenously using the money 
                                                          
71
Wages and return to capital are assumed exogenous to be determined outside the model. 
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market equilibrium conditions
72
.  The central bank manipulates high-powered money 
through the money market by trading of short-term securities.    
     It is worth noting that the modified financial programming model has endogenous 
resource gap variables, which are used to isolate short- and long-run variables from the 
effects of predicted lack of financing.  Hence, the simulation results, including short-run 
aggregate supply (Q) and inflation, implicitly assume that the predicted resource gaps that 
are reflected as foreign exchange gaps or saving-and-investment gaps are fully met by 
additional inflow of foreign savings.  Neither the resource gaps nor surpluses are linked 
with money market equilibrium nor goods market equilibrium.  In other words, if the model 
predicts a financing gap, it would be reflected neither as lower money supply from the 
banking system (compared with the baseline) nor as government excess borrowing from the 
central bank.  In all simulation scenarios, all the components of money supply, such as 
claims on government borrowing and gross international reserves, remain as assumed in the 
plan.  Therefore, any disequilibrium in the money market reflects temporary deviations of 
the demand for or supply of money from their respective long-run equilibrium trends when 
one or more of their respective determinants temporarily deviates from long-run 
equilibrium trends.  For example, appreciation of the exchange rate (compared with the 
plan) is expected to cause a temporary deviation of the demand for money from its long run 
trend. 
     On the other hand, in the goods market, required total investment is determined using 
the ICOR technique irrespective of the level of savings.  A temporary increase in the 
required level of investment in relation to GDP from the long-run equilibrium trend affects 
neither money demand nor money supply despite the fact the deviation is expected to create 
excess demand for financing (compared with the baseline) because, the model 
endogenously reflects the projected excess demand as a resource gap, which is a separate 
variable.  If the additional financing from abroad seems impossible to raise, one has to 
conclude that the plan is inconsistent and that the plan targets are unattainable.  In other 
                                                          
72
One of the main sources of change in high-powered money, i.e., change in net foreign assets of the central 
bank are it is one of the three key policy targets while change in claims on government is computed as a 
residual. Annex VI presents how the long-term equilibrium level of government borrowing from the central 
bank is determined. 
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words, it implies either the targets should be revised downwards or policy measures that 
could address the gap are needed
73
.   
     The behavioral elements of the model are set out in this section in terms of long-run 
levels relationship, but the estimation and simulation exercises in section 3.7 and section 
3.8 are conducted on first differences from which predicted levels are derived by 
cumulation.   The complete model in the latter form, including its identities and cumulation 
equations is given in section 3.6.5.  Section 3.6.5also defines the equation numbers, so that 
in this section the equation numbers are not a continuous series.  Where equations appear 
here but not in section 3.6.5, they are marked with a prime.  
3.5.1 The Goods and Services Market 
3.5.1.1 Supply Side of the Goods and Services Market 
3.5.1.1.1 Long-term Output Growth 
In this chapter, long-term (potential) output is formulated in line with endogenous growth 
theory and on the analysis that has been provided in chapter 1.  The production function in 
equation (1) is, therefore, specified as a function of capital stock (K), labor force (N), 
human capital development (H), infrastructure services (FQ) and export (X).  The 
production function is permitted to exhibit increasing returns to scale to capital and labor 
factor inputs, as human capital stock and infrastructure output affects the productivity of 
these factor inputs [Agenor and Montiel, 1999, p.679].  In developing countries, export 
growth also raises the productivity of private capital and labor by providing economies of 
scale, technology transfer and improved managerial skill as discussed in chapter 1. 
lnQt = a11 + a12 lnKt + a13lnNt + a14lnHt + a15lnFQt + a16lnXt+ u1t..................................1’ 
   0<a12<1; 0<a13< 1; and a14, a15, a16> 0 
All variables are in real terms where ‘ln’ stands for natural logarithm; Q is potential (long-
term) output (measured by real GDP); and K is total gross capital stock, which is the sum 
                                                          
73
The model could easily be turned into a neo-classical equilibrium path model by dropping the endogenous 
gap variables, and linking the goods market to money and foreign exchange markets directly, without the 
intermediary foreign exchange gap and fiscal gap variables. 
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of private and public gross capital stocks. ‘N’ is labor; ‘H’ is human capital – the stock of 
skills; ‘FQ’ is services (outputs) of core infrastructures such as electricity, transport and 
communication and water and sewerage as defined by the World Bank 1994 [Wang, 2002]; 
and X is exports of goods and services.   
For the financial programming model, potential output is an exogenously determined target 
(Q
T
t) which, if the growth rate is constant, could be specified as follows: 
lnQ
T
t= lnQ
T
t-1(1+g
T) ……………...………………………………………..........………… 1 
3.5.1.1.2   Capital Stock, Investment Requirement and Factor Productivity 
Growth 
This section presents the determination of long-term level of capital formation and total 
factor productivity growth.  
A.  Total Capital Stock 
The evolution of the capital stock (K) is governed by the identity in equation (2) 
Kt = It + (1-σ)Kt-1…………………………………….…………….……...…………... 2 
It = Ipt + Igt…..………………………………………………...…………….…...…….....3 
where all variables are in real terms, I is gross total capital formation; Ip is gross private 
capital formation; Ig is gross public capital formation, and the parameter ‘σ’ represents the 
annual average rate of depreciation, which is assumed to be constant and to apply equally to 
both public and private capital stock.   
B. Total Investment Requirement 
The GDP growth target of the program is assumed constant over the long-term. Given the 
target rate of growth of output, the production function equation (1), defines the necessary 
inputs, so that given other inputs, the target rate of investment may be determined.  In this 
model, long-term growth requires that the productivity-augmented capital-output ratio is 
either constant or decreasing, since an increasing path would imply convergence to a point 
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at which all domestic resources were used to keep the stock of capital at the level required 
by the growth target.  The maximum growth rate is obtained at the point where the capital 
output ratio is constant (assuming that the capital coefficient is less than one) [Mikkelsen, 
1998].  Hence, the long-term level of investment can be determined using a kind of 
incremental-capital-output-ratio (ICOR) technique by solving the first difference of 
equation (1) for ∆lnK, substituting (∆K/Kt-1) for ∆lnK and setting u1t = 0. 
∆Kt = [g
T
- (α13∆lnNt + α14∆lnHt+ α15∆lnFQt+ α16∆lnXt)] Kt-1/α12 ….......................…. 5’ 
Using equations (2) and (3), we can rewrite equation (5’) as  
Ipt+ Igt= [g
T
- (α13∆lnNt + α14∆lnHt+ α15∆lnFQt+ α16∆lnXt)] Kt-1/α12 + σKt-1…….........5’’ 
In developing countries, and particularly in Ethiopia, Ig is a policy determined variable 
associated with infrastructure and human capital development, so in the programming 
framework it is an exogenous variable.  The latter implies that the sustainable level of 
private investment demand is endogenously determined as a residual in equation (5’’) for a 
given growth target. 
C. Total Factor Productivity Growth 
C.1 Human Capital Development 
Human capital (H) is specified as a function of public capital stock and real gross domestic 
output per head (Q/N).  The latter represents the demand for labor or the economy’s 
absorptive capacity. 
lnHt = a21 + a22lnKgt + a23 ln(Q/N) + u2t….……………………….……...........…..….. 6 
a22 and a23> 0 
where Kgt is gross public capital stock, Q/N is real GDP per-capita, and human capital (H) 
is measured by gross school enrolment in junior-secondary school, senior secondary school 
and higher education.  Thus, following Barro (1989), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and 
Loayza, Fajnzylber and Calderon (2005) human capital is measured in flow terms instead 
of stocks. In our case this is mainly because stock data are not available, but Loayza, et al 
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(2005, p.39) argue that “This flow measure more closely captures current policies on 
schooling and human capital investment than stock measures related to education 
attainment of adult population or life expectancy”.  In developing countries, government 
investment is expected to have a strong impact on human capital development, as it is the 
lead investor in education.   
C.2 Infrastructure Output  
In this model, infrastructure output (FQ) is assumed a function of public capital stock (Kg).   
lnFQt = a31 + a32lnKgt+ a33lnNt+ u3t ……..……..………  ……………….…....….…. 7 
         a32 and a33 > 0 
Infrastructure output is determined by labor and the stock of capital in physical 
infrastructure such as roads and rail network infrastructure, airport and seaport 
infrastructure, electricity generation and transmission, and water and sewerage and telecom 
infrastructures. 
C.3 Export Demand Equation 
In line with conventional export models, exports of goods and services are specified as a 
function of real GDP and the real exchange rate.  
lnXt = a41 + a42lnQt+ a43lnREERt + e5t……………………………………….….…..… 8 
      a42 > 0 and a43 < 0 
where a42 and a43are long-run elasticities, and REER is the real effective exchange rate 
index as defined in equation (9) below.  Exports of goods and services are expected to 
increase with real GDP and decrease when the real exchange rate appreciates.  Although 
one can also add world economic prospects as an additional explanatory variable, given 
Ethiopia’s insignificant share in total world trade volume, domestic supply and relative 
prices of exportable commodities are considered the only binding constraints in this model.  
World economic conditions affect Ethiopia’s export performance through its impact on 
international prices of commodities, which is already captured by the REER.   
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REER is determined using the identity in equation (9). 
REERt = ∑wit (e
f
it/et)(PD
f
it/PDt) …………….…...………………………….....….….. 9 
where ∑ is the summation operator and ‘w’ is a weight which measures the share of total 
trade (exports plus imports of goods) of a trading partner ‘i’ in total exports and imports of 
goods of Ethiopia. ‘e’ is the nominal exchange rate of the Birr in terms of USD, i.e., USD-
to-Birr ratio; e
f
 is the exchange rate of a trading partner country in terms of USD; PD is 
domestic consumer price index; and PD
f
 is the consumer price index of a trading partner.  
Data on the top seventeen major trading partner countries, which collectively account for 
more than 80 percent of total trade, are used to construct the REER index (see Annex IV for 
details on page 249). 
3.5.1.2   Short-Term Aggregate Demand  
Equation (10) presents the short-term aggregate demand identity. 
Qt = Cpt+ Cg
K
t + Ipt + Ig
K
t+ Xt-Zt………………...……………………...….…...….… 10 
where Qt is real GDP; Cpt is real private consumption demand; Cgt is real government 
consumption demand; and Zt is real imports of goods and non-factor services demand.  The 
subscript ‘K’ indicates the variable is exogenously determined. 
3.5.1.2.1 Private consumption demand 
Private consumption demand is specified as a function of real disposable income and the 
real interest rate.  
lnCpt = a51 + a52lnY
d
t +  a53r + e5t…….…............………………...…......……..….… 11 
             0 < a52 <1; and a53 < 0  
Disposable income (Y
d
) is determined as total income (Q) less income tax (T), as follows:  
Y
d
t = Qt-Tt …………………………………………………….……………….…….. 12 
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The real interest rate (r) is endogenously determined using equation (13) below, where ‘i’ is 
the nominal interest rate, which is exogenously determined by policy, and П is the domestic 
inflation rate.  
rt = [(1+it)/(1+Пt) - 1] …..………........…………………………….………...……… 13 
3.5.1.2.2   Government Consumption 
Government Consumption (Cg) is a policy determined variables. 
Cgt = Cg_Qt
K
*Qt…………………………………...……….………………….….….. 14 
where Cg_Q is the ratio of government-consumption-to-GDP ratio at time‘t’, which is 
policy determined and the superscript ‘K’, signifies that the variable is exogenously 
determined.  
3.5.1.2.3   Import Demand Equation 
Real imports of goods and services demand (Z) is specified as a positive function of real 
GDP.   
lnZt = a61 + a62lnQt + e6t.……..………………........…………………..............……  15 
     a62> 0  
where a62 is the long-run elasticity parameter.  In least developed countries, which rely 
heavily on imports of machinery, equipment and intermediate inputs, the exchange rate 
plays little role as a binding constraint to imports because imports do not have close 
domestic substitutes [Taylor, 1994].  Particularly in the case of Ethiopia, it is complicated 
to model the role of the exchange rate in the domestic market because of the existence of a 
relatively large parallel market for foreign exchange
74
.  Therefore, for simplicity, I followed 
                                                          
74
 In countries which are characterized by frequent foreign exchange shortages, prices of imported items, 
particularly consumer goods, semi-finished goods and raw materials are largely determined by the exchange 
rate in the parallel market. For instance, during Ethiopia’s economic program, despite a 144 percent 
devaluation of the birr from Birr2.07/USD to Birr5.0/USD, domestic inflation dropped from 22 percent in 
1992 to 8 percent in 1993 [Ayalew, 1994 and Dercon, 2002].  Ayalew (1994, 181) argues that before the 
reform “the lion’s share of consumer goods were imported either through the black market or franco-valuta, 
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Polak’s original financial programming and World Bank’s RMSM import models [Khan, et 
al, 1990, pp. 160-166]. 
3.5.2   The Money Market  
In the money market, the long-term sustainable inflation target is determined by the 
equilibrium between demand for and supply of money.  Therefore, in the FP framework, 
the policy determined money supply is set to match the long-run demand for money so that 
the money market clears in line with inflation and international reserve targets.  However, 
in the short-run, money demand could deviate from money supply as a result of temporary 
deviation of short term aggregate supply from long term potential output, causing actual 
inflation to deviate from targeted inflation.  On the other hand, as international reserves are 
a predetermined target, the model assumes that any long-term disequilibrium in the foreign 
exchange market is addressed through acquisition of additional inflow of foreign savings.   
3.5.2.1   Money Supply  
Equations (16) to (24) are a set of identities that determines the level of money supply in an 
economy.  Equation (16) demonstrates that money supply (M
S
), which represented by 
broadly defined money (M2), is the product of the money multiplier (m) and the reserve 
money (RM) of the central bank. RM, on the other hand, is the sum of net international 
reserves on the country (Fm) and central bank’s net claim on government (Dmg).  Other 
items net (OIN) of the central bank which changes with acquisition of own assets or its-
own liability to economic agents is less predictable and estimated as a residual.  
International reserves and net claims on government both evolve through time according to 
the changes in them implied elsewhere in the model.  In the financial programming 
framework, the change in claims on government (∆Dmg) that is consistent with long-term 
growth target is determined in the money market (see Annex VI), whereas, the change in 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
whose prices are obviously quoted at the parallel market level.  Moreover, most of the public enterprises were 
operating below capacity due to shortage of foreign exchange.”   Therefore, depreciation of the official 
exchange rate had little impact on the relative prices of goods in the domestic market. 
106 
 
 
international reserves of the central bank (∆Fm) is determined in the foreign exchange 
market(see section 3.5.4). 
M
S
t = mt*RMt………………………...………………………...........…..……....……. 16 
RMt = et*Fmt+ Dmgt - OINt ………………………..…….………...........….……….… 17 
Fmt = Fmt-1 + ∆Fmt………….………………………..……………….…...........…....…. 18 
Dmgt = Dmgt-1 + ∆Dmgt …...….…………………...……..………...….…...........…….… 19 
The money multiplier is defined by various ratios that are assumed either constant or 
variable by the government as policy instruments.       
mt = (1 + cct)/[rqrt (1 + sdt + tdt) + cct + errt] ...……...…….…….…………..……….. 20 
cct = CCt/DDt ………………………………………….......………………….......….. 21 
sdt = SDt/DDt ………………………………………...............………………...….…. 22 
tdt = TDt/DDt ……………………………………………...……………………….…. 23 
errt = EDt/DDt ………………………………………………….................……....….. 24 
where ‘cc’ the ratio of currency in circulation (CC) to demand deposit (DD); ‘sd’ is the 
saving deposits (SD) to demand deposit ratio; ‘td’ is the time deposits (TD) to demand 
deposit ratio; ‘err’ is the excess reserve (ED) to demand deposit ratio; and ‘rqr’ is the legal 
reserve ratio on bank deposits.   The ratios in equation 20 to 24 are assumed constant. 
     Money supply changes when either the money multiplier (m) or the reserve money 
(RM) changes or both.  The money multiplier (m) is policy determined.  As the ‘cc’, ‘sd’, 
‘td’ and to some extent ‘err’ are constant ratios, ‘m’ changes when the central bank changes 
the required reserves ratio (rqr) on bank deposits.  On the other hand, high-powered 
(reserve) money changes either when claims on government (Dmg) or international reserves 
of the central bank (Fm) changes.  
3.5.2.2   Money Demand  
The long-run real money demand (M
d
/PD) equation is specified as a function of disposable 
income, per-capita rural output ratio (PC-RUROUT), the real interest rate and the real 
effective exchange rate.  Specification of the money demand equation is similar to the 
modified cash-in-advance model used in chapter 2which is selected there as the best fit 
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model for developing countries in the process of structural transformation.  The only 
difference is that, following Mikkelsen (1998), inflation expectation is incorporated into the 
short-term aggregated demand and price determination block in this model. 
Ln(M
D
/PD)t= a71 + a72lnY
d
t + a73lnPC-RUROUTt+ a74r + a75lnREERt + u7t………...25 
a72, a73 > 0 and a74, a75 < 0; 
The demand for money is expected to increase with increases in disposable income and per-
capita rural output while it decreases when the real interest rate increases or the real 
effective exchange rate appreciates.   
Per capita rural output (PC-RUROUT), in turn, is determined using the identity in equation 
(26) below.    
PC-RUROUTt = (Yag_Q
K
t*Qt)/N_RUR_Pt .......…….………..…………….....….…. 26 
where N_RUR_P is rural population and Yag_Q is the ratio of agricultural output (Yag) to 
total output at time‘t’.  The superscript ‘K’ indicates that the ratio is exogenously 
determined.  
3.5.2.3 Money Market Equilibrium  
Equation (27) presents the money market equilibrium condition.  
 M
S
t = M
D
t…………………………..…….……………………….……..……....….. 27 
In this model, as the components of the money supply (in equations 16 and 17) are either 
plan targets (such as net international reserves and net claims on the government) or policy 
determined variables (like central bank claims on other sectors and the reserve requirement 
ratio
75
); hence the money supply is de facto assumed constant both over the short run and 
                                                          
75
Reserve requirement ratio is the only policy variable in the money multiplier equation as the other variables 
are assumed constant over the long run.   
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long run
76
.  Hence, unplanned disequilibria in the money market arise only due to 
temporary deviations of the demand for money from its long run trend.  
3.5.3   The Government Sector 
Equation (28) below is the government budget constraint which shows that government 
gets income from tax and non-tax revenue (R), and external current and capital transfers 
(Gcg) and (Gkg) respectively.  It spends its income on consumption of goods and services 
(Cg); and it pays interest on the central bank stock of borrowing (Dmg), the stock of 
commercial bank borrowing (Dbg) and holdings of treasury bills (B), at interest rate ‘i’. It 
also needs to pay interest on the stock of foreign borrowing, Fg, at interest rate i
f
, which is 
converted from foreign currency terms by nominal exchange rate, et.  As usual, the 
government deficit needs to be financed by foreign borrowing (e*Fg), commercial bank 
borrowing (Dbg), central bank borrowing (Dmg) or treasury bills sell (B).   
Dmgt = Cg
K
t + Igt + it
f
*et*Fgt + it*(Dmgt + Dbgt + Bt)
K
 - R
K
t - Gcg
K
t - Gkg
K
t - et*F
K
gt - 
Dbg
K
t - B
K
t - Ωgt……...…...….……...….….............................….…….....28 
The superscript ‘K’ indicates that the variable is exogenously determined while the 
subscript ‘t’ signifies time.  Now the challenge is that, in least developed countries, the 
government’s capacity to mobilize tax and non-tax income is limited.  Moreover, the 
projected bank and non-bank financing sources may not be large enough to meet the 
government’s financing needs.  On the other hand, as discussed in section 3.5.2.3, the 
financial programming framework limits government’s access to central bank financing 
because of the money supply target.  So, closure of the model can be ensured only by 
adding a variable called the government-financing gap (Ωg), which is a measure of the 
degree of disequilibrium in the system.   
                                                          
76
The policy challenge in developing countries is almost always for government to prevent money supply 
running ahead of demand.  The supply of credit to the private sector is determined by the capacity of banks 
(outside the central bank) based on the capacity to create money.  The latter is determined by the demand for 
credit and central bank policy, particularly the legal reserve requirement policy.  Hence, private sector 
demand for credit has little role in determining excess supply of domestic credit. 
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     The presence of the financing gap in the model implies that the objective of achieving 
the long-term growth target along with the targets for inflation and international reserves is 
possible only if the government can secure an additional flow of resources either from 
domestic or foreign savings.  Otherwise, the government should revise its target growth and 
investment demand down to stay in line with its inflation and balance of payments targets.  
Only when Ωg = 0 can we say that the government meets its financing needs.  Therefore, 
the extent to which Ωg > 0 assesses the feasibility of the plan at least from the fiscal 
perspective. 
3.5.4   The Foreign Exchange Market 
Ensuring a sustainable balance of payments position is one of the three pillars of a financial 
programming exercise.  On the right hand side of equation (35), the sum of exports of 
goods and services (X), net foreign interest income for investment abroad (i
f*F), workers’ 
remittances (W), foreign government transfers (Gcg) and foreign private transfers (Gcp) less 
imports of goods and services (Z) equals the current account of the balance of payments.  
The current account deficit could be financed either by external government borrowing 
(Gkg) or by external private borrowing (Gkp).  On the other hand, accumulations of net 
external reserves by the government (Fg), by the non-bank private sector (Fp) or by the 
commercial banks (Fb) all serve to lower the build up in the central bank’s international 
reserves (Fm).  All variables in equation 35 are in foreign currency terms except exports 
and imports of goods and services, which need to be converted by the nominal exchange 
rate. 
Fmt = (PD*X/e)t - (PD*Z/e)t + i
f
*F
K
t + W
K
t + Gcp
K
t + Gcg
K
t+Gkp
K
t 
+ Gkg
K
t - Fg
K
t - Fb
K
t - Fp
K
t + Ω…………………………...…………….....35 
where PD is domestic price index (GDP deflator) and the subscript K signifies that the 
variable is exogenously determined.  In the FP framework, the change in international 
reserves is a predetermined policy target (Fm). The economy is said to have a sustainable 
balance of payments position in the medium and long run when it is able to finance its 
current account deficits from its capital account surplus while maintaining the international 
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reserves target (Fm)
77
.  On the other hand, if the current account deficit cannot be financed 
by the predicted capital account surplus, it must be reflected as a foreign financing gap 
(Ω)78.  Therefore, the extent to which Ω is greater than zero defines the feasibility of the 
overall plan.  Given the set of policies, positive Ω implies the government should try to 
secure medium term financing from foreign sources or cut its growth target consistent with 
the available financing to avoid getting into an unsustainable macroeconomic situation.  
3.5.5    Saving and Investment Equilibrium 
The saving and investment equilibrium can be derived from the aggregate demand identity 
following Khan, et al (1990).  Doing some manipulation in equation 10
79
, we get: 
∆Kt  = (Yt
T
 - Tt – CPt) + (Tt-CGt) + (Zt-Xt) ….....…..…...…………..………..…….. 10’ 
Equation (10’) indicates that domestic investment is the sum of private savings, public 
savings, and the inflow of foreign savings in the form of financing of net imports. It is clear 
that the solution to the fixed-factor production function in equation (5’), leads to a knife-
edge solution for growth.  The model avoids this problem if the economy is able to raise 
sufficient foreign savings to make up the difference between domestic savings and the 
required level of investment [Khan, et al, 1990].   
Rearranging equation (10’), we get, 
       St = ∆Kt + (Xt - Zt) ………………………………………………….………....…… 36 
where S is gross domestic savings.  
                                                          
77
 In the short run, if the current account deficit is larger than foreign exchange inflows through the capital 
account, the country would be forced to finance the deficit by drawing down its international reserves.  
However, persistent financing through this means is obviously not sustainable indefinitely and so is likely to 
result in a balance of payments crisis in the medium run or sooner. 
78
Note that the government budget-financing gap (Ωg), in section 3.5.3, is a subset of the balance of payments 
gap (Ω). 
79
From aggregate demand, Y
T
 = Cp + Cg + I + X - Z,  solving for gross domestic investment, I, gives 
  I = Y
T
 - Cp– Cg + Z- X, 
Adding and subtracting T (which cancels out each other) in the above equation, gives us:  
 I  = (Y
T
 - T – CP) + (T-CG) + (Z-X).  
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Equation (36) suggests that domestic savings increase when exports grow faster than 
imports.  When the rate of growth of exports manages to overtake the rate of growth of 
imports, the trade deficit shrinks, which indicates that the country starts to spend less on 
domestic consumption and increases its exports to the rest of the world [see Sekkat, 2012, 
Skott et al, 2012, Jarreau and Poncet, 2011 and Gala and Rocha,2009 for the details].  The 
latter, in turn, results in a rise in savings rate in the modern sector. For instance, Gala and 
Rocha (2009) found that competitive exchange rate increases profit margins in the tradable 
sector and this leads to a rise in aggregate domestic savings. 
Equations (37) to equation (40) present various identities of the savings and saving-
investment gaps. 
Gross national savings (S_NTL): 
S_NTLt = ∆Kt + (Xt  - Zt) + et*[i
f
tFt + W
K
t + Gcp
K
t + Gcg
K
t]..……..…………........…. 37 
Saving –Investment gap (S_I_NTL) before financing from available foreign savings: 
S_I_NTLt  = S_NTLt - ∆Kt …….………………….………...……………...……...... 38 
Available foreign savings (S_FORGN) 
S_FORGNt = [Gkp
K
t + Gkg
K
t - Fm
K
t - Fg
K
t - Fb
K
t - Fp
K
t]*et …………...….…...…39 
Saving-Investment gap (S_I) after financing from available foreign savings: 
S_It  = S_I_NTLt  + S_FORGNt……….……………..……………………………… 40 
3.5.6   Aggregate Supply and Prices 
The FP framework allows the deviation of short-term aggregate supply from long-term 
aggregate supply.  The long-run aggregate supply curve is vertical while the short-run 
supply curve is positively slopping.  Any deviation of short-run aggregate supply and 
inflation from their respective long-term targets and would be corrected through fiscal and 
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monetary policies
80
.  This implies that while short-term aggregate supply exceeds the long-
term trend, short-run inflation will also exceed the long-term target.  The central bank will 
correct disequilibrium in the money market either by changing its high-powered money 
target or the legal reserve requirement ratio.  Interest rate policy is also an option but the 
problem in least developed countries such as Ethiopia, where there is credit rationing, is 
that it is difficult to identify the relationship between interest rate and investment demand 
[IMF, 2007, Bruce and Stiglitz, 1990 and Ali and Deininger, 2012].  In addition, as 
investors generally face high internal rates of return in these counties the interest rate rarely 
behaves as a binding constraint to investment demand.  From the fiscal policy side, the 
government could use tax rates and government consumption to affect short-term aggregate 
output.   
     Studies indicate that, in less monetized economies least-developed countries, where food 
accounts more than half of the consumption expenditure basket, short-term inflation could 
be affected through three channels.  The first channel is through the money market.  When 
the supply of money exceeds the demand for money, it creates excess aggregate demand 
and pushes prices up in the short-term.  The second channel is through imported inflation.  
Developing countries’ consumer price indices, particularly in countries with larger food 
shares in the consumer baskets, are highly sensitive to changes in international food prices 
(Durevall, et al, 2013).  The 2006-2007 and 2010-2011 international food and fuel price 
shocks affected Ethiopia badly by pushing consumer prices higher (Durevall, et al 2013 and 
Birru, 2007).  Consumers have relatively long memories for inflation.  Hence, inflation 
expectations is the third channel.  Once prices deviate from the long-run trend, the memory 
lingers for some time and affects current price formation. 
Пt = ϴ1 EX_ADt + ϴ2П
f
t+ ϴ3П
e
t……………..……………..………………….…… 41 
                                                          
80
In “steady-state”, where the inflation rate is constant, short-term output growth equals potential growth, as 
determined by the production function in equation (1’). 
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where П is short-term inflation, EX_AD is proportionate deviation between the demand for 
and supply of money, Пf is foreign inflation and  Пe is expected inflation.  ϴi is weight 
attached to the contribution of channel ‘i’ (to inflation).  Mikkelsen (1998) in his financial 
programming model uses deviation of short-term aggregate output from long-run trend 
output (Q/QP-1), to measure excess aggregate demand instead of deviation.  Moreover, 
inflation expectation is measured as a weighted sum of inflation target and past-inflation 
rates.  On the other hand, in this model, short-term inflation is determined in the money 
market by the deviation between the supply of and demand for money. 
EX_ADt = (M
S
t - M
D
t)/ M
D
t.…………………………………………………....…… 42 
Money market disequilibrium is estimated to explain between 30 to 40 percent of headline 
inflation in Ethiopia (Birru, 2007).  On the contrary, in the Durevall, et al (2013) model, 
excess money supply is found insignificant and does not seem to have a direct long-run 
impact on inflation in Ethiopia.  However, Durevall, et al (2013) argues that the finding 
does not mean excess money is not an important determinant of inflation in Ethiopia; rather 
it could be due to the use of a small sample (11 years of monthly data) [Durevall, et al, 
2013. p.14].    
     Foreign inflation or imported inflation is computed as the percentage change in 
consumer prices of major trading partner countries.  The weighted sum of 6 major trading 
partner countries’ consumer price indices, which have significant trade relation with 
Ethiopia on agricultural commodities, is used as proxy to world food price index (WPF)
81
 
(see Annex IV.2.4) on page 198).   
Пft=(WPFt - WPFt-1) / WPFt-1  ………........………...…………………..…....…….. 43 
Inflation expectations follow an adaptive expectation process by which expected inflation is 
a weighted average of the inflation target and the previous year’s actual inflation.  The 
central bank is to announce its inflation target at the beginning of each fiscal year, and the 
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The six countries are China, India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kenya and Djibouti. 
114 
 
 
public is assumed to use this information, along with the memory of the previous year’s 
inflation to form its expectations.  
Пet = ʋ [(PD
T
t/PD
T
t-1) -1] + (1-ʋ)* [(PDt-1/PDt-2) -1] ……………………..……..….. 44 
where, PD
T
 is target domestic price index; PD is actual domestic price index; and ʋ is the 
weight attached to the contribution of inflation target on people’s formation of inflation 
expectation. 
3.5.7   Model Closure 
As set out above, the model contains 46 endogenous variables: 7 behavioral equations, 
which are estimated below and 39 identities; 43 exogenous and 3 policy objective variables, 
i.e., potential output (Q), inflation (П) and change in gross reserves of the central bank 
(∆Fm) which, in the financial programming context, are set, equal to target values.  No 
automatic adjustment to equilibrium in balance of payments and fiscal accounts as the 
exchange rate (e) and the domestic interest rate (i) are assumed fixed.  Imbalances in the 
balance of payments and government budget are reflected in the foreign financing gap (Ω) 
and the government budget financing gap (Ωg).  Table 3.2 gives a full listing of variables.   
Q
T
t = Q
T
t-1(1 + g
T) ……...…….………………………...……..………..………...….. 1 
Пt = П
T
t → PDt  = PD
T
t-1 (1 + П
T
t) = PD
T……………….…..………..............…….. 45 
∆Fmt = ∆F
T
mt…..……………..……...….……..….………...………….........…...….. 46 
et = e
k
t……...…………………………..…………………………….........…....…… 47 
i = i
k
t……………………...…..………….……………………………..........…..….. 48 
As the objective of this modified financial programming model is to check internal 
consistency in the medium term plan, it does not have closures in the normal modeling 
sense of a set of assumptions that allow all the endogenous variables to be fully determined 
given the exogenous ones in a mutually consistent fashion.  Rather it determines two 
endogenous variables – the financing gaps in the government sector and the foreign 
exchange market – that indicate the likely extent of disequilibrium in the model – the 
inconsistency between the various assumptions and plan targets.  If the financing gap 
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variables are other than zero, the government’s growth plan is deemed infeasible and 
something must be adjusted.  This may involve changes in certain policy instruments – e.g. 
the tax rate, exchange rate or government consumption – or a change in targets.   
     The previous paragraph should not be taken as suggesting that there is no adjustment in 
the model, however.  In the goods market, the long-term level of investment is determined 
applying a kind of incremental capital-output (ICOR) principle.  After exogenously 
determining the level of total government investment, private sector investment is 
computed as a residual using the technical relationship of the production function (equation 
5’’).  This implies that, as a typical feature of a financial programming model, the 
government fiscal operation crowds out private sector activities in the medium and long-
term.  Otherwise, it may potentially undermine sustainability of the medium-term 
macroeconomic stability scenario of the program.  If aggregate demand goes above long-
run productive potential, short-term aggregate supply can expand temporarily beyond its 
long-term level, and this is reflected in a deviation of short-term inflation from target 
inflation.  Through the effects of the latter, domestic prices serve as an adjustment factor in 
the goods markets.  
3.6 Data and Estimation Methodology 
3.6.1   Data 
The purpose of the model is to explore aspects of economic policy facing the Ethiopian 
government.  For this purpose the parameters of the behavioral equations need to be 
estimated, which I do equation-by-equation using annual time series from 1971 to 2013.  
Table 3.2, in Section 3.6.4 below, presents the endogenous and exogenous variables and 
policy instruments employed in the model.  I am able to use official data produced by the 
National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the Central Statistics Authority (CSA) and the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) to cover the full set of variables.  
Precise sources and definitions of the main variables are given in Table 3.1 below and the 
full list of variables is provided in Annex 3.1.   
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Table 3-1: Definition of Variables and Sources of Data  
    (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
BBGROSL 
_USD 
NBE’sGrossForeign Liability (in 
USD) 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
BBGROSR 
_USD 
NBE’s Gross International 
Reserves (in USD) 
" 
BBNFA NBE’s Net Foreign Assets  " 
BBNGOV NBE’s Net Claims on Gov’t  " 
BBNPVT NBE’s Net Claims on the Private 
Sector  
" 
BBOIN Other Items Net of the NBE " 
CBNFA_USD Commercial Banks’s Net Foreign 
Assets (in USD) 
" 
CBNGOV Commercial Banks’ Net Claims on 
Government  
" 
CBNPVT Commercial Banks’s Net Claims 
on Private Sector  
" 
CG Real Government Consumption MOFED’s National 
Accounts  
CP Real Private Sector Consumption " 
CUACB_USD Current Account of the BOPs (in 
USD) 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
DEF GDP Deflator (2011 = 100) MOFED’s National 
Accounts  
E Nominal Exchange Rate of the 
Birr (Birr/USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
F Real Infrastructure Output MOFED’s National 
Accounts  
F_BOR_NET 
_USD 
Official Net Foreign Borrowing 
From Abroad (in USD) 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
F_BOR_OTH 
_NET_USD  
Other Sectors Net Foreign 
Borrowing From Abroad (in USD) 
" 
FDI_USD Foreign Direct Investment (in 
USD) 
" 
FYNETW_ 
USD 
Net Foreign Income from Abroad 
(in USD) 
" 
GOVCAP_E Government Capital Expenditure MOFED’s Fiscal Statistics 
GOVCON_E Gov’t Consumption Expenditure  " 
GRANT Official Grants  " 
H Human Capital Index Computed from CSA’s  
Reports 
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Table 3.1 (Cont’d):  Definition of Variables and Sources of Data 
                                             (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
Name of   
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
IG Real Gross Gov’t Capital 
Formation 
MOFED National Accounts 
INTRATE Minimum Interest Rate  NBE’s Annual Reports 
IP  Real Gross Private Capital 
Formation 
MOFED, National Accounts  
M Broad Money Multiplier NBE’s Annual Reports 
M0 High-powered (Reserve) Money " 
M2 Broad Money Supply " 
N_RUR_P Total Rural Population of 
Ethiopia 
CSA Reports 
N_TOT_P Total Population of Ethiopia " 
N_URB_P Total Urban Population of 
Ethiopia 
" 
NFA Net Foreign Assets of the 
Banking System 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
NTX Non-Tax Revenue of the 
Government 
MOFED, National Accounts 
OFFTRAN 
SW_USD 
Official Transfer(in USD) NBE’s Annual Reports 
OIN Other Item Net of the Banking 
System 
" 
PC_RUROUT Per-capita Rural Output MOFED, National Accounts  
PD Consumer Price Index (2011 = 
100) 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
PVTRANSW 
_USD 
Private Transfers (in USD) " 
Q Real GDP (Actual) MOFED, National Accounts  
QP Real Potential Output Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, 2010 
S Real Gross Domestic Savings 
(Public plus Private Savings) 
Computed from MOFED's 
National Accounts 
SHT_CAP 
_USD 
Short-term Capital Net Inflows 
(in USD) 
NBE’s Annual Reports 
TX Total Tax Revenue  MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
TX_Y Total Income Tax Revenue " 
X Real Exports of Goods and 
Service 
MOFED, National Accounts  
Z Imports of Goods and Services  NBE’s Annual Reports 
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     Recently, there has been a good deal of controversy between the Ethiopian Authorities 
and the IMF over the accuracy of the national accounts data.  Specifically, this was 
concerned with the GDP estimates.  However, after a long 
discussion to resolve the disagreement and produce an agreed set of data, the IMF finally 
have confirmed that the Ethiopian Authorities’ data measure economic activity reasonably 
and have accepted the official series
82
. 
    Getting official statistics on capital stock data is a basic problem in developing countries.  
Therefore, I use the technique similar to Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).  This technique is 
commonly called ‘the perpetual inventory method’.  It argues that ‘capital stocks is the 
accumulation of the stream of past investments’.  If one assumes that a given capital stock 
depreciates at proportionate rate σ per annum, this implies that the average life of 
investment made in year X equals 1/σ.  The initial capital stock (K0) could therefore be 
estimated by dividing initial gross total investment (I0) by σ.  The limitation of this 
technique however is that it assumes annual stream of investments in the last 1/σ years 
were equal.  Once K0 is determined, successive year capital stock values are derived using 
equation (2) by adding the current level of gross total domestic investment (It) onto one 
period lagged net capital stock, (1-σ)Kt-1.  Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) estimate that σ is 
roughly between 0.03 and 0.04.  In this chapter, the former - a 3 percent annual average 
depreciation rate - is assumed.  
     In many developing countries, time-series data on employment is not available.  Hence, 
similar to the studies in most LDCs, I use total population data obtained from the Central 
Statistics Agency as a proxy to labor stock (N) [Ram, 1987].  Human capital (H) is defined 
as the fraction of time that labor spend to acquire skill (Agnor and Montiel, 199, p. 680).  In 
this chapter, H is computed as total number of students in 7
th 
grade and above including 
university graduates obtained from Central Statistics Agency and Ministry of Education. 
 
                                                          
82
The IMF expressed its concerns in very sweeping ways such as ‘growth is overestimated by 2-3 percentage 
points’.  The statement does not indicate where the sources of weaknesses are.  Neither, it gives details of 
those estimates.   
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Figure 3-1:  Plots of Selected Variables of the Model for the Period (1971-2013)
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Figure 3.1 (Cont’d): Plots of Selected Variables of the Model for the Period  
(1971-2013) 
 
 
    Figures 3.1 (below) depict the evolution of selected variables in the model.  Close 
inspection of main variables indicates presence of three distinct periods in the speed of 
economic growth that confirms the discussion in section 3.3.  For instance, real GDP, 
consumption, gross fixed investments (both public and private), human capital and 
infrastructure output plots are relatively flat between 1971 and early 1990s indicating 
stagnation in economic activities during the period.  Then, the slopes of the curves show a 
moderate rise between 1993 and early 2000 following the IMF-World Banks supported 
economic reform program but remain subdued until 2003.  On the other hand, government 
consumption declines during the period reflecting the program’s focus on fiscal discipline 
between 1993 and 2002.  Then comes the third episode, which is the period between 2004 
and 2013.  In this period, almost all variables in the real, external and fiscal sectors 
experienced steeper slops reflecting the effects of accelerated economic growth.   
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     Real domestic savings and tax revenue depicts a relatively longer period of stagnation 
compared with other main economic variables.  Both of them show sharp rises only from 
2007 onwards.  
3.6.2   Methodology 
3.6.2.1   The Econometric Estimation Procedure 
The behavioral equations are estimated one-by-one using the short-run dynamic error 
correction method.  Following Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005) and Peresan et al 
(2001), each equation is specified as a single equation autoregressive distributive lag 
(ARDL) format as follows: 
∆yt =∑z θz∆yt-z-1 + ∑i∑zκiz∆xit-z + α1 [yt-1 -∑iβixit-1-β0] + ut……………..….……....... 49 
where i = 1 … n refers to explanatory variables included in the equation and z = 0…. Z 
counts over time-periods, with Z equal to the maximum lag.  yi is the dependent variable, xi 
are explanatory variables (regressors); θz and кiz are the short-run coefficients and βi are the 
long-run coefficients.  α1 is the speed of adjustment or the error correction term and the 
expression in bracket represents the long-run vector.   
The ARDL approach is very suitable to the formulation of single equation time series 
models because, unlike the standard cointegration tests, there is no need for unit root pre-
testing [Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman, 2005 and Pesaran, et al, 2001].  In addition, a 
study by Gerrard and Godfrey (1998, p.235) finds that ‘the ARDL approach provides not 
only better estimators of the long-run coefficients but also more reliable diagnostic 
procedures for the derived ECM’ than the Engle-Granger variant.  They also argue that 
although both Engle-Granger and ADL methods yield super-consistent estimators of long-
run coefficients, because of small sample biases, the LM test for autocorrelation and the 
RESET test may be severely oversized when applied to the equation of the Engle-Granger 
variant.  
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     The asymptotic theory that Pesaran, et al, (2001, p.315) developed offers “a simple 
univariate framework for testing the existence of a single level relationship between yi and 
xi when it is not known with certainty whether the regressors are purely I(0) or purely I(1) 
or mutually cointegrated”.  The null hypothesis is defined as H0: α1 = 0, that is no level 
relationship or no cointegration and is tested against the alternative that H0: α1 ≠ 0, using an 
F-test.  Pesaran et al’s (2001) bound testing approach provides lower bound and upper 
bound critical values for the F-statistics.  The lower bound assumes that all variables are 
I(0) and the upper bound that all variables are I(1).Accordingly, testing the error correction 
term, α1, against the critical values using a F-statistic tabulated in Pesaran et al, (2001) 
provides the answer as to whether there is a long-run relationship or not.  If the calculated t-
statistic lies above the upper bound, the null will be rejected, and confirm presence of the 
long-run cointegrating vector in the model [Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman, 2005].   
     To find the parsimonious model with the appropriate lag length, I rely on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC).  In addition, due to the absence of a sufficiently long data 
series, the maximum lag length is pre-determined.  The lag length is set at 3 in the case of 
long-term output and money demand equations which are expected to have relatively quick 
convergence to equilibrium and have relatively large number of explanatory variables.  For 
the remaining equations, the lag lengths are allowed to go up to 5 due to the relatively 
longer-gestation period.  For example, human capital equation is allowed to have 5 lags 
because of the long gestation period needed in acquiring skill in formal education.   
3.6.2.2   Diagnostic Checks 
As explained in section 3.6.2.1, ARDL models yield super-consistent estimators of long-
run coefficients.  However, estimation of such models using OLS estimation method 
requires adherence to the standard assumptions about the distribution of the disturbances 
and the exclusion of relevant regressors.  There is therefore a need to check for 
misspecification to assess data consistency of the ARDL models [Gerrard and Godfrey, 
1998].  Diagnostic tests such as normality, autocorrelation, heterosckedasticity and 
misspecification of functional forms tests are conducted on the residuals of the estimated 
model. One of the tests is the Jarque-Bera normality test.  The Jarque-Bera test statistic has 
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a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.  If the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed errors is rejected, it indicates that the inference we make about the coefficient 
estimates could be wrong.   
     The second test is for the misspecification of the functional form.  Although all the 
behavioral equations are specified in log-transformed form, there is still a chance that the 
correct functional form is non-linear in parameters.  Ramsey’s RESET test is used to the 
test for misspecification of functional form.  The test has a chi-square distribution.  The 
third test is for serial correlation (autocorrelation), which we make using the Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Autocorrelation test.  Greene (2000, p.736) states that ‘the usual explanation 
of autocorrelation, in ARDL models, is serial correlation in omitted variables’.   
     The fourth test is the heteroskedasticity test.  Although there is less probability of 
detecting heteroskedasticity problems in time series models, if it happens that the 
magnitude of the residuals is related to the magnitude of the recent residual, the test 
statistics would be less efficient.  The chapter applies autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) LM, which is recommended by Gerrard and Godfrey (1998) for 
ARDL models. 
     Finally, there is always a chance that a set of variables is basically cointegrated but may 
also be subjected to a finite number of permanent shocks to either variables or parameters 
values.  Hence, I also conduct cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ) tests on the residuals of the estimated equations to test for shocks and/or 
permanent changes in the long-run elasticities.  The CUSUM and statistics are based on the 
one-step ahead prediction errors, i.e., the differences between the dependent variable (yt) 
and its predicted value based on the parameters estimated at time t-1 [Brooks, 2008]. 
3.6.2.3   Structural Break Tests 
As Ethiopia has gone through three political and economic regimes in the last four and half 
decades, some relationships or variables are likely to be subject to structural breaks.  
Therefore, I carry out a simple covariance analysis differential intercept and “interaction 
variables” [Greene, 2000 and Gujarati, 2004].  The test helps to identify whether a 
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structural shift has taken place in the economy or sub-section of the economy at any point 
within the sample period.  The test is conducted only on the long-run equation of the 
model.  Equation (25’) below illustrates how, for example, a structural break test could be 
conducted on the demand for money equation (equation 25), in section 3.5.2.2.   
∆ln(MD/PD)t = ∑β71∆ln(M
D
/PD)t-m-1 + ∑β72∆lnY
d
t-m + ∑β73∆lnPC-RUROUTt-m + ∑β74∆rt-m 
+ ∑β75∆lnREERt-m + α71[(ln(M
D
/PD)t-1+ α72lnY
d
t-1 + α73lnPC-RUROUTt-1 + α74rt-1  + 
α75lnREERt-1 + α76(D*lnY
d
t-1) + α77(D*lnPC-RUROUTt-1) + α78(D*rt-1) + 
α79(D*lnREERt-1) + α791D + u792t] ........................................................................ 25’ 
where D is the dummy variable, given zero, for example, to the 1971 – 2006 period and one 
to the 2007 -2013 period.  The dummy variables are both additive and multiplicative to 
allow for differential intercepts and differential slopes respectively.  The challenge in this 
technique is to identify the time when the structural break is likely to have occurred, 
especially if there could have been more than one break point in a sample, associated with 
either policy changes, regime changes or other shocks of permanent nature.  Therefore, 
prior information (knowledge) about the possible break points or variables that are believed 
to be subject to structural shifts plays important role in conducting the test on the selected 
basis.  The shifts in political and policy regimes are obvious candidates for example.
83
 
     Once the possible break points or variables are selected, equation (25’) will be estimated 
repeatedly each time by changing assumptions about the period and/or the variable.  For 
instance, if the suspected break years are 2004 and 2007, first the model will be estimate 
assuming structural shift happens in 2004.  In this case, D takes zero for the period between 
1971 and 2003, and one for the remaining period, i.e., 2004-2013.  The model will be 
estimated again changing the assumption for the break point to 2007.  In the latter case, D 
will take zero for the period 1971-2006 and one for the remaining.  Having completed the 
estimations, the next step is to compare the different models using significance tests, 
normally a t-test, on the coefficients of the structural break variables and choose the model 
with the most significant coefficients.    
                                                          
83
 Khan (1980) tests the stability of the demand for money in Pakistan using this technique.   
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3.6.2.4 Single Equation Based Structural Model vs. 
Simultaneous Equation Model  
I use the single equation method to estimate individual equations and then simulate them as 
a complete structural model.  If one had an infinite amount of data, it would be desirable to 
estimate the whole system simultaneously, but here, as in other structural macro-modeling 
contexts such as ‘The Bank of England Quarterly Model’ by Harrison, et al (2005), ‘The 
Bank of England Macroeconomic Model’ by Arestis and Swayer (2002) and ‘A Model for 
Financial Programming’ by Mikkelsen (1998), this is not feasible.  Given our limited data 
span (which is, actually, long by the standards of most developing countries), one can 
identify a number of advantages of our equation-by-equation approach.  The magnitude and 
significance of individual long-run parameters in each structural equation is of the interest 
per se in order to facilitate our understanding of the interaction of target and policy 
variables: estimating a single equation allows a much tighter focus on those parameters and 
their properties.  The specification of each structural equation is theoretically motivated and 
the cointegrating vectors are identified a priori based on theory rather than having to be 
specified ad hoc to meet the demands of estimating as a system.  In addition, the complete 
model includes a large number of identities (defined variables) which link the different 
sectors in the economy; if it were estimated simultaneously all these would have to be 
included. 
     On the other hand, one of the drawbacks of estimating single-equation ECMs is that the 
approach is built on the assumption that all explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. 
Particularly, since the model uses annual data, it is reasonable to suspect contemporaneous 
correlations.  Banerjee (1998, p.274) states that the weak exogeneity assumption is fairly 
well used in practice and allows for the presence of lags of the dependent and explanatory 
variables in the data generation process of the ARDL conditional model.  Durevall, et al 
(2013) argues that if the estimated coefficients are confirmed to be stable, we can use this 
fact as an indirect support for the use of single-equation ECMs. 
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3.6.3   Simulation Model  
Section 3.5 set out the model by way of its long-run relationships, and now the estimation 
supplements these with quite complex dynamics along the lines of equation (49) above.  
The model is solved year-by-year recursively.  All the estimated dynamic equations plus 
the necessary identities in the model are solved for each observation in the solution sample, 
using an iterative algorithm to compute values for the endogenous variables. 
     Using the model in a FP context requires that key policy objectives such as long-term 
growth, inflation and international reserve are set at target levels from outside the model 
and so are exogenous at the simulation stage.  This is possible because the FP model 
determines the values of the two-gap variables – the foreign exchange gap and the fiscal 
gap – that render the target feasible.  In the FP model, variables such as the interest rate, the 
reserve requirement ratio, the exchange rate and government consumption are also set 
exogenously for each simulation.  It would be possible in principle, however, to set the gap 
variables to zero – so that the model is perfectly closed – and then find endogenously the 
values of the policy variables that permit this to occur. 
3.6.4   Structure of the model 
The model contains behavioral relations for potential output, private consumption and 
investment, infrastructure output, human capital, exports and import demand.  Overall, the 
system consists 46 endogenous variables of which 7 behavioral variables and remaining 39 
identities.  Table 3.2 below provides summary of the structure of the model. Definitions of 
the variables are given in Table 3.3.   
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Table 3-2: The Basic Structure of the Model 
Policy 
Target
s 
Endogenous Variables, 
 determined in Exogenous 
Variables 
Policy 
Instrum
ents 
Para-
meters/ 
Coeff-
icients 
Behavioural  
relationships  
        
Identities 
 
g
T
 Ip Q
T
 П N R e αij 
  X I  П
e
 N_RUR_P WFP Ig_Q βij 
ПT  Z Ig Ωg if Fmt-1 Cg_Q ʋ 
  H K 
Ω 
e
f
 
Dmt-1 rqr 
σ 
∆Fm
T
 FQ Kg PD PD
f
 Dbgt-1 i ϴi 
  Cp Q PD
T
 T Fgt-1 ∆Dmg wi  
  M
D
 m П
f
 OIN Ft-1 ∆Fm   
    RM B CC Bt-1 ∆Fg   
    M
S
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d
 SD Kt-1 ∆B   
    EX_AD Fm TD Kgt-1 ∆Dbg   
    REER F ED PDt-1 TX_Q   
    r Fg DD  NTX_Q   
    Cg Dbg Yag_Q      
    Dmg cc Gcg      
    PC_RUR
OUT 
sd 
Gkg 
   
  
    S td Gcp      
    S_NTL err Gkp      
    S_I_NTL TX ∆Fp      
    S_FORG
N 
NTX 
∆Fb 
   
  
    S_I  W      
 
3.6.5 The Structure of the Model in Simultaneous Equations Form 
This section pulls the model together and presents the simultaneous equation structure of 
the modified financial programming model that combines all the behavioral equations, 
identities and exogenous variables presented in the theoretical section (Section 3.5).  The 
definitions of the variables are provided in Table 3.3 above.  The precise model used in the 
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simulation and forecasting exercise, with all the identities and parameter values and lags as 
estimated in Section 3.7 below is presented in Annex I.  
Table 3-3: Definitions of Variables 
I.     Endogenous Variables  II.     Exogenous Variables  
Cg real gov’t consumption  βij short-run elasticity coefficient 
Cp real private consumption  αij long-run elasticity coefficient 
Dmg central bank's net claims 
on gov't 
∆Fb change in NFA of 
commercial banks 
FQ infrastructure services 
(output) 
∆Fg change in NFA of the 
government 
F total investment abroad ∆Fm change in NFA of the central 
bank 
Fb NFA of commercial 
banks 
∆Fp change in NFA of the private 
sector 
Fg NFA of the government B total treasury bills holdings; 
Fm
T 
net international reserves 
target (Fm) in local 
currency 
cc currency in circulation ratio 
Fp NFA of the private sector Cg_Q real gov’t consumption 
demand 
H Human capital stock Dbg Comm. banks' claims on 
gov’t 
I gross total capital 
formation 
e nominal exchange rate  
Ig gross public capital 
formation (including state 
enterprises capital 
formation) 
err excess reserve ratio  
Ip total private capital 
formation 
Gcg external government current 
transfer; 
K total gross capital stock,  Gcp external private transfers 
Kg gross public capital stock Gkg government net external 
borrowing 
M the money multiplier   Gkp private net external 
borrowing 
Md_PD_A real money demand g
T
 long-term growth rate (target) 
MS broad money supply (M2) i domestic nominal interest rate  
NTX total non-tax revenue i
f
 Foreign nominal interest rate 
PC-
RUROUT 
per-capita rural output 
ratio; 
Ig_Q public capital formation to 
GDP ratio 
Q real GDP (aggregate 
demand) 
N labour stock measured by 
total population 
Q
T
 potential  output  NTX_Q non-tax revenue to GDP ratio 
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Table 3-3 (Cont’d): Definition of Variables 
I.     Endogenous Variables  II.     Exogenous Variables  
R real domestic interest rate; OIN Other items net (OIN) of the 
central bank; 
REER real effective exchange rate; POPagr rural population; 
RM reserve money of the central 
bank; 
rqr legal reserve ratio on bank 
deposits 
S gross domestic savings 
(domestic private plus 
public sector savings) 
sd saving deposits ratio 
S_FORG
N 
foreign savings td time deposits ratio 
S_I saving-investment gap after 
available foreign savings 
TX_Q total tax revenue to GDP 
ratio 
S_I_NTL saving-investment gap 
before financing from 
available foreign savings 
W workers remittance 
S_NTL gross national savings Yag_Q agricultural output to GDP 
ratio 
TX total tax revenue ϴi the weight attached to the 
contribution of channel ‘i'  
X real exports of goods and 
services 
σ annual depreciation rate of 
capital stock  
Y real domestic disposable 
income;  
П domestic inflation rate of 
consumer goods 
Z real imports of goods and 
services  
WFP food price index of major 
trading partner countries  
Ω BOPs financing gap  ʋ the weight attached to the 
contribution of inflation 
target on people’s formation 
of inflation expectation 
Ωg government financing gap   
ПT domestic inflation rate     
Пf food inflation in major 
trading partner countries 
  
Пe inflation expectation   
 PD  domestic price index   
 PD
T
  Domestic price index target   
     A dynamic solution is used to predict the future values of the variable for the entire 
period of both within sample and out-of-sample simulations. E-views solves the model 
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recursively using an iterative procedure.  The FP framework has seven blocks, i.e., the 
long-term growth and productivity; the aggregated demand; the money market; the 
government sector; the balance of payments; saving-investment equilibrium and price 
blocks.   
I. Long-term Growth, Investment and Total Factor Productivity Block 
I.A Long-Term Output Growth  
Qt
T
 - Q
T
t-1 (1+g
T) = 0 ………………………………………………….….…….........…… 1 
I.B. Total Investment and Factor Productivity Growth  
I.B.1.    Total Capital Stock 
Kt - [It + (1-σ)Kt-1] = 0….……………………………...………………….…….…..……. 2 
It – (Igt + Ipt) = 0…………….……………………………………..........…..........….......… 3 
Kgt - (1-σ)Kgt-1+ Igt = 0…………………………………………..........……...........….…... 4 
I.B.2.   Total Private Investment Requirement 
Ipt - [(g
T
- [α13∆lnNt + α14∆lnHt +α15∆lnFQt +α16∆lnXt])Kt-1/α12 - Igt + σKt-1] = 0............... 5 
I.B.3.   Total Factor Productivity Growth 
∆lnHt-[∑β21∆lnHt-m +∑β22∆lnKgt-m +∑β23∆ln(Q/N)t-m +α21(lnHt-1+α22lnKgt-1  
+ α23ln(Q/N)t-1 +α24)] = 0………………………………...………..……………… 6 
∆lnFQt-[∑β31∆lnFQt-m +∑β32 ∆lnKgt-m+∑β33∆lnNLt-m+ α31(lnFQt-1 +α32lnKgt-1+ 
 α33lnNLt-1+ α34)] = 0……...………………………...…………………………...… 7 
∆lnXt – [∑β41∆lnXt-m +∑β42∆lnQt-m + ∑β43∆lnREERt-m + α41(lnXt-1 + α42lnQt-1  
+ α43lnREERt-1 + α44)] = 0………………………………………..……….….…… 8 
REERt = ∑wit (e
f
it/et)(PD
f
i/tPDt) ……………………………….......................….……….. 9 
II. Short-Term Aggregate Demand  
Qt - Cpt - Cgt - Ipt - Igt - Xt + Zt= 0 ……...……………………...………..............….…….. 10 
∆lnCpt - [∑β51∆lnCpt-m + ∑β52 ∆lnY
d
t-m + ∑β53∆rt-m + α51(lnCpt-1 + α52lnY
d
t-1  
 + α53rt-1+ α54)] = 0…………….……………………………….…………....….... 11 
Y
d
t – (Qt - Tt) = 0 …………...………………………………………….….……….....….. 12 
rt - (1+it)/(1+Пt) = 0 ………..……..………..………………………….…………...….....  13 
Cgt - Cg_Q
K
t*Qt = 0 .………..……………………………..………….…………….......… 14 
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∆lnZt – [∑β61∆lnZt-m + ∑β62 ∆lnQt-m + α61 (lnZt + α62lnQt + α63)] = 0…………….....….. 15 
III. The Money Market 
III.A Money Supply  
M
S
t– mt*RMt= 0 ……..………..……..……….……………………………..………...…. 16 
RMt - (et*Fmt+ Dmg
K
t - OIN
K
t) = 0 …..……………………….….…..……..………..…… 17  
Fmt - (Fmt-1 + ∆Fm
K
t) = 0 …………………...……………………...………………………. 18 
Dmgt - (Dmgt-1 + ∆Dmg
K
t) = 0 …...……………..…………………………...…………….… 19 
mt - (1+cct)/[rqrt (1+sdt+tdt)+cct+errt] = 0 ……………………..……………………....…. 20 
cct – CC
K
t/DD
K
t = 0 ……………………………...………………..………..………...……21 
sdt – SD
K
t/DD
K
t = 0 ……………………….…………………...…………...……..……….22 
tdt – TD
K
t/DD
K
t = 0 …….………………………………...…………......………..………. 23 
edt – ED
K
t/DD
K
t = 0 …………..…………………………………..............……….…..…. 24 
III.B Money Demand  
∆ln(MD/PD)t - [∑β71∆ln(M
D
/PD)t-m-1 +∑β72 ∆lnY
d
t-m+ ∑β73∆lnPC-RUROUTt-m+∑β74∆rt-
m+∑β75∆lnREERt-m +α71[(ln(M
D
/PD)t-1 +α72lnY
d
t-1 
+ α73lnPC-RUROUTt-1+α74∆rt-1 + α75lnREERt-1 + α76]] = 0 …………..…….... 25 
PC-RUROUTt-1Yag_Q
K
t*Qt/N_RUR_Pt = 0 ………..….…..……………………....…..... 26 
 
III.C Money Market Equilibrium  
M
S
t – M
D
t  = 0 …………...……………………...…………….………..…………......….. 27 
IV The Government Sector 
Ωgt- [(TXt+NTXt +Gcg
K
t+Gkg
K
t)-[Cgt+Igt+ et*it
f
*Fgt+it*(Dmgt+Dbgt+Bt)]+(et*Fg
K
t 
+Dbg
K
t+Dmg
K
t +B
K
t)] =0 ……….....………..…….……………………………. 28 
TXt– TX_Q
K
t*Qt = 0 ………………..……………….............………...….….……......… 29 
NTXt – NTX_Qt*Qt = 0…………………………………………..………….…....…...… 30 
Fgt = Fgt-1 + Fg
K
t……………………………………………………..…...…...…..…...… 31 
Dbgt = Dbgt-1 + Dbg
K
t……………………………….………………..……..……..……… 32 
Bt = Bt-1 + B
K
t…………………………………...……………………....…..…..….…… 33 
V. The Balance of Payments 
Ωt - [(PD*X/e)t– (PD*Z/e)t + i
f
Ft +W
K
t +Gcp
K
t +Gcg
K
t+Gkp
K
t+Gkg
K
t 
132 
 
 
-Fm
K
t-Fg
K
t-Fb
K
t-Fp
K
t]= 0………………………….……...……..………….…... 34 
Ft = Ft-1 + Fmt + Fg
K
t + Fb
K
t + Fp
K
t…………….……………….………………....…. 35 
VI. Saving-Investment Equilibrium 
VI.A Domestic Savings 
St- [∆Kt + (Xt-Zt)] = 0 ……………..……………………….……………………………. 36 
VI.B National Savings 
S_NTLt  -[∆Kt + (Xt - Zt) + et*(i
f
tFt + W
K
t + Gcp
K
t + Gcg
K
t)] = 0 ...….…………..........…. 37 
VI.C Saving –Investment Gap 
S_I_NTLt  - [S_NTLt  - ∆Kt]  = 0 ……..……………………...…….…..…..............….... 38 
VI.D Available Foreign Savings 
S_FORGNt – et*[Gkp
K
t+ Gkg
K
t-Fm
K
t-Fg
K
t-Fb
K
t-Fp
K
t] = 0…….……...….............……39 
VI.E Saving-Investment Gap after Available Foreign Financing 
S_It  - [S_I_NTLt  + S_FORGNt] = 0 ……………………..…………….............…….… 40 
VII. Aggregate Supply and Prices 
Пt- (ϴ1 EX_ADt + ϴ2П
f 
t+ ϴ3П
e
t) = 0 …………..…….…..….…..............................…… 41 
EX_ADt - (M
S
t - M
d
t)/ M
d
t = 0 ………………………...…………..............................….. 42 
Пft- [(WPFt - WPFt-1) / WPFt-1]  = 0 ……......…..…………………..............…...........….. 43 
Пet - [ʋ [(PD
T
t/PD
T
t-1)-1] + (1-ʋ)* [(PDt-1/PDt-2)-1]] = 0 ……............................................ 44 
PDt- (1+ Пt) PDt-1 = 0 ………………..……………………………………..............…… 45’ 
3.7 Estimation Results of Individual Equations 
This section reports the estimation of the long-run equations specified in Section 3.5.  The 
estimation takes a short-run dynamic error correction mechanism as presented in equation 
(49).  Except for the real interest rate, which enters as explanatory variable in the private 
consumption function (equation 11) and the nominal interest rate in the demand for money 
function (equation 25), all variables are transformed into natural logarithms.  Interest rates 
are expressed in percentage form.  This all implies that, except in the case of interest rate, 
all other reported coefficients are elasiticities.  We do not have much theory with which to 
interpret the short-run dynamics, so we do not spend much time describing them, but we do 
note a few striking features below.  The long-run coefficients of the ARDL model, on the 
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other hand, are of keen interest because we can interpret them and because financial 
programming is basically a long-run exercise.   
     The estimates of the long-run relationships are shown in bold in square brackets below 
and will form the center of our discussion in this section.  Following the literature, the 
coefficients inside the bracket are normalized by dividing the estimated long-run 
coefficients by the ECM term, i.e. α1 as illustrated under equation (49) [Pesaran and Shin, 
1997 and Banerjee, et al, 1998]. A key estimate is that of α1, the error correction 
mechanism (ECM) coefficient, the sign and significance of which tells us whether the long-
run estimates represent a genuine long-run cointegrated relationship or not.  It needs to be 
significantly less than zero for cointegration, so that if, say, the actual value of the 
dependent variable exceeds the predicted long-run value, the growth of the variable is 
reduced in the next period.  The significance of these coefficients are tested using the 
Pesaran et al, (2001) bound test statistic with unrestricted intercept and no trend.  The 
Pesaran et al, (2001) critical values for the bound test statistics are attached as Annex VII 
and VIII on pages 259-261. 
3.7.1   Potential Output 
Equation (50) reports the long-run growth or potential growth model specified in equation 
(1’).  The estimation result shows that the ECM term is significant at one percent level as 
reflected by a t-statistic of -6.62.  The critical value at one percent level of significance with 
three period lag is -4.37.  All the coefficients in the long-run model have the expected 
signs.  
     The elasticity of output with respect to physical capital is 0.53 which implies a 1 percent 
increase in capital stock expands potential output by 0.53 percent which is moderately 
higher than the other developing countries which about 0.40 percent when structural factors 
such as export growth and human capital (education) are included [Chenery, 1986].  The 
higher elasticity in Ethiopia might reflect the fact that initial capital stock was lower than 
the average in developing countries [Romer, 2006 and Agenor and Montiel, 1999].  Labor 
is found to be insignificant, as expected in a typical labor surplus agrarian economy.  On 
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the other hand, human capital, infrastructure services and exports are all found to have 
significant positive contributions to economic growth, via the spillover they induce, with 
elasticities of 0.15, 0.13 and 0.08 respectively.  The sum of elasticities of all production 
inputs in equation (50) is about 0.94, which is close to constant returns to scale.  This 
supports the argument by Agenor and Montiel (1999, p.680) that “… in models exhibiting 
spillover effects sustained growth does not result from the existence of external effects, but 
rather from the assumption of constant returns to scale in all production inputs that can be 
accumulated”84.  
     The ECM coefficient is 0.72, which suggests that long-run disequilibria in potential 
output are corrected quickly.  This is not surprising given that equation (1’) is close to 
being a technological rather than a behavioral relationship.  This rapid adjustment is 
overlaid, however, by cyclical dynamics, which suggest that increases in Q are partially 
unwound after two years (negative coefficients on lagged values) and a very strong 
instantaneous reaction to physical capital, which is gradually eroded through the error 
correction mechanism, and the dynamics of Q.   
∆LOG(Q) = -0.1835*∆LOG(QP(-2)) - 0.1060*∆LOG(Q(-3)) + 1.7198*∆LOG(K)     
                     (-2.5745)                          (-1.3276)                         (2.8522)                    
 
+ 0.1966*∆LOG(NT)        – 0.4084*∆LOG(NT (-1)) - 0.5695*∆LOG(NT(-2)) 
  (1.8319)             (-4.2285)                           (-5.8901)     
 
- 0.4393*∆LOG(NT (-3)) + 0.0565*∆LOG(H) – 0.1408*∆LOG(FQ(-2))  
 (-4.3106)            (1.7836)                (-2.6250)                          
 
- 0.2632*∆LOG(FQ(-3)) + 0.0681*∆LOG(X) – 0.0694*∆D(LOG(X(-1))  
(-5.5762)                       (2.5209)            (-3.2619)                 
 
+ 0.0494*∆LOG(X(-3)) – 0.7175*[LOG(Q(-1)) - 0.5325*LOG(K(-1)) 
(2.3160)             (-6.6282)                     (-2.1930)                      
 
 + 0.0374*LOG(NT (-1)) - 0.1497*LOG(H(-1)) - 0.1227*LOG(FQ(-1))  
 (-0.4996)                          (-4.0342)                     (-2.0410)                       
 
 - 0.0171*DSB2007*LOG(FQ(-1)) – 0.0805*LOG(X(-1)) + 0.0519*DUMY92 – 2.6043] ...........…50 
 (-5.4832)                 (-2.2806)                     (1.5156)                 (-1.1801) 
 
 AdjustedR
2
 = 0.967   s = 0.017 
                                                          
84
Robelo (1991) also emphasizes that increasing returns are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate 
endogenous growth. 
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       Figure 3.3 shows the impulse response function for a onetime 10 percent increase in 
physical capital.  The figure demonstrates that the model is stable but that adjustment takes 
a relatively long time to settle to the steady-state value.  There are also vigorous dynamics 
associated with changes in the labor force, but given that the variable itself evolves very 
steadily, these do not end up having much impact on the temporal evolution of Q.  
     As we discuss below, however, the diagnostic tests indicate the need for a permanent 
shock to output of five percent in 1992 as the economy was liberalized and also a structural 
change in the relationship with at least one of the regressors in fiscal year 
Figure 3-2: Impulse response of output (Q) for a 10 percent increase in physical 
capital stock (K) in 2014 
 
2007.  The change in 2006 and 2007 is attributed to a significant shift in food markets, 
which accounted for about 57 percent of the consumption basket.  For the first time since 
the country began to compile official statistics, food inflation began to be positive during a 
good harvest season (i.e., between November and January), outside drought and war years. 
We discuss food inflation below, but, briefly, Figures 3.13 and 3.14, on pages 149, depict 
quarterly food inflation line-graphs for the periods 1981-2006 and 2007-2013, respectively.  
The graph in the second period clearly shows that inflation stayed positive throughout the 
period, with very few exceptions. 
     As argued in Chapter 2, the change in the structure of the food markets, and the resulting 
break in the food inflation cycle, stems from years of investments in rural 
telecommunication and road infrastructure, which facilitated the integration of people in 
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rural areas into telecom and transport services.  Moreover, better access to rural credit 
through microfinance institutions has eased liquidity constraint in rural areas.  Todaro and 
Smith (2009, p.237) argue, “Raising the income levels of the poor will stimulate an overall 
increase in the demand for locally produced necessity products like food and clothing, 
whereas the rich tend to spend more of their additional incomes on imported luxury goods”.  
As illustrated in Figure 3.2 below, per capita rural income has steadily risen since 2004, but 
in value terms, it took almost three years, until 2006, to reach the level attained in 1996.   
Figure 3-3: Annual Real Per-capita Rural Income (1971-2013) in thousand Birr 
 
It is not possible to estimate the equation in standardized form but we can calculate the 
relative contributions to potential output by calculating the effects of increasing each 
variable by a ‘typical amount’.  Table 3.4 shows the contributions implied by the long-run 
coefficients in terms of two ‘typical variations’ – the standard deviation of each variable 
which, broadly, captures how much statistical explanation each variable offers, and the 
average growth of each variable over my sample, which gives a more historically oriented 
view.  Table 3.4 presents a calculation of the former type.  
Table 3-4: Contribution of Each Variable to Output Growth 
 
Variable 
 
lnQ 
 
lnK 
 
lnN 
 
lnH 
 
lnFQ 
 
lnX 
Sum/ 
Residual 
Coefficient  1.000 0.533 0.037 0.150 0.140 0.081   
Std. Deviation 0.108 0.174 0.054 0.027 0.023 0.025   
Contribution 0.108 0.093 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.104 
Shares   85.7% 1.9% 3.7% 3.0% 1.9% 3.9% 
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Table 3.4 indicates that Ethiopia’s economic growth is highly dependent on physical capital 
formation over the sample period (1971-2013)
85
. In China, Wang and Yao (2002), using a 
simple growth-accounting framework that incorporates human capital stock, found that 
physical capital contributed about 47.7 percent of China’s economic growth during reform 
period (1978-1999), while labor, human capital stock and the residual TFP contributed 15.9 
percent, 11.0 percent and 25.4 percent, respectively. Moreover, for three newly 
industrialized economies, namely, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, Young (1995) estimates 
that the contribution of total factor productivity ranges between 16.5 percent and 31.5 
percent. 
     The findings have significant policy implication for Ethiopia.  First, as the economy 
grows, the marginal cost of keeping the current growth momentum though physical capital 
accumulation rises significantly, which would raise the question of financing.  Second, as 
the cost of investment grows, the country becomes less competitive in the international 
market, which in turn, worsens the current account situation.  Hence, Ethiopia needs to 
strengthen further its policies on raising total factor productivity as well as investing 
strongly in human capital development and infrastructure growth. 
A. Diagnostic tests 
The reported robustness test statistics are in table 3.5 below.  
           Table 3-5: Diagnostic test results 
Tests Jarque-Bera ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 0.142 0.57 10.158 1.97 
p-values (0.93) (0.448)  (0.001) (0.37) 
 Briefly, they suggest the following:  
                                                          
85
The results may have been heavily influenced by the economic situation during the period between 1971 
and 2003, which accounts about three-fourths of the total sample.  During that period, average unemployment 
was more than 30 percent, export growth was depressed, and the country did little on human capital and 
infrastructure development.  On the other hand, between 2004 and 2013, government has made significant 
investment on human capital and infrastructure developments.   So, the picture is expected to be different in 
the latter period.  However, the small sample size limits me from running a separate regression for the period. 
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1/The model passes Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test.  The null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. 
2/The null hypothesis of normally distributed errors, the Jarque-Bera test, is not rejected, 
which indicates that inference about the coefficients is likely to be correct.   
3/In the LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected, which offers some comfort about 
omitted variables and suggests that the standard errors are efficiently estimated. 
4/ In the RESET test, the null hypothesis is that the functional form is correct and the value 
of the test statistic greater than the Chi-squared critical value rejects the null. This test has 
been criticized for being oversized in ADL models with I (1) variables leading to frequent 
over-rejections, however: based on a Monte Carlo experiment on the validity of diagnostic 
tests, Gerrard and Godfrey (1998, p. 228) suggest extreme caution in interpreting its results.  
B. Stability tests 
Structural break tests were also conducted on the model before all the other diagnostic tests 
on the residuals and the parameters were carried out.  As the Chow break point test is found 
unsuitable to equation (50) because of the presence of a step dummy in 1992, the approach 
described in section 3.6.2.3 is used. 
     Table 3.6 presents the long run part of the estimated potential output model Equation 
(1’) in ECM form three possible structural shifts - starting respectively in 2000, 2004 and 
2007. These dates are selected based on a prior knowledge
86
.  The year 2000 is the period 
when the Ethiopian government started to give special emphasis to economic growth 
following the end of the two-year border conflict with Eritrea, while 2004 is the year in 
which the country embarked on a double-digit growth path.  On the other hand, in 
connection with the Ethiopian millennia
87
, several road and water projects and one of the 
largest hydroelectric power dams were commissioned in the year 2007.  In addition, 2007 
                                                          
86
In addition, visual inspection of trends of fitted and residual plots are also used as supplementary evidences.  
For instance, the residual plot shows a strong upward shift in 2007 and the model’s predictive power gets 
weaker since then.   
87
The Ethiopian millennium, i.e. 2000 E.C., was celebrated on September 11, 2007.  
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was the year when government renewed its commitment to Ethiopian renaissance and 
called for national reconciliation.  As a result, at the government’s invitation, a record 
number of Ethiopian Diaspora returned home and began to be engaged in a wide range of 
investment activities in the country.   
     Table 3.6 shows that, based on a t-test on the structural shift variable
88
 
[DSB(2007)*LogFQ(-1)], there is strong evidence for the presence of a structural shift in the 
relationship between output and infrastructure starting 200789.  The results also clearly show 
that the inclusion of a structural shift variable improves the overall performance of the 
model.  For instance, unlike the other models, the coefficient of the lagged long-run output 
variable (Log(Q(-1)), which is also the ECM term, is found significant at 1 percent level.  
In the other models, the ECM term fails to pass even at 10 percent significance level.  
Moreover, physical capital, infrastructure output and exports are also found to be 
significant with a shift in 2007, whereas they generally failed to be so in the remaining 
models. 
Table 3-6: Tests for structural break point in potential output equation 
  2000 2004 2007 
Long-run variable1/ 
Coeffi- 
cient  t-ratio  
Coeffi- 
cient  t-ratio  
Coeffi- 
cient t-ratio  
Log K(-1) 0.400 1.352 0.291 0.962 0.382 2.193** 
Log NT(-1) -0.071 -0.561 -0.053 -0.561 -0.027 -0.500 
Log H(-1) 0.104 2.313** 0.091 2.033* 0.107 4.034*** 
Log FQ(-1) 0.058 0.475 0.052 0.693 0.088 2.041* 
Log X(-1) 0.014 0.331 0.012 0.322 0.058 2.281*** 
Log Q(-1) -0.518 -3.038 -0.449 -2.494 -0.717 -6.628*** 
DSB(X)*LogFQ(-1) 0.001 0.182 0.003 0.916 0.012 5.483*** 
1/DSB(X) represents DSB2000, DSB2004 andDSB2007 respectively, where DSB stands 
for dummy for structural break. 
                                                          
88
The structural break tests were conducted on both human development (H) and infrastructure output (FQ) 
variables. However, based on t-test results and comparisons on the performance of the model, including the 
significance of the ECM term (in the three models), all the evidences indicate that the shift in infrastructure 
output variable is the prime cause for structural shift in the long run output model.  Hence, the three models 
are re-estimated dropping the structural shirt variable attached to human development index variable 
[DSB(X)*LogH(-1)]. 
89
 According to the t-test results, there is no evidence of structural shift in the output equation in 2000 and 
2004.  
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     The cumulative sum of recursive residual (CUSUM) and squares of recursive 
(CUSUMSQ) plots indicate that, once we allow for the structural break in 2007, the 
estimated coefficients are stable.  The diagnostic figures are reproduced here for this case 
by way of illustration, but for the various equations below, I reproduce them only when the 
null hypothesis of stability is (nearly) rejected. In the case of potential output, the CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ plots both remain within a 5 percent  
Figure 3-4: CUSUM: 1971–2006 
 
Figure 3-5: CUSUM: 2007–2013 
 
Figure 3-6: CUSUMSQ: 1971-2006 
 
 
Figure 3-7: CUSUMSQ: 2007-2013 
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significance level portrayed by the two broken straight lines. However, note that because of 
the structural change built into final equation E-Views provides the tests only for subsets 
either side of the break.  
3.7.2   Human Capital Development  
Equation (51) reports the short-run dynamic error-correction model results of human capital 
model in equation (6).  The ECM term is significant at one percent level confirming long-
run relationship in the model, and its magnitude is about -0.9.  As expected the elasticity of 
public physical capital stock is almost unity and is significant at one percent level implying 
a one-to-one relationship between public investment and human capital development.    
∆LOG(H)) = 0.129*∆LOG(H(-2)) + 0.376*∆LOG(H(-3)) + 0.157*∆LOG(H(-4))  
       (1.281)   (3.844)                         (1.674)  
 
+ 0.261*∆LOG(H(-5)) + 0.166*∆LOG(PC_Y) - 0.139*∆LOG(PC_Y(-1))  
  (2.899)                          (0.934)                         (-0.670)                               
 
- 0.362*∆LOG(PC_Y(-5)) + 2.689*∆LOG(KG) + 1.215*∆LOG(KG(-2)) +  
 (-1.987)                                (4.917)          (2.000)                           
 
0.864*∆LOG(KG(-5)) - 0.879*[LOG(H(-1)) -0.254*LOG(PC_Y(-1))  
(1.492)                         (-6.898)                       (-3.654)    
 
-1.121*LOG(KG(-1)) + 9.148] ………………………………………………....…….. 51 
(-6.356)                         (6.162)    
 
AdjustedR
2
 = 0.684   s = 0.056    
The estimated elasticity of per-capita income is about 0.25.  In one sense this might reflect 
the incentive to families or individuals to invest human capital development, but it more 
probably reflects their capacity to finance education, which involves opportunity costs even 
if not direct costs. It is rather lower than one would expect because we tend to think of 
education as a superior good or service, however, increasing income arguably takes longer 
to work through the system to affect enrollment rates than just the immediate impact we 
have been able to identify here. 
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     Figure 3.8 shows the dynamic adjustment to a 40 percent increase in public capital 
formation in 2015
90
.  The variable reverberates around its steady-state for a longer time 
before it settles down.  
Figure 3-8: Impulse response function for a 40 percent increase in public 
capital formation (Ig) 
 
Equation (51) was subjected to the array of diagnostic and stability tests and revealed no 
concerns in any of them. The diagnostic tests are reported in Table 3.7 below 
Table 3-7: Diagnostic Test results   
Tests   Jarque_Bera  ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 
 
0.432  1.462 1.162 0.676 
        p-values   (0.806)  (0.227)  (0.281)  (0.713) 
 
3.7.3   Public Infrastructure  
Equation (52) reports the ECM model estimation results of equation (7).  The model 
confirms the presence of strong co-integration.  The ECM term is significant at 1 percent 
level and its magnitude is close to 0.86.  The Chow test confirmed presence of a structural 
break in the relationship between capital stock and infrastructure in 2000.
91
  The sum of the 
elasticities of public capital stock indicate that, since 2000, a one percent increase in the 
                                                          
90
A 40 percent increase in public capital formation (Ig) in 2015 is equivalent to adding an extra 3.3 percent to 
the public capital stock. 
91
As there is no step dummy in this model, a Chow break point test is applied to detect presence of a structural 
break. 
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former leads to a 0.83 percent increase in infrastructure output.  In this equation, labor is 
also found to be insignificant.  This implies that labor is not a major constraint on provision 
of infrastructural services in a labor-surplus economy like Ethiopia. Infrastructure sector 
mainly employs low-skilled workers. 
∆LOG(FQ)) = 0.463*∆LOG(FQ(-1)) + 0.360*∆LOG(FQ(-2)) + 0.196*∆LOG(FQ(-3))  
         (3.298)                           (2.548)                            (1.510)                            
 
+ 0.168*∆LOG(FQ(-4))  + 1.698*∆LOG(KG) - 1.085*∆LOG(KG(-1)) 
 (1.249)                (2.866)     (-1.717)                           
 
- 0.505*∆LOG(KG(-4)) + 0.368∆LOG(N) - 0.856*[LOG(FQ(-1)) – 0.802*LOG(KG(-1)  
(-1.049)                            (2.356)             (-6.008)                         (-5.047)                                  
 
-0.027*DSB2000*LOG(KG(-1) -0.088*LOG(N(-1) + 1.998]……….........…………..……… 52 
(-5.976)                                      (-0.626)                     (-3.824) 
 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.720   s = 0.052    
The short-term dynamics are quite long-lived in this equation.  An increase in infrastructure 
services provision induces further increases in each of the next four years, while an increase 
in public investment produces a burst of infrastructure services, which then erodes over the 
next few years.  Figure 3.9 shows the impulse response function for a 40 percent increase in 
public capital formation in 2015. 
Figure 3-9:  Impulse response function for a 40 percent increase in public 
capital formation 
 
The equation passes the normality, heteroscedasticty, omitted variable and autocorrelation 
tests – see Table 3.8.  The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests revealed a structural instability, 
which we identified as being in 2000, due to a shift in government policy towards public 
infrastructure investment.  Once this is allowed for these tests, suggest no problems at all. 
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   Table 3-8: Diagnostic Test results    
Tests 
 
Jarque_Bera ARCH RESET LM        
Chow 
Breakpoint 
Test (2000)  
Statistic 
 
2.719 0.096 0.002 1.195 96.36 
p-values  (0.257) (0.757) (0.961) (0.550) (0.000) 
 
3.7.4   Exports 
In equation 53, the significance of the ECM term at 1 percent level signifies the presence of 
cointegration vector in the export equation.  The speed of adjustment is relatively quick, 
suggesting that about four-fifth of the deviation from the long-run equilibrium will be 
eliminated the next year. Given the sensitivity of Ethiopia’s economy to foreign exchange 
crises, this quick rate of adjustment is good news for economic management. Real GDP and 
the REER have the expected signs and both have long-run elasticities of around unity.  The 
former is pretty much in line with experience elsewhere, but the latter is rather higher than 
found in most developing  
∆LOG(X) = 0.268*∆LOG(X(-1)) + 0.300*∆LOG(X(-2)) + 0.419*∆LOG(X(-3)) 
     (1.559)                           (1.623)                         (2.234)                           
 
+ 0.296*∆LOG(X(-4)) -0.480*∆LOG(REER) + 0.306*∆LOG(REER(-2))  
 (1.828)            (-2.829)                          (1.286)                                  
 
+ 0.616*∆LOG(REER(-3))  + 0.316*∆LOG(REER(-4)) + 1.100*∆LOG(Q)  
(3.059)                                   (1.349)                                   (2.328)                        
 
- 1.311*∆LOG(Q(-1)) - 0.455*∆LOG(Q(-4)) - 0.783*[LOG(X(-1))  
 (-2.574)                        (-0.925)                       (-4.360) 
 
+ 0.670*LOG(REER(-1)) -1.205*LOG(Q(-1)) -0.531*DUMMY_84  
(4.192)                               (-4.293)                      (-3.144)                          
 
+ 0.561*DUMY92 + 1.489]…………………………..………………………………........…… 53 
(3.313)        (0.895) 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.725 s = 0.107 
countries. Although adjustment may be quite slow, this strong response to the real 
exchange rate suggests that the Ethiopian government is fortunate in terms of having an 
145 
 
 
effective tool with which to manage its balance of payments.  The dynamic adjustment of 
exports to 10 percent increase in real GDP is illustrated in figure 3.10.   
The export equation passes all the diagnostic tests Table 3.9 and the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests also confirm that the estimated equation is very stable.  The step dummies 
for 1984 and 1992 are needed to make the model stable.  The former represents the most 
severe drought that caused agricultural output to decline by 13 percent while the latter 
stands for change of government. 
Table 3-9: Diagnostic Test Results   
Tests   Jarque_Bera ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 
 
0.570 2.298 0.703 0.516 
p-values  (0.752) (0.131)  (0.402)  (0.773) 
 
Figure 3-10:  Impulse response function for a 10 percent increase in real GDP 
(Q) in 2014 
 
3.7.5   Private Consumption 
The private consumption function is also found to have a stable long-run relationship with 
an ECM close to 0.8.  The long-run elasticity of consumption with respect to disposable 
income is close to one in line as one might expect in a poor economy.  As expected, the real 
interest rate negatively affects private consumption demand, with a partial elasticity that 
implies that a one-percentage point increase in real interest rate leads to a 0.002 percent 
decrease in private consumption demand.        
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∆LOG(CP) = -0.180*∆LOG(CP(-1)) + 0.123*∆LOG(CP(-4)) + 0.603*∆LOG(YDI)  
                      (-1.375)                           (0.686)                            (5.373)                          
 
+ 0.001*∆RINTRATE(-1) + 0.001*∆RINTRATE(-2) - 0.782*[LOG(CP(-1))  
(1.555)                                  (0.810)                              (-4.834)                        
 
-1.080*LOG(YDI(-1)) + 0.002*RINTRATE(-1) + 1.242]……….............……….......……….54 
(-5.107)                          (2.120)                            (4.421) 
 
            Adjusted R
2
 = 0.734   s = 0.034     
The model settles into its steady state value relatively quickly– see figure 3.11 for the 
impulse response function.   
     As with other equations, the diagnostic tests are all passed with very little sign that the 
null hypotheses of ‘good’ behavior are rejected – Table 3.10.Likewise, there is no sign of 
instability. 
Table 3-10: Diagnostic Test Results  
Tests   Jarque-Bera ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 
 
0.515 0.012 0.573 1.562 
p-values  (0.773) (0.912)  (0.449)  (0.458) 
Figure 3-11:  Impulse response function for a 10 percent increase in real YDI 
in 2014 
 
3.7.6   Imports 
The import function is found to be subject to repeated structural shifts.  The first one 
happens in 1993 when the country liberalized trade from a command economy supported 
by the IMF and the World Bank.  The second structural break happened in 2004 when the 
economy shifted to double digit growth trajectory.    
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∆LOG(Z) = 0.153*∆LOG(Z(-2)) + 0.165*∆LOG(Z(-4)) - 1.627*∆LOG(Q(-2))  
    (1.146)              (1.171)                        (-3.591)                
  
- 0.824*∆LOG(Q(-4)) - 0.338*[LOG(Z(-1)) -0.992*LOG(Q(-1))  
(-1.686)                        (-4.027)                    (-1.960)         
 
-0.080*DSB1993*LOG(Q(-1)) -0.057*DSB2004*LOG(Q(-1)) + 1.897]………......................... 55 
(-5.333)          (-3.102)             (0.420) 
 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.607   s = 0.094 
The ECM term is found significant at 5 percent level but the speed of adjustment is low 
(0.34).  As expected the output elasticity is close to unity.  The model has passed all the 
diagnostic tests reported in Table 3.11.  The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests also suggest 
that the coefficients are stable.  
     As shown in Figure 3.12, the impulse response for a shock in real GDP produces quite a 
strong unsettled pattern for about 10 years until 2025, and throughout this period, the 
variable reverberates in the positive territory, outside its steady state value.   
Table 3-11: Diagnostic Test Results  
Tests   Jarque-Bera ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 
 
0.652 1.356 0.504 0.304 
p-values  (0.722) (0.244)  (0.478)  (0.201) 
 
Figure 3-12:  Impulse response function for a 10 percent increase in real GDP 
in 2015 
 
3.7.7 The Demand for Money  
Equation (56) reports the estimation result of the demand for money function specified in 
equation (25) – in short-run dynamic error correction form.  The ECM term is significant at 
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one percent level confirming that the demand for money function in Ethiopia is 
cointegrated.  As theoretically motivated, the long-run elasticity coefficient of real GDP is 
close to one but a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the income elasticity of the 
demand for money is one.   
 
∆LOG(M2D_PD_A) = -0.147*∆LOG(M2D_PD_A(-2)) - 0.326*∆LOG(M2D_PD_A(-3)) 
(-1.557)                                          (-2.07)                                            
 
- 0.507*∆LOG(Q(-1)) - 0.241*∆LOG(Q(-2)) - 0.340*∆LOG(Q(-3))  
(-1.718)               (-1.293)                        (-1.671)                         
 
- 0.368*∆LOG(PC_RUROUT) + 0.400*∆LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1)) - 0.538*∆LOG(REER)  
(-2.688)              (2.037)                                            (-7.869)                           
 
- 0.058*∆LOG(REER(-1)) - 0.449*∆LOG(REER(-3)) - 2.207*∆INTRATE – 
(-0.819)    (-4.219)                              (-2.601)                     
 
2.930*∆INTRATE(-3) - 0.663*[LOG(M2D_PD_A(-1)) - 1.091*LOG(Q(-1))  
(-3.385)                        (-4.531)                     (-3.984)                                                               
 
+ 1.028*LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1)) - 0.297*DSB2006*LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1)) 
(4.501)                  (-2.360)       
 
+ 0.451*LOG(REER(-1)) + 2.859*INTRATE(-1) -1.044]…………………….……...…….……56 
   (3.721)                               (3.189)              (-0.671) 
 
 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.814   s = 0.041 
 
Per-capita rural output exercises a negative effect on the demand for money, given real 
GDP; that is, for a given GDP the larger the amount in the monetized urban and semi-urban 
areas, the larger is the demand for money.  Structural break tests confirm a break in the 
rural output relationship in 2006.  This was the period when the historical link between a 
good agricultural harvest season and a drop in food inflation began break down.  Prior to 
2006, food prices used to decline during agricultural harvest season (November to January) 
and start to rise in the slack season particular during sowing season (June to September). 
     There were at least two major reasons for the strong seasonal link between harvest and 
food price cycle.  First, there was no organized credit market such as microfinance 
institutions to smooth out liquidity strains during harvest season; this matters because this is 
the season that many traditional social activities take place in rural areas, including 
weddings.  A number of religious festivities would also take place during this period.  
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Second, the rural sellers come from far away with their produce, usually on foot and on 
horseback.  In the absence of telecommunication facilities, they would have no prior 
information about prices.  Hence, during harvest season they all tend to converge on the 
food market and have to take whatever the market offers because most of them are 
desperate to get liquid and cover expenses related to non-farm activities. The implication is 
that, although the rural demand for money increases during harvest season, their income 
from each unit of their produce declines because of lower prices.  The latter is what is 
reflected as a negative long-run elasticity coefficient of PC_RUROUT prior to 2006.  A 
structural break happens around 2007 because improved access to telecoms, transport 
facilities and, most importantly, to rural financing schemes that revolutionize rural life and 
help to break a strong seasonality link between harvests and food prices (Birru, 2007).  
     Figure 3.13 shows that, before 2007, food inflation was generally low and follows 
cyclical patterns, swinging between negative and positive territories, which repeat every 
year, except the drought years of 1985, 1995 and 2003.  However, this has changed since 
2007.  Figure 3.14 illustrates that, despite bumper harvests, food prices did not drop 
between October and January as it used to do in the previous years.  So, rural incomes 
increase from both a high volume of production and a continuous rise food prices.  The 
delayed delivery of food aid by the World Food Program amounting about USD 140 
million that coincided with the 2000/01 bumper harvest led food prices to drop by 60 
percent drop in the same year.  The food aid had been expected to come in 1999/2000 when 
the country experienced a moderate drought. 
Figure 3-13:  Quarterly Trend of Food Inflation in Ethiopia during 1981(QI) 
- 2006(QIV) 
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Figure 3-14:  Quarterly Trend of Food Inflation in Ethiopia during 2007(QI)-
2013(QIV) 
 
 
The demand for money increases when the domestic currency depreciates.  The past 
relative stability of the Birr and the public confidence that this earned means that 
expectations tend not to extrapolate from one depreciation to another future one.  Thus, as 
the birr depreciates people tend to hold additional domestic currency per unit of imported 
goods that reflects the dominance of transactions effect in their decision. Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Rehman (2005) also documented similar findings for India and Indonesia.  On the other 
hand, exactly as expected, the partial elasticity of money demand with respect to the 
interest rate is negative, i.e., -2.1, implying that a one percentage point increase the nominal 
interest rate leads to a 2.1 percent decline in the demand for money.  This indicates that the 
public see interest as an opportunity cost of holding money in Ethiopia.  
     Money demand shows complex short-term dynamics in Ethiopia – witness the large 
number of lagged changes in the error correction equation.  Figures 3.17-3.19 below show 
the impulse response functions for GDP, per-capita rural income and the real exchange rate 
respectively. The figures indicate that adjustments to both income, per-capita rural income 
and exchange rate shocks appear to reverberating around their respective steady states for 
quite long periods before settling down. 
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A. Impulse Response Functions 
Figure 3-15  Impulse response function for a 10 percent increase in real 
GDP in 2014 
 
Figure 3-16:  Impulse response function for a 40 percent increase in rural per-
capita income in 2015 
 
Figure3-17:  Impulse response function for a 10 percent appreciation 
REER in 2014 
 
     The demand for money function passes the normality, hetreosckedasticity, and the 
correct functional form tests.  However, it fails to pass the autocorrelation LM tests.  As 
explained in section 3.6.2.2, the presence of autocorrelation in ARDL model is an 
indication of serial correlation in omitted variables.  If the latter case, Green (2000) 
suggests, trying to relax the non-linear restrictions on the ARDL model as next step and 
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refitting the model by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS).  However, he also 
argues, “the asymptotic efficiency of FGLS estimators may not carry over to small samples 
because of the variability introduced in the estimated Ω”.  Therefore, Greene (2000, p. 470) 
continues to argue, “If the departure from the classical assumptions is not too severe, least 
squares may be more efficient than FGLS in a small samples”.  The fact that the model 
passes the RESET test, which is also one of the omitted variable tests, could suggest that 
the problem is not big enough to be considered as a severe departure from the classical 
assumptions.  So, as suggested by Greene (2000), limited by the small sample problem, we 
proceed with the estimated equation. 
 Table 3-12:  Diagnostic Test Results  
Tests Jarque-Bera ARCH RESET LM 
Statistic 0.954 0.693 0.197 12.302 
p-values (0.621) (0.683)  (0.657) (0.001) 
 
B. Stability tests 
 Figure 3-18: CUSUM                             
        
               Figure 3-19: CUSUMSQ 
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3.8 Model Simulation Results 
This section presents simulation results of the model.  Section 3.8.1 presents within-sample 
dynamic simulations for the period 2006 - 2013, while section 3.8.2 presents the out of 
sample forecasts for the period 2014 – 2025.  In the latter, I will try to evaluate the 
feasibility of the policy objectives that are laid out in the vision 2025 statement, and the 
implications that these targets have for economic policies, assuming that there will be no 
change in the main targets and policies.  The twelve year horizon is based on the remaining 
two years of GTP I, i.e., 2014 and 2015, followed by two successive GTPs, i.e., GTP II and 
GTP III, each with five-year duration that leads up to vision 2025.  The within-sample 
simulations use actual values for the exogenous variables during the period between 2006 
and 2013.  For the forecasts, except in a few cases which demand special judgments, all 
exogenous variables that are expressed in ratios, are kept constant at their 2013 values 
while exogenous variables that are not ratios are assumed to grow at their respective growth 
rates observed during 2011 – 2013.  There are also few cases where actual data for 2014 
and 2015 is used.  The economic targets, such as potential GDP growth, long-term inflation 
target and international reserve targets are kept unchanged at GTP I levels and I assume, 
initially, at least, no change in policies exercised during the first three years of the plan 
period (2011-2013). 
     Regarding the simulation procedure, as discussed in section 3.6.3, the model is solved 
simultaneously through an iterative procedure using E-views solver.  For presentation 
purposes, the simulation results are presented visually, with the figures organized into four 
groups based on market categories, i.e., the real sector, the external sector, the fiscal sector 
and the saving-investment equilibrium.  The monetary sector is combined with the real 
sector because the two are interwoven in the determination of inflation.  In addition, certain 
results are also tabulated for selected variables.  
    One modification of the model is important to note, however: the import equation 
(equation 55) is not used in the empirical simulation model as it made the model unstable.  
The impulse response function clearly shows that after a shock the variable reverberates 
outside the steady state value until 2025, which is the entire length of the simulation 
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exercise (see figure 3.12 on page 93).  This affects the stability of the whole model.  Hence, 
in the in-sample simulation, the import model is replaced by an identity using the imports 
(Z) to GDP (Q) ratio, Ф, as a coefficient to compute the value of imports in a given year, 
i.e., Zt = Фt*Qt.  Moreover, in the forecast exercise, the import coefficient (Фt) is modified 
exogenously to reflect the expected impact of the process of economic transformation from 
the agriculture base to a manufacturing base
92
.  As a result, the ratio is projected to rise at a 
rate similar to that observed over the first three years of GTP I (please see Table 3-16, on 
page 175-132).   
3.8.1   Within Sample Simulation: 2006 - 2013 
3.8.1.1   Actual vs. Baseline 
This section asks how well the simulation model tracks the actual data.  The baseline 
simulation is a simple run of the model without assuming any policy and making the 
exogenous variable take actual values during the solution period.  The model is solved 
recursively year by year for all endogenous variables for the period 2006-2013 using a 
dynamic solution.    
     As illustrated in Figures 3-20, the baseline solutions track the actual values well for 
almost all variables in the real section, with the exception of moderate deviations in private 
sector investment, inflation and infrastructure services during 2006 and 2007, and an error 
of trend over the rest of the period in the last five years, i.e., 2008-2013.  2006 and 2007 are 
the years in which structural breaks are found in the real output growth and money demand 
models as explained in sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.7, and it is time when the country experienced 
exogenous shocks associated with the rise in international prices of food.    
     In the external sector, the baseline simulation of exports and imports of goods and 
services tracks the actual values reasonably well although there is a persistent small under-
prediction of exports. This may be associated to the exogenous shocks in  
                                                          
92
 In the entire projection period (2014-2025), imports, particularly imports of capital goods and 
intermediaries, percentage of GDP are projected to rise steadily.   
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Figures 3-20:  Within-Sample (2006 -2013) Simulation Results: Baseline vs. 
Actual 
A. Real GDP, Investment and Inflation 
 
         B. Saving and Investment 
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C. External sector variables 
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D. Government Financing Gap 
 
international food prices that happened repeatedly since 2006.  Particularly, the export 
sector benefitted from the rise in prices as more than 70 percent of Ethiopia’s exports come 
from the agriculture sector.  Following from the trade results, the baseline simulation of the 
current account balance is also relatively accurate but with a tendency to slightly 
exaggerate the deficit.  The baseline foreign exchange gap looks extremely bad in figure 
but that is an artifact of the scale; in fact, the deviations are proportionately very small (the 
maximum error is 3.8 percent of total imports of goods and services).  The deviations in the 
external sector and savings could be explained by exogenous shock described above which 
are not well captured by the model.   
     In the government sector, the figure also looks alarming, but the deviation between the 
actual and baseline government financing gaps is less than 0.3 percent of GDP, which 
seems acceptable.  The baseline scenarios of domestic savings, national savings and gross 
fixed investment also track their actual counterparts fairly well.  Savings and investment 
show deviations in 2006 and 2007 related to those observed in the real and external sectors, 
and there is a tendency for the saving and investment gap to be under-predicted. 
     Overall, the predictive performance of the model is less than perfect, but not by so much 
that it is invalidated as a tool for exploring scenarios surrounding the GTP.  Before moving 
on to that, however, I explore some policy experiments for the period 2011-2013, in section 
3.8.1.2, below. 
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3.8.1.2 Simulation Results with Alternative Policy Scenarios 
In this section, the model is used to explore two alternative policy scenarios, in order to 
elucidate its workings more thoroughly.  The first assumes a 10-percent one-time nominal 
devaluation of the Birr against the dollar relative to baseline and the second assumes a 10 
percent one-step increase in public investment relative to baseline.  The shocks are assumed 
to happen in 2012.  All other policy and exogenous variables are assumed to maintain their 
baseline values.  The results are described in terms of the difference between the scenario 
and the baseline values of key variables. 
A. A Step Devaluation of the Birr by 10 percent in 2012 
This simulation confirms the main hypothesis of a foreign exchange constrained small open 
economy scenario.  A step devaluation of the Birr at the time, when the latter had already 
had appreciated by more than 15 percent in real terms as domestic inflation surged to close 
to 39 percent in 2012, results in a significant improvement in the current account of the 
balance of payment as exports increased moderately while imports increased only slightly. 
The increase in imports is a scale effect.  Consequently, the foreign exchange gap turns 
more positive.  In the money market, the demand for money increases as the Birr 
depreciates resulting in excess demand for money, pushing down the rate of inflation down.  
Similar to a typical foreign exchange constrained economies, in Ethiopia, domestic prices 
of tradable goods, particularly prices of imported goods reflect not the official exchange 
rate used here, but the black market rate [Dercon, 2002 and Ayalew, 1994].  The gap 
between official and parallel market exchange rate had already reached 7 percent by 2012, 
so the recorded depreciation had barely any effect on domestic prices but increased the 
demand for money because exports are monetized and banks were forced to inject 
additional liquidity.  Figure 3.21(D6) shows the government’s financing-gap also moving 
into the positive space.  This is because, as shown in Figure 3.21(D5) the non-bank public 
are willing to hold more government liabilities as part of their wealth portfolio following 
higher income flows from exports and export related activities. Corresponding to the 
government and foreign exchange gaps, the results also show an increased surplus saving-
investment balance.  
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Recall that this model is designed for an exercise in financial programming with 
endogenous gap variables, i.e., Ωg and Ω, which does not allow for a full set of adjustments 
that one would find in a forecasting model. Thus, the devaluation has resulted in a series of 
positive gaps in the foreign, government and savings-investment sectors.  In a real 
economy, these gaps would lead to further adjustments, which would tend to eliminate the 
excesses according to whatever method was chosen to close the model.  The government 
might adjust its policy stance by, for example, deciding to repay overseas debt and letting 
the capital account surplus to shrink. However, this would be a controversial policy 
proposal for a poor country that requires more investment in infrastructure and expanding 
its productive capacity.  Therefore, the other alternative is to let the budget deficit widen by 
investing on infrastructure and absorb the excesses in the economy.  
Figures 3-21:  Within Sample (2008-2013) Forecasts – The Effects of a 10 Percent 
Devaluation of the Birr in 2012 
A. Real GDP, Investment and Inflation 
 
240,000
280,000
320,000
360,000
400,000
440,000
480,000
520,000
560,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Q (Scenario 1) Q (Baseline)
A1.    Real GDP (Q): Level
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
IP (Scenario 1) IP (Baseline)
A2.   Real Private Investment (IP): Level
200,000
240,000
280,000
320,000
360,000
400,000
440,000
480,000
520,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
CP (Scenario 1) CP (Baseline)
A3.   Real Private Consumption (CP): Level
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
INFLATION (Scenario 1)
INFLATION (Baseline)
A4.    INFLATION: Percentag change in CPI
160 
 
 
B. Saving and Investment  
 
C. External Sector  
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D. Government Financing Gap 
 
B. A Step Increase in Real Public Fixed Formation by 10 percent in 2012    
The second policy scenario is a 10 percent one-step increase in public investment against 
the baseline in 2012.  The results are shown in Figure 3-22 below. In a straight-forward 
financial programming framework where capacity output is fixed and total investment is 
calculated using ICOR technique, increasing public sector investment would not increase 
total investment; instead, it would result in the crowding out of private investment, as 
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shown in the Real Sector of Figure 3-22(A2). Thus the policy would affect potential output 
by positively affecting factor productivity through the resulting increase in infrastructure 
output and human capital stock– see Figures 3-22(A4) and (A5).  Short-run aggregate 
demand, on the other hand, would remain more or less unaffected (Figure 3-22(A1)) 
despite a conspicuous decline in total gross total fixed investment whose effect seems to be 
offset by the rise in TFP . 
Figures 3-22:  Within-Sample (2008-2013) Forecasts – The Effects of a 10 
Percent Increase in Public Sector Investment 
A. Real GDP, Investment and Inflation  
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B. Saving and Investment  
 
C. External Sector Variables 
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D. Government Financing Gap 
 
In this scenario, the external current account balance shows some improvement due to 
slight decline in imports of goods and services following the decline in real GDP.  
However, the impact is significant in the government sector because the extra public 
investment drives the government into substantial budget deficit.  However, the saving-
investment gap has not widened correspondingly because, as Figures 3-22(D3) and (D4) 
show, the government expenditure is offset by lower private investment demand (Figure 3-
22(A2)).  The fiscal side could be closed, for example, by letting the yield on government 
bonds rise and, consequently, attracting the surplus in the private sector.    
     The scenario just described is not very attractive in terms of the needs of a low-income 
country like Ethiopia.  So I now ask the model to explore what would happen if the 
government wishes to finance the budget deficit resulting from its increased investment on 
infrastructure by inflationary financing instead of cutting consumption or exploring for 
additional external financing.  If the government decides to finance the resulting deficit 
through central bank borrowing while letting private investment remain unchanged,  it 
would effectively be raising total investment beyond the level required for the given 
potential growth rate. 
 
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q (Scenario 1)
GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q (Baseline)
D4.   Government Budget Financing Gap as
a Ratio of GDP (GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q)
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
TX (Scenario 1) TX (Baseline)
D1.   Total Tax Revenu (TX)
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
GOVCON_E (Scenario 1)
GOVCON_E (Baseline)
D2.    Real Government Consumption Expenditure
(GOVCON_E)
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
GOVCAP_E (Scenario 1)
GOVCAP_E (Baseline)
D3.   Real Government Capital Expenditure
(GOVCAP_E)
165 
 
 
Figures 3-23:  Assuming Governemnt Finances the Deficit by Borrowing from 
the Centeral Bank 
A. Real Sector Block 
 
B. Saving and Investment  
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C. External Sector  
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In the money market, the resulting excess money supply leads to an increase in inflation 
and this in turn results in a real exchange rate appreciation.  Consequently, in the foreign 
exchange market, exports decline while imports remain unaffected, turning the current 
account balance and foreign exchange gap to more negative.  This increases the saving-
investment gap as shown in Figure 3-23(B4).  In the immediate future, the solution to close 
the model is quantitatively by either borrowing from abroad or crowding out more private 
investment and aggregate consumption.  The latter helps to offset the excess investment 
demand created resulting from the policy scenario. 
3.8.1.3   Evaluation of GTP I Target vs. Actual Performance during 
the First Three years of the Plan Period: 2011-2013 
In this section, I try to evaluate the consistency of targets and policy insturments of GTP I 
using the simulation model. The model is used to reproduce projections of the main macro 
variables using policy targets and assumptions about policy instruments as laid out in the 
plan. The plan targets and simulation results of the model will also be compared with actual 
performaces in the first three years of the plan (2011-2013).  While Table 3.13 below 
provides the main macroeconomic targets and demand side projections of the economy, 
Table 3.14 presents the assumptions for the main macroeconoimc policy instruments 
[Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2010]. Other macro projections of the plan are 
provided in Table 3.15 along with simulation results and actual performance. Because of 
the lack of information on the assumptions in the plan about some exogenous variables, 
particularly official external borrowing and other public sector net borrowing in the capital 
account of the balance of payments, actual data is used in the simulation model.   
    Table 3.15 indicates that in the real sector block, the simulation model is relatively less 
optimistic about real GDP projections than the plan except in 2013.  The difference lies 
basically on the projections of real aggregate consumption demand.  For instance, despite 
aggressive policies in the real, monetary and external sectors that would shift relative prices 
in favour of domestic savings, the plan appeared to consistently over-project aggregate  
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Table 3-13: Main Macroeconomic Policy Targets of GTP I: 2011-2015 
(Baseline Case Scenario) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
  
Base-
Year Targets 
Real GDP (Q) (% Change) 10.4 11 11.1 11.3 11.2 11.4 
Inflation (% Change)1/ 7.5 9 9 9 9 9 
Domestic Savings (% GDP) 5.5 7.4 10.4 12.4 14.4 15 
Tax Income (% GDP) 11.3 11.7 12.1 13.2 14.7 15 
Non-tax Income (% GDP) 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
  Projections (as percent of GDP)  
Aggregate Consumption Demand (C) 94.5 92.6 89.6 87.6 85.6 85 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (I) 22.3 25.3 27.2 28.1 28.9 28.2 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 13.6 16.6 17.7 19.2 20.8 22.5 
Imports of Goods and Services (Z) 33.0 34.0 34.5 35.0 35.3 35.7 
Source:  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Growth and Transformation Plan 
(2010/11 – 2014/15), Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 
November 2010, Addis Ababa. 
1/ The target is single-digit inflation. But, for operational purpose the NBE uses 9 
percent target. 
Table 3-14: Main Macroeconomic Policy Instruments in GTP I: 2011-2015  
    
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
  
Base 
Year Targets 
Nominal Exchange Rate (% 
depreciation) 23.7 25.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Gov’t Consumption Expenditure (% 
GDP) 8.4 8.9 8.6 8.8 9.1 9.3 
Gov’t Capital Expenditure (% GDP)  10.3 11.6 11.6 12.3 13.3 14.4 
Nominal interest rate (% Change) 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Gov’t Borrowing from NBE (in 
Millions of Birr) 822.0 1000.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Statutory Reserves of Banks (% of 
Net Deposits of the Banking System) 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
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Table 3-15: Comparison of the Plan against Model Simulation Results and Actuals 
  2011 2012 2013 
  
Plan (GTP-
I) 
Simulati
on 
Result Actual 
Plan 
(GTP-
I) 
Simulati
on 
Result Actual 
Plan 
(GT
P-I) 
Simula
tion 
Result Actual 
I. The Real Sector (Demand 
Side), Money Market and Prices % Change  
Real GDP (Q) 11.0 10.4 11.3 11.1 7.2 8.7 11.3 13.0 9.7 
Consumer Price Index (PD_A) 9.0 24.4 33.1 9.0 20.4 30.1 9.0 7.2 12.3 
  As Percentage of GDP  
Aggregate Consumption Demand 
(C) 92.6 90.0 86.3 89.6 79.1 78.2 87.6 81.4 77.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (I) 25.3 26.6 28.2 27.2 33.2 36.0 28.1 36.9 38.4 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 16.6 16.9 18.3 17.7 15.9 14.8 19.2 14.6 14.4 
Imports of Goods and Services (Z) 34 34.0 34.6 34.5 30.0 31.5 35.0 35.0 30.7 
II. Saving-Investment Balances As Percentage of GDP  
Gross Domestic Savings (S) 7.4 10.0 13.7 10.4 20.9 18.9 
12.4
0 18.6 19.6 
Gross National Savings (S_NTL) - 25.3 29.3 - 33.1 31.1 - 30.1 31.7 
Domestic Savings-Investment Gap 
(S_DOM_I_Gap) -17.9 -16.6 -14.5 -16.8 -12.3 -17.1 -15.7 -18.3 -18.8 
National Savings -Investment Gap 
(S_I_Gap ) - -1.9 -0.7 - -2.5 -4.0 - -9.4 -5.4 
Savings-Investment Gap after 
Financing from foreign Savings 
(S_I) - 1.91 0.30 - -0.93 -0.01 - -3.3 0.05 
Note: The dash sign ‘-‘ indicates data is not available 
 
 
170 
 
 
Table 3.15 (Cont'd):   Comparison of Plan Projections against Model Simulation Results and Actuals: (2011 -2-12)1/ 
  2011 2012 2013 
  
Plan 
GTP-I 
Simulation 
Result Actual 
Plan 
GTP-I 
Simulation 
Result Actual 
Plan 
GTP-I 
Simulation 
Result Actual 
III. External Sector As Percentage of GDP (Unless and Otherwise Stated) 
Resource Balance (X-Z) -17.4 -17.1 -16.3 -16.8 -14.1 -16.7 -15.8 -20.4 -16.3 
Current Account Balance 
(CUACB_USD) - -1.9 -0.7 - -3.6 -5.4 - -13.2 -7.6 
Foreign Exchange Gap 
(FX_GAP_Q) - 2.0 0.0 - -1.3 0.12 - -4.7 0.3 
Change in Gross Int'l 
Reserves Target (in Mill. Of 
USD) (BBGROSR_USD)2/ $200.0 $200.0 $1080.9 $200.0 $200.0 -$873.3 $200.0 $200.0 $101.9  
REER (% Change)  -19.4 -0.6 3.3 -3.0  7.1 10.50 0.5  -1.2 2.8  
IV. Fiscal Sector As Percentage of GDP  
Total Tax Revenue (TX) 11.3 12.6 11.7  - 12.5 12.1  - 13.6 13.2 
Total Non-Tax Revenue 
(NTX) 2.8 2.2 2.2  - 2.5 2.5 -  2.2 2.2 
Government Consumption 
Expenditure (GOVCON_E ) 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.60 7.8 7.5 8.8 8.1 8.0 
Government Capital 
Expenditure (GOVCAP_E ) 11.6 10.8 11.4 11.60 13.6 10.6 12.3 17.1 11.6 
Government Total Financing 
Gap  
(GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 
1/ The dash sign ‘-‘indicates data is not available 
2/ BBGROSR_USD is one of exogenously determined policy targets of the plans so that the model uses it directly. 
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consumption throughout the first three years of the plan (2011-2013).  While the plan 
forecasts aggregate consumption to decline only by 1.9 percentage point of GDP, from 94.5 
percent of GDP in 2010 to 92.6 percent in 2011, the model projected consumption to 
decline to 90 percent of GDP in the same period.   This difference appears to be the major 
explanation for the difference in real GDP growth projections.  The model projections are 
closer to the actual performance than the plan forecasts.  On the other hand, although the 
plan believes that investment would be the main source of growth, generally, it appears to 
underestimate the amount of investment needed to bring about the targeted 11 percent 
GDP.  For instance, using the ICOR method, the model projected the total investment 
requirement to achieve the projected 11 percent growth at 33.2 percent and 36.9 percent of 
GDP for 2012 and 2013 respectively, while the plan projected at 27.2 and 28.1 percent.  As 
is illustrated in Table 3.15, the actual investment demand in 2012 and 2013 stood at 36 
percent and 38.4 percent of GDP respectively, which are closer to the simulation results 
than the plan projections.   
On the other hand, the plan projected a higher contribution of exports of goods and services 
to GDP growth compared with the model despite lack of clear policies to boost export 
growth over the plan period.  The appreciation of the exchange rate by 14% between 2011 
and 2013 depressed exports growth and contributed a fair share of the deviation between 
the actual and projected growth rates in two ways.  First, as a component of the demand 
side of the GDP, lower growth in exports means a lower contribution to growth.  Second, 
the export spillover effect on TFP would also be lower.  Had it not been for the growth of 
investment, GDP growth would have been much lower than the ones that were actually 
achieved.  This is one of the inconsistencies of the plan.   The over-performance of 
investment growth was made possible by the higher than planned growth in domestic 
savings.  The model also projected domestic savings-to-GDP ratio to reach 20.9 percent 
and 18.9 percent in 2012 and 2013 respectively.  The latter are relatively close to the actual 
outturn than the plan.   
     In the external sector, the plan is a little more optimistic about the trade balance than the 
simulation mainly due to its having a higher projection of export growth than the model.  
Consequently, gross international reserves were projected to see continuous build-ups of 
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USD 200 million every year throughout the plan which is different from the actual outturn.  
On the other hand, the model takes gross reserves as a policy target so that its projection is 
not different from the plan.  Not surprisingly, many of the projections of the plan and the 
model are close to each other, because, first, the fiscal sector is mostly government policy 
determined, and second, the model uses identities to project most of the variables in this 
sector, which is similar to the method used by the plan. One exception to this is the case of 
government capital expenditure in 2013, because the model projects gross fixed capital 
formation to reach 36.9 percent of GDP (compared with the 28 percent share in the plan) 
and the simulation projects the lion’s share of the increase to come from government capital 
formation.  The model is closer to the actual outturn in terms of the prediction of gross total 
fixed capital formation.  However, the main source of the increase in the latter turned out to 
be the surge in private capital formation contrary to the model’s prediction of government 
capital formation. 
     To conclude, the plan appears to project growth and many of the demand side variables 
such as imports and government expenditures relatively well.  However, it underestimates 
investment and domestic savings which are the key determinants of growth and the 
resource gaps.  On the other hand, despite the lack of clear policies in the external sector, 
the plan seems to overestimate export growth.  Applying the same set of policies that are 
laid out in the plan, the model’s projections of exports are much lower than the plan’s. 
3.8.2   Out-of-Sample Simulation Exercises: 2014-2025 
The following two sections present baseline out-of-sample forecasts, simulation results, and 
the policy implications under different scenarios.  While the simulations for the baseline are 
run from 2009 to 2025, the simulations for the policy scenarios run from 2014 to 2025.  
Fiscal year 2025 is the expected year of the completion of the Third Five-Year Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP-III) when Ethiopia hopes to realize its vision of becoming a 
middle-income country.  The period 2009-2013 is included in baseline simulation to 
demonstrate how the simulation tracks the actual before it projects 12 years into the future. 
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3.8.2.1   Simulation Scenarios 
Developments over the first three year of the plan were mixed.  The economy grew at an 
average rate of 9.9 percent, but average annual inflation was 24.9 percent and foreign 
exchange constraints started to suppress investment demand.  Contrary to a significant 
reduction in the  current account deficit in the first year of the plan (from USD 1.2 billion in 
2010 to USD 0.2 billion in 2011), which reflected a 32 percent increase in exports of goods 
and services following the major devaluation of the Birr, the foreign exchange gap 
continued to widen in the following two years.  In 2012 and 2013, exports of goods and 
services growth decelerated to 11 percent and -0.5 percent respectively.  On the other hand, 
the investment-to-GDP ratio grew steadily, reaching 35.7 percent in 2013 from 29.1 in 
2010, one year before the plan. The investment boom was  largely financed by surging 
domestic savings, which overshot the five-year target of raising the domestic-saving-to-
GDP ratio to 15 percent within the first three years.  By 2013, the domestic-saving-to-GDP 
ratio had already reached 19.6 percent.   
    In the baseline forecast scenario, this section examines two questions.  First, ‘is the 
double digit average growth target attainable given current policy environment?’  Second, 
‘what could be the major growth constraints in the coming 12 years, including the next two 
Growth and Transformation Plans that are expected to take the country into vision 2025?’  
This represents a classic use of a financial programming model – it takes some targets and 
some policy positions and asks whether, given the underlying behavior of the economy, 
they are mutually consistent.  As noted above, inconsistencies show up either as non-zero 
financing gaps in the government, foreign exchange and savings-investment budgets or 
missing the targets despite available resources.  The latter may arise when the policy mixes 
are not well aligned with the stated objectives.  
     Given the information from the baseline simulation, the section then introduces some 
policy changes by shocking selected policy instruments, to assess the response in growth 
and inflation targets, and examine reactions in the goods and money markets, saving-
investment equilibrium, external sector and fiscal sector.  Finally, I take the GTP’s targets 
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and use an E-Views solver to derive the equilibrium policy path, for a selected policy 
instrument, by forcing the model to solve for a zero foreign exchange gap. 
     In this model, international gross reserve target is given.  It is exogenously determined 
by policy, and the National Bank of Ethiopia’s intervention in the foreign exchange market 
is always based on this target so that the short-term and long-term targets for gross 
international reserves are similar.  On the other hand, short-run aggregate supply and the 
short-run inflation rate are determined in the market.  Hence, as noted in section, 3.5, in the 
short-run, output and inflation can temporarily deviate from their respective long-term 
trends.     
3.8.2.2   Baseline Forecast 
A. Major Assumptions 
The baseline scenario aims to achieve three policy targets from the GTP: the potential 
growth rate target, the inflation target and the gross international reserves target are all 
assumed to remain unchanged from the previous three year of GTP I.  Table 3.16 
summarizes the assumptions about the main exogenous variables.  On average, real   GDP 
is targeted to grow at an annual average rate of 11 percent; long-term inflation is targeted to 
remain in single digits; and gross international reserves in months of next year’s import of 
goods and services not to go below two months.  No change in policies is assumed and no 
new policy instruments are introduced.  Exogenous variables -  population (urban, rural and 
total), private transfers, workers’ remittances, commercial banks’ NFAs, other items nets 
(central bank and banking system) and the agricultural output to GDP ratio - are assumed to 
grow at their respective annual average rates of growth in the previous three year (2011 -
2013).  Where policies are expressed in terms of proportions of GDP, such as the 
government investment to GDP ratio, the
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Table 3-16: Projections of Main Exogenous Variables and Policy Targets 
YEAR 
BB 
GROSR 
_USD 
BB 
NPVT 
CB 
NFA 
_USD 
CG 
_Q 
DBB 
NGOV E 
F_BOR_ 
NET 
_USD 
F_BOR 
_OTH 
_NET 
_USD 
FDI 
_USD g
T
 
GOV 
CAP 
_E_R 
GOV 
CON 
_E_R 
GOV 
EXT 
FCY 
G_R 
2011 3198.0 6250.0 1406.9 0.09 5976.0 16.1 1019.3 430.3 1242.5 11.0 0.56 0.93 0.48 
2012 2324.7 12502.0 1074.4 0.09 4433.9 17.3 937.8 230.8 1072.1 11.0 0.69 0.87 0.40 
2013 2426.6 16507.0 1154.6 0.09 7725.1 18.2 1687.5 398.9 1231.6 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2014 2669.3 20257.0 1270.1 0.09 9656.4 19.3 1940.6 608.1 1359.2 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2015 2936.2 29157.0 1397.1 0.09 12070.5 20.4 2231.7 927.0 1500.0 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2016 3229.8 21867.8 1536.8 0.09 15088.1 21.7 2566.5 1413.0 1655.4 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2017 3552.8 14578.5 1690.5 0.09 18860.1 23.0 2951.4 2154.0 1826.8 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2018 3943.6 16036.4 1775.0 0.09 20934.7 24.4 3246.6 2369.4 2016.1 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2019 4416.8 17640.0 1863.8 0.09 23237.5 25.8 3571.3 2606.4 2224.9 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2020 4946.9 19404.0 1957.0 0.09 25793.7 27.4 3928.4 2867.0 2455.4 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2021 5540.5 21344.4 2054.8 0.09 28631.0 29.0 4321.2 3153.7 2709.8 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2022 6205.3 23478.8 2157.6 0.09 31780.4 30.8 4753.3 3469.1 2990.5 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2023 6950.0 25826.7 2265.4 0.09 35276.2 32.6 5228.7 3816.0 3300.3 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2024 7784.0 28409.4 2378.7 0.09 39156.6 34.6 5751.5 4197.6 3642.2 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
2025 8718.1 31250.3 2497.7 0.09 43463.8 36.6 6326.7 4617.4 4019.5 11.0 0.72 0.91 0.55 
Note:  BBGROSR_USD=NBE gross reserve in USD; BBNPVT = NBE claims on private sector; CBNFA_USD  = commercial banks’ NFA; 
CG_Q = gov’t consumption expenditure to government consumption demand (in the national accounts) ratio; DBBNGOV = change in 
NBE’s net claims on Gov’t; E = exchange rate (Birr/USD); F_BOR_NET_USD = net official foreign borrowing in USD;  
F_BOR_OTH_NET_USD = net foreign borrowing of other public sector in USD; FDI_USD = foreign direct investment in USD; g
T
 = 
growth target; GOVCAP_E_R = gov’t capital expenditure to public fixed capital formation ratio; GOVCON_E_R = gov’t consumption 
expenditure to total government consumption demand (in the national accounts); and GOVEXTFCYG_R = gov’t external financing to 
official foreign borrowing  
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Table 3-16 (Con’d): Projections of Main Exogenous Variables and Policy Targets 
YEAR 
GOVN 
NBNK 
FCYG 
_R 
GOV 
RES 
FCYG 
GRA 
NT 
_R 
IG 
_Q 
INTR 
ATE 
N_TOT 
_P 
NTX 
_R 
OFF 
TRAN 
SW 
_USD PD 
PV 
TRAN 
SW 
_USD 
QAG 
_R 
SHT 
_CAP 
_USD TX_R 
TX 
_Y 
_R Ф 
2011 0.08 311.3 0.55 0.20 0.05 82213.0 0.02 1860.7 100.0 2746.7 0.45 -156.6 0.13 0.04 34.6 
2012 0.17 -1564.5 0.42 0.15 0.05 84321.0 0.03 1787.9 120.8 3245.8 0.44 -120.9 0.13 0.04 31.0 
2013 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 86614.0 0.02 1529.9 129.7 3577.5 0.43 -91.6 0.14 0.05 32.1 
2014 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 88899.2 0.02 1529.9 140.1 3932.4 0.42 -137.4 0.14 0.05 32.8 
2015 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 91244.6 0.02 1529.9 151.3 4322.5 0.41 -206.1 0.14 0.05 33.4 
2016 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 93651.9 0.02 1529.9 163.4 4751.2 0.39 -309.2 0.14 0.05 34.1 
2017 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 96122.8 0.02 1529.9 176.5 5222.6 0.38 -463.7 0.14 0.05 34.8 
2018 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 98658.8 0.02 1529.9 190.6 5740.6 0.38 -602.8 0.14 0.05 35.5 
2019 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 101261.8 0.02 1529.9 205.8 6310.1 0.38 -783.7 0.14 0.05 36.2 
2020 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 103933.4 0.02 1529.9 222.3 6936.0 0.37 -1018.8 0.14 0.05 36.9 
2021 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 106675.5 0.02 1529.9 240.1 7624.1 0.37 -1324.4 0.14 0.05 37.6 
2022 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 109490.0 0.02 1529.9 259.3 8380.4 0.37 -1721.8 0.14 0.05 38.4 
2023 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 112378.7 0.02 1529.9 280.0 9211.7 0.36 -2238.3 0.14 0.05 39.2 
2024 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 115343.6 0.02 1529.9 302.4 10125.5 0.36 -2909.8 0.14 0.05 39.9 
2025 0.11 -11946.3 0.47 0.13 0.05 118386.7 0.02 1529.9 326.6 11129.9 0.35 -3782.7 0.14 0.05 40.7 
Note: GOVNNBNKFCYG_R = gov’t non-bank financing to change in broad money ratio; GOVRESFCYG = government residual 
financing; GRANT_R = budgetary grant to official transfer ratio; IG_Q= pubic fixed capital formation to GDP ratio; INTRATE = nominal 
interest rate; N_TOT_P = total population; NTX_R = non-tax revenue to GDP ratio; OFFTRANSW_USD = official transfer in USD; PD = 
consumer price index; PVTRANSW_USD = private transfer in USD; QAG_R = agricultural output to GDP ratio; SHT_CAP_USD = net 
short-term capital inflow;  in USD; TX_R = total tax revenue to GDP ratio; and Ф = imports of goods and services to GDP ratio. 
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government consumption to GDP ratio, tax revenue to GDP ratio, and various components 
of monetary liabilities (i.e., currency in circulation, savings deposit, time deposits and 
excess reserves) to demand deposit ratios, these are assumed to remain constant at their 
2013 values.   
B. Simulation Results 
Table 3.17 and Figures 3.24 present simulation results of the baseline forecast.  The 
forecasts indicate that maintaining the target potential GDP path requires high private and 
public investment ratios (Table 3.17 and Figures 3-24(A3) and (A4)) supported by growing 
total factor productivity growth sustained through human capital and infrastructure output 
growth (Figures 3-24(A5) and (A6)).  This indicates that the program growth is attainable if 
these necessary conditions in other markets can be fulfilled.  However, the model shows 
that achieving this would put great strain on the money market, which shows a growing 
disequilibrium, especially in the first two years of the forecast period – Figure 3-24(A7).  
As a consequence of this, inflation is forecast to rise close to 16 percent in 2015 before 
decelerating and briefly touching the single digit regime in 2018.  Over the long-term, 
inflation hovers around 12.5 percent on average, missing the single digit target of the plan.  
The forecast hike in inflation aggravates an already bad situation in international 
competitiveness. Associated with the disequilibrium, actual GDP (Figures 3-24(A1) and 
(A2)) grows a little above the trend in potential GDP at 12.1 percent (Table 3.17) and, 
despite the strong growth, ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP averaged over the 
forecast period is forecast to drop slightly to 13.4 percent from 13.7 percent in 2013 actual 
(13.7 percent). 
     The need for strong investment to maintain real growth significantly widens the saving-
investment gap over the forecast period.  The forecasts in Table 3.17 and Figures B4 and 
B6 show that saving-investment gap widens continually as a ratio of GDP throughout the 
forecast period, and reaches 17.5 percent by 2025, even after financing part of the gap from 
trend-based projected foreign savings, in the capital account of the balance of payments.  
This implies that the plan is inconsistent as it stands now without revising the targets or 
reconsidering additional policy measures that could address the   
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Table 3-17: Simulation Forecast Results for Baseline Scenario: 2014-2015(for Selected Goods, Money and External Markets 
Variables) 
1/
 
  
Long-
term                              
Output                         
Growth                          
Target                   
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run                        
Aggregate                         
Supply                    
Growth                  
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Savin
g-                       
Invest
ment                             
Gap                     
(S_I_
Q) 
Public                     
Investm
ent              
Require
ment                              
(IG_Q) 
Private                            
Sector                             
Investm
ent                  
Require
ment                   
(% 
GDP)                         
(IP_Q) 
Total                  
Investm
ent                                    
Require
ment                          
(% 
GDP)          
(I_Q) 
Exports 
of                 
G&S       
(% 
GDP)                      
(X_USD
_Q) 
Resource                   
Gap                    
(% GDP)                              
(X-
Z_USD_
Q) 
Current 
Account 
Balance (in 
Millions of
USD) 
(CUACB_U
SD) 
Foreign                 
Exchange                     
Gap                   
(% GDP)                    
(FX_GAP
_Q) 
Target Policy Baseline 
2013
1/
 11.0 13.2 22.6 35.8 9.7 12.3 13.7 -17.0 -$2,346 0.2 0.0 
2014 11.0 13.2 24.2 37.4 12.0 13.3 14.8 -17.9 -$3,573 -1.6 -1.6 
2015 11.0 13.2 31.1 44.3 14.9 16.8 13.8 -19.6 -$6,294 -4.7 -4.7 
2016 11.0 13.2 31.7 44.9 11.2 13.4 12.0 -22.1 -$9,004 -6.9 -6.9 
2017 11.0 13.2 26.5 39.7 6.1 9.5 12.4 -22.4 -$9,638 -5.9 -5.9 
2018 11.0 13.2 27.9 41.1 14.7 10.2 13.9 -21.6 -$10,928 -6.0 -6.0 
2019 11.0 13.2 33.6 46.8 14.9 12.0 13.0 -23.2 -$14,834 -8.7 -8.7 
2020 11.0 13.2 33.0 46.2 11.2 12.8 12.9 -24.0 -$18,059 -10.2 -10.2 
2021 11.0 13.2 32.5 45.7 11.8 12.4 14.1 -23.6 -$20,458 -10.5 -10.4 
2022 11.0 13.2 37.1 50.3 15.0 13.5 13.8 -24.6 -$26,498 -12.7 -12.7 
2023 11.0 13.2 37.9 51.1 10.8 13.4 12.9 -26.3 -$33,601 -15.1 -15.1 
2024 11.0 13.2 35.9 49.1 10.2 13.5 13.5 -26.4 -$38,983 -16.0 -16.0 
2025 11.0 13.2 37.8 51.0 12.6 13.6 13.8 -27.0 -$47,522 -17.5 -17.5 
Aver-
age 11.0 13.2 32.4 45.6 12.1 12.9 13.4 -23.2 -$19,949 -9.6 -9.6 
1/ Figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals. 
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root cause of this inconsistency.  The continually rising gap also suggests the problem is 
intrinsic to the system so that securing additional foreign financing alone would not solve 
the problem.   
     Corresponding to the domestic saving-investment gap is a large disequilibrium in the 
external sector [Jayme JR, 2003 and Taylor, 1994].  The continued appreciation of the 
exchange rate in the baseline (Figure C4) is forecast to drag export growth down, which in 
turn depresses economic growth because of lower export spillover effects.  Moreover, with 
lower export-spillovers, sustaining the 11 percent growth target has become more 
expensive because, given the sluggish productivity growth, the volume of investment 
required per unit of output as the economy grows gets higher.  Table 3.17 shows that the 
total amount of investment required to achieve 11 percent growth reaches 51 percent of 
GDP by 2025.  Imports are forecast to grow strongly driven by a robust GDP growth 
projection (Figure C2).  Consequently, given exogenously forecast foreign savings, the 
foreign exchange gap is projected to widen to about USD 66.8 billion by 2025, which is 
37.4 percent of GDP!  As usual, because it is under direct control, the forecast shows 
government financing remaining comfortable and steady given the robust growth projection 
and the government’s relatively low consumption expenditure (about 8.7 percent of GDP). 
     To conclude, the forecast widening of the saving-investment and foreign gaps suggest 
that attaining the forecast real GDP growth and inflation targets is not feasible. As 
constructed in the model, but also in reality, these gaps are binding constraints on the 
forecast growth and inflation targets.  On the other hand, cutting investment is not the best 
option given the targeted growth and the country’s vision to break the cycle of poverty.  As 
the experience in the first three years of the GTP indicates, it looks possible to accelerate 
domestic savings with appropriate policies – refining and strengthening policies that have 
been used to accelerate domestic savings in the past. 
     Turning to the foreign exchange gap, two alternatives exist – foreign borrowing/capital 
transfers and boosting net exports. Increasing foreign borrowing is neither feasible nor 
desirable, for although Ethiopia is currently in the low debt distressed countries region, debt 
is growing rapidly, so that international capital markets 
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Figures 3-24: Baseline forecasts (2014 – 2025) 
A. Goods and Services and Money Markets  
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C. External Sector 
 
 
D. Government Sector 
 
are unlikely to provide a major injection of funds.  Moreover, the forecast of a continually 
increasing foreign exchange gap indicates that securing additional financing in the capital 
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market would only postpone the problem into the long-term by leading the debt burden to 
an unsustainable level.  Hence attention must focus on the current account, about which two 
important issues are worth noting: export growth shows no sign of accelerating given the 
inflation-induced appreciation of the real exchange rate while, on the other hand, import 
growth shows no sign of abating given the strong growth projection.  Overall, then, 
rethinking the policy options is unavoidable if Ethiopia is to achieve the plan targets and 
sustain growth in the long-term.  
3.8.2.3 Simulation Exercise under Alternative Policy Measures  
In the baseline scenario, it is observed that with widening saving-investment and foreign 
exchange gaps, the growth and inflation targets are not feasible, and need to be addressed.  
Therefore, this section runs some alternative policy simulation scenarios that are targeted to 
address the external and internal imbalances.  The chapter considers the following six 
policy scenarios: 
Scenario 1.  Devaluing the Birr by 40 percent in 2014 from the Baseline. 
Scenario 2. Raising domestic savings through a forced saving scheme.  The long-run 
elasticity coefficient of disposable income is lowered by 0.04 points, from 1.0836 to 
1.0436, in the private consumption function;  
Scenario 3.  Reducing the potential GDP growth target by 2 percentage points from 11 
percent to 9 percent per year; 
Scenario 4.  Reducing the potential GDP growth target to 9 percent and devaluing the Birr 
by 20 percent; 
Scenario 5.  Reducing the base money supply by selling 30 percent of the central bank’s 
financial asset holdings through Open Market Operation; 
Scenario 6.  Solving for the exchange rate path that brings the foreign exchange gap to zero. 
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Scenario I.     Devaluation of the Birr by 40 percent by 2014 from the Baseline 
The first policy simulation assumes a step devaluation of the Birr by 40 percent in 2014.  
As one of the main policy instruments in the external sector, and given the fact the baseline 
scenario indicates depressed export growth due to continual appreciation of the Birr in the 
forecast period, devaluation is considered as a key potential policy tool to address the 
external imbalance.  The policy has dual objectives, as it also expected to have a positive 
impact on the saving-investment equilibrium through the current account of the balance of 
payments.   
     The immediate impact of a depreciation of the REER is to boost exports of goods and 
services.  Exports of goods and services continually increase and reach 18.5 percent of 
GDP by 2025, from 13.5 percent in 2013.  Compared with the baseline, the policy helps 
exports as a ratio of GDP to be 4.7 percentage points higher by 2025.   Figure 3.25 (C2) 
also shows that imports-to-GDP has seen a one-time permanent upward step because now 
imports cost more in local currency compared with the baseline.  Consequently, the current 
account has seen continuous improvement over the projection period and by the end of 
2025, the average current account deficit has shrunk by more than USD 10 billion from 
USD19.9 billion (in the baseline forecast) to USD 9.8 billion (Table 3.18).  Improvement in 
the current account balance has turned the foreign exchange gap positive in the first five 
years of the projection period (2014-2018) and lower deficits in the rest of the years 
compared with the baseline – Figures 3-25.  Overall, the foreign exchange gap is 
significantly narrowed to an annual average of 1.4 of percent of GDP compared with 9.6 
percent in the baseline.  The deficit appears to be financeable; however, as the annual 
deficit is forecast to widen as much as 10 percent of GDP by 2025, the country needs to 
save the surpluses of the first five years so that it can use them in the deficit years.     
     In the goods and money markets, the spillover from the higher rate of growth of exports 
compared with the baseline reduces the required level of investment per unit of output.  As 
a result, annual average total investment as percentage of GDP declines by 2.3 percentage 
points, from 45.6 percent to 43.3 percent despite the increase in aggregate 
184 
 
 
Table 3-18: Simulation Results Assuming a 40 Percent Devaluation of the Birr (for Selected Goods Market, Money Market and 
External Sector Variables: 2014 – 20251/) 
  
Long-
term                                 
Out- 
put                                 
Grow- 
th                                       
Target                                      
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-                        
Investment                          
Gap                         
(S_I_Q) 
Public                    
Invest
ment                 
Require
ment                                   
(IG
_Q) 
Private
Sector                                  
Investment                                     
Requireme
nt
(% GDP)                                              
(IP_Q) 
Total
Investment      
Requireme
nt
(% GDP)
(I_Q) 
Export of                                      
G&S                                         
(% GDP)                                 
(X_USD_
Q) 
Current Account Balance 
(in Millions of USD) 
(CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% GDP)           
(FX_GAP_Q) 
Target Policy Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 Bs Sc1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 17.1 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346.0 -$2,346.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 -2.7 
2014 11.0 13.2 20.7 22.0 37.4 39.4 12.0 15.4 13.3 11.8 14.8 24.6 -$3,573.0 $2,125.0 -1.6 13.7 -1.6 -0.4 
2015 11.0 13.2 26.2 23.1 44.3 41.1 14.9 14.6 16.8 15.2 13.8 17.5 -$6,294.0 -$1,876.0 -4.7 3.5 -4.7 -0.6 
2016 11.0 13.2 27.0 24.9 44.9 43.1 11.2 11.7 13.4 13.6 12.0 14.4 -$9,004.0 -$4,166.0 -6.9 0.3 -6.9 -2.8 
2017 11.0 13.2 23.7 23.2 39.7 40.1 6.1 7.8 9.5 6.9 12.4 13.9 -$9,638.0 -$4,484.0 -5.9 1.8 -5.9 -3.5 
2018 11.0 13.2 24.6 21.8 41.1 38.6 14.7 12.6 10.2 9.5 13.9 16.7 -$10,928.0 -$4,577.0 -6.0 2.3 -6.0 -2.4 
2019 11.0 13.2 28.8 25.6 46.8 44.2 14.9 16.8 12.0 12.4 13.0 15.8 -$14,834.0 -$7,302.0 -8.7 -1.2 -8.7 -3.7 
2020 11.0 13.2 28.5 27.2 46.2 46.2 11.2 11.8 12.8 13.8 12.9 15.3 -$18,059.0 -$9,604.0 -10.2 -3.2 -10.2 -6.7 
2021 11.0 13.2 28.1 24.6 45.7 42.4 11.8 9.6 12.4 12.3 14.1 17.9 -$20,458.0 -$9,727.0 -10.5 -2.3 -10.4 -6.7 
2022 11.0 13.2 31.3 25.8 50.3 44.5 15.0 14.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 18.4 -$26,498.0 -$12,924.0 -12.7 -4.4 -12.7 -7.5 
2023 11.0 13.2 32.2 28.6 51.1 48.1 10.8 12.4 13.4 13.8 12.9 16.8 -$33,601.0 -$18,289.0 -15.1 -7.9 -15.1 -11.2 
2024 11.0 13.2 30.8 27.5 49.1 46.0 10.2 9.0 13.5 14.2 13.5 17.9 -$38,983.0 -$20,974.0 -16.0 -8.6 -16.0 -13.2 
2025 11.0 13.2 32.2 27.3 51.0 45.9 12.6 11.7 13.6 14.4 13.8 18.4 -$47,522.0 -$26,101.0 -17.5 -10.3 -17.5 -14.4 
Aver
- age 11.0 13.2 27.8 25.1 45.6 43.3 12.1 12.3 12.9 12.6 13.4 17.3 -$19,949.3 -$9,824.9 -9.6 -1.4 -9.6 -6.1 
1/ Figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals, and the 40 Percent Devaluation of the Birr is computed from the Baseline
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supply compared with the baseline (Table 3.18 and Figures 3-25(A1) and (A3)).  The boom 
in exports and improved balance in the money markets feed through into an actual GDP, 
which rises above baseline levels – showing annual average growth of 12.9 percent 
compared with 12.3 percent in the baseline (Table 3.18 and Figures 3-25(A1) and (A2)). In 
steady state, of course, it will be constrained to fall back onto potential GDP, for which we 
have imposed target growth of 11 percent per year, but the projections, as well the actual 
economy, display dynamics that allow deviations to persist for some time.  
     The increase in the demand for money as a result of higher growth and the depreciated 
exchange rate lead the money market disequilibrium (Figure 3-25(A7)) to improve in the 
first five years until 2018, offsetting the effect devaluation on the money supply.  
Therefore, inflation is forecast to show a moderate decline compared with the baseline.  It 
looks counterintuitive to see a major devaluation followed by a decline in inflation.  
However, for the following reasons it happened in Ethiopia in 1993 after a 144 percent 
devaluation in Birr terms, and after the frequent adjustments in the value of the Birr in 2009 
and 2010.  When the exchange rate appreciates, exports decline and the foreign exchange 
market faces major shortage.  This results in a widening gap between the official and 
parallel market exchange rates.  And, prices, particularly prices of imported goods, usually 
adjust to the parallel market exchange rate.  So, devaluation begins to affect the prices of 
imports directly when the rate of devaluation exceeds the gap between the parallel and 
official exchange rate. Secondly, the devaluation increases the demand for money, as 
people need to hold more money per unit of foreign currency for transaction purposes.  The 
third reason is that as devaluation increases exports, it eases the foreign exchange constraint 
and hence boosts the supply of importable goods.  In fact, the latter may push prices further 
down by narrowing the supply gap premium in the goods market. For instance, after the 
first major devaluation in 1993, inflation dropped to 7.7 in 1993 from 21.9 percent in 1992.  
Similarly, after a cumulative depreciation of the Birr by more than 40 percent in 2009 and 
2010, inflation subsided from 34.2 percent in 2009 to 5.2 percent in 2010. 
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Figures 3-25:  Effects of a 40 Percent Devaluation of the Birr in 2015 
A. Goods and Services and Money Market  
 
B. Saving and Investment  
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     Reflecting improvements in the current account, the saving-investment balance (Figure 
B6) shows a moderate improvement.  The average saving-investment gap is narrowed from 
9.6 percent in the baseline to 6.1 percent of GDP (Table 3.18, column 17 and 18).  
However, the deficit is still not sustainable. 
     In the government sector, consumption and capital expenditure as a ratio of GDP decline 
compared with the baseline (Figure 3-25(D3) and (D4)) because of the higher denominator, 
i.e, the higher than baseline GDP.  The demand for government securities by the non-bank 
public is forecast to rise as the latter feel wealthier due to increased flow of income from 
exports (Figure 3-25(D5)).  As a result, the government-financing surplus shows a sharp 
rise, reaching close to 3 percent of GDP by 2020 (Figure 3-25(D6)).  
     To conclude, devaluation of the Birr seems to be an effective policy instrument in 
addressing problems related to the resource gaps, i.e., foreign exchange and saving-
investment gaps if it is cautiously implemented to avoid under- or over-shooting of the 
intended results.  
Scenario II. Raising domestic savings through forced saving scheme.  The long-run 
elasticity coefficient of disposable income is lowered by 0.04 points, from 1.0836 
to 1.0436, in the private consumption function. 
The results of this simulation are presented in Table 3-19 and Figures 3-26. As expectated 
gross domestic savings and gross national savings show improvements as ratios of GDP 
(Figures 3-26(B1) and (B2)).  These changes are reflected in the foreign exhange and the 
saving-investment gaps but are slightly moderated by an increase in the ratio of total 
investment to GDP and an unchanged import-to-GDP ratio compared with the baseline 
(Figure 3-26(C2)).  Because the gaps adjust to absorb the change in savings, the effects on 
the rest of the economy are negligible. Thus the policy has little impact on the goods and 
money markets, except on acutal GDP growth which declines from 12.1 percent in the 
baseline to 11.8 percent on average (Figures 3-26(A1) to (A9)).  
     In government sector, as expected, consumption and capital expenditure increase as a 
ratio of GDP compared withthe baseline.  This is because, as they are policy determined       
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Table 3-19:Forecast Simulation Results Assuming a Forced Saving: 2014-2025 
  
Long-
term                   
Output                 
Growth                            
Target                             
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-         
Investment 
Gap        
(S_I_Q) 
Public                                  
Invest
ment                             
Requir
ment                       
(IG_Q) 
Private
Sector                      
Investment                         
Requirement                          
(% GDP)                                
(IP_Q) 
Total 
Investment           
Requireme
nt
(% GDP)     
(I_Q) 
Export of                        
G&S                    
(% GDP)                      
(X_USD_
Q) 
Current Account 
Balance (in 
Millions of USD) 
(CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% 
GDP)                
(FX_GAP_Q
) 
Target Policy Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 Bs Sc2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 9.7 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346 -$2,346 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
2014 12.0 13.2 24.2 24.3 37.4 37.5 12.0 10.4 13.3 13.1 14.8 14.8 -$3,573 -$3,443 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.3 
2015 13.0 13.2 31.1 31.0 44.3 44.2 14.9 14.7 16.8 16.8 13.8 14.0 -$6,294 -$5,977 -4.7 -4.2 -4.7 -4.2 
2016 14.0 13.2 31.7 31.9 44.9 45.1 11.2 11.3 13.4 13.4 12.0 12.0 -$9,004 -$8,759 -6.9 -6.7 -6.9 -6.7 
2017 15.0 13.2 26.5 26.7 39.7 39.9 6.1 5.4 9.5 9.5 12.4 12.2 -$9,638 -$9,372 -5.9 -5.6 -5.9 -5.6 
2018 16.0 13.2 27.9 27.9 41.1 41.1 14.7 13.9 10.2 10.1 13.9 13.9 -$10,928 -$10,396 -6.0 -5.5 -6.0 -5.5 
2019 17.0 13.2 33.6 33.9 46.8 47.1 14.9 15.5 12.0 12.3 13.0 13.0 -$14,834 -$14,319 -8.7 -8.4 -8.7 -8.3 
2020 18.0 13.2 33.0 33.6 46.2 46.8 11.2 11.0 12.8 13.0 12.9 12.6 -$18,059 -$17,729 -10.2 -10.1 -10.2 -10.1 
2021 19.0 13.2 32.5 32.6 45.7 45.8 11.8 11.1 12.4 12.5 14.1 13.9 -$20,458 -$19,836 -10.5 -10.2 -10.4 -10.2 
2022 20.0 13.2 37.1 37.3 50.3 50.5 15.0 15.1 13.5 13.7 13.8 13.8 -$26,498 -$25,560 -12.7 -12.3 -12.7 -12.3 
2023 21.0 13.2 37.9 38.6 51.1 51.8 10.8 11.0 13.4 13.6 12.9 12.7 -$33,601 -$32,899 -15.1 -15.0 -15.1 -15.0 
2024 22.0 13.2 35.9 36.2 49.1 49.4 10.2 9.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.3 -$38,983 -$37,992 -16.0 -15.9 -16.0 -15.9 
2025 23.0 13.2 37.8 37.8 51.0 51.0 12.6 12.4 13.6 13.8 13.8 13.8 -$47,522 -$45,793 -17.5 -17.2 -17.5 -17.2 
Aver-
age 17.5 13.2 32.4 32.6 45.6 45.8 12.1 11.8 12.9 12.9 13.4 13.3 -$19,949 -$19,340 -9.6 -9.4 -9.6 -9.4 
Note: figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals. 
190 
 
 
Figures 3-26:  Effects of Government Forced Savings Measures 
A Goods and Services and Money Market  
 
B. Saving and Investment  
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C. External Sector 
 
D. Government Sector 
 
 
variables, their values remain unchanged in absolut terms but, as a ratio of a lower GDP 
compared withthe baseline, their relative values show moderate improvement resulting in 
lower governemnt surplus than the baseline. 
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     To conclude, in the context of a Financial Programming exercise this policy does not 
bring the intended improvements in the goods and money markets. However, because it 
eliminates some of the financing gaps, combining it with other policies may help to redress 
imbalances that would otherwise curtail real economic improvements. Also, of course, one 
must recognise that intrioducing an effective forced savings will pose challenges in and of 
itself. 
Scenario III.  Assuming that Potential Growth Target is Cut Back by Two Percentage 
Points from 11 Percent to 9 Percent 
Lowering long-term growth rate by 2 percentage points is found to have the expected 
positive impact in redressing internal and external disequilibrium – see Table 3-20.  Exports 
as a ratio of GDP are forecast to decline marginally to 13.1 percent from 13.4 percent in the 
baseline because of the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate compared with the 
baseline, which in turn arises because average annual inflation eases up from 12.9 percent 
to 13.2 percent per annum.  However, the significant drop imports in absolute terms 
following a 2.4 percentage drop in annual average GDP growth, from 12.1 percent in the 
baseline to 9.7 percent more than offsets the decline in exports and leads to an improvement 
the current account deficit that goes down from USD 19.9 billion in the baseline to USD 
15.8 billion (Table 3.20).  Moreover, private investment demand as a ratio of GDP declines 
from 32.4 percent in the baseline to 28.1 percent, in the simulation because a lower 
potential growth target entails a lower investment need. 
     Parallel to the improvement in the current account balance, the gaps in the foreign 
exchange and saving-investment balances go down by 1.7 percentage points each – see 
Table 3-20, columns (15)-(18) and Figures 3-27(B6) and (C6).  It is worth noting that the 
saving-investment gap is the direct reflection of foreign exchange gap in the absence of 
exchange rate policy as the relative price of tradable to non-tradable remains unaffected.  
This is clear from a comparison of the simulation results from scenarios 1 and 4 against 
scenarios 2, 3 and 5.  In the government sector, although consumption and capital 
expenditures have not changed in absolute terms, their values as a ratio of GDP have 
declined resulting in a lower surplus in government financing as a ratio of GDP.  
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Table 3-20: Forecast Simulation Results Assuming 9 percent Potential Growth Target 
  
Long-
term                   
Out-
put                 
Grow-
th                            
Target                             
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-         
Investment 
Gap        
(S_I_Q) 
Public                                  
Investment                               
Requirem-                                 
ent                            
(IG_Q) 
Private 
Sector                      
Investment                         
Requireme
nt  
(% GDP)                                     
(IP_Q) 
Total
Investment       
Requireme
nt               
(% GDP)     
(I_Q) 
Export of                        
G&S                    
(% GDP)                      
(X_USD_
Q) 
Current Account 
Balance (in Millions of 
USD) (CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% GDP)           
(FX_GAP_Q) 
Target Policy Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 Bs Sc.3 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 9.7 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346.0 -$2,346.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
2014 9.0 13.2 24.2 22.6 37.4 35.8 12.0 9.0 13.3 12.9 14.8 14.8 -$3,573.0 -$3,328.0 -1.6 -1.1 -1.6 -1.1 
2015 9.0 13.2 31.1 28.4 44.3 41.6 14.9 12.3 16.8 16.6 13.8 14.2 -$6,294.0 -$5,479.0 -4.7 -3.5 -4.7 -3.5 
2016 9.0 13.2 31.7 28.4 44.9 41.6 11.2 8.6 13.4 13.2 12.0 12.2 -$9,004.0 -$7,731.0 -6.9 -5.5 -6.9 -5.4 
2017 9.0 13.2 26.5 22.3 39.7 35.5 6.1 3.1 9.5 9.4 12.4 12.4 -$9,638.0 -$7,973.0 -5.9 -4.0 -5.9 -4.0 
2018 9.0 13.2 27.9 23.1 41.1 36.3 14.7 12.0 10.2 10.1 13.9 14.0 -$10,928.0 -$8,679.0 -6.0 -3.8 -6.0 -3.8 
2019 9.0 13.2 33.6 29.1 46.8 42.3 14.9 13.1 12.0 12.4 13.0 12.9 -$14,834.0 -$11,918.0 -8.7 -6.5 -8.7 -6.5 
2020 9.0 13.2 33.0 28.5 46.2 41.7 11.2 8.8 12.8 13.3 12.9 12.4 -$18,059.0 -$14,561.0 -10.2 -8.2 -10.2 -8.2 
2021 9.0 13.2 32.5 27.4 45.7 40.6 11.8 9.1 12.4 13.0 14.1 13.5 -$20,458.0 -$16,174.0 -10.5 -8.4 -10.4 -8.4 
2022 9.0 13.2 37.1 32.1 50.3 45.3 15.0 13.1 13.5 14.4 13.8 13.2 -$26,498.0 -$20,885.0 -12.7 -10.7 -12.7 -10.7 
2023 9.0 13.2 37.9 33.2 51.1 46.4 10.8 8.9 13.4 14.4 12.9 12.0 -$33,601.0 -$26,571.0 -15.1 -13.3 -15.1 -13.3 
2024 9.0 13.2 35.9 30.5 49.1 43.7 10.2 7.5 13.5 14.4 13.5 12.6 -$38,983.0 -$30,352.0 -16.0 -14.2 -16.0 -14.2 
2025 9.0 13.2 37.8 32.1 51.0 45.3 12.6 10.5 13.6 14.8 13.8 13.0 -$47,522.0 -$36,460.0 -17.5 -15.7 -17.5 -15.7 
Aver-
age 9.0 13.2 32.4 28.1 45.6 41.3 12.1 9.7 12.9 13.2 13.4 13.1 -$19,949.3 -$15,842.6 -9.6 -7.9 -9.6 -7.9 
1/ Figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals 
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Figures 3-27:  Effects of Lowering Potential Growth Assumption to 9 percent 
A. Goods and Services and Money Market  
 
B. Saving and Investment  
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C. External Sector 
 
D. Government Sector 
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Scenario IV.  Assuming Potential Growth is Two Percentage Points lower than the Baseline 
(Similar to Scenario 3) and Devaluation of the Birr by 20 percent in 2014 
This scenario combines a reduction in domestic aggregate demand by assuming a 2 
percentage point lower potential output growth (i.e. scenario 3) with the scenario which 
assumes a relative price adjustment in favor of the tradable sector by devaluing the Birr 
(scenario 1, but this time only 20 percent devaluation).  As shown in Table 3.21, the current 
account deficit shows significant improvement compared with not only the baseline but 
also with scenario 3.  As average exports increase from 13.4 percent to 15.2 percent of 
GDP, the annual average current account deficit declines from USD 19.9 billion to 11.1 
billion.  Consequently, the annual average foreign exchange gap declines from 9.6 percent 
to 3.6 percent as a ratio of GDP while the saving-investment gap narrows to 3.0 percent 
from 9.6 percent in the baseline.  The latter indicates significant improvements compared 
with both the baseline and scenario 3 (Table 3.20 and 3.21). 
     In the goods market, the decline in the total investment to GDP ratio is stronger 
compared with scenario 3, when only lowering potential GDP growth is assumed (Tables 
3.20 and 3.21).  In this scenario, the boost in export growth following the relative price 
shift in favor of tradable goods stimulates output growth because the higher spillover 
effects from the export sector offset part of the decline in the demand for physical capital 
formation.  In the government sector, current and capital expenditure to GDP ratios 
increase similar to scenario 3.  However, this time the demand for government securities 
sees a significant rise compared with both the baseline and scenario 3 because of higher 
wealth following improvement in the export sector (Figure 3-28(D5)).  Consequently, the 
government-financing surplus experiences a dramatic upward shift (Figure 3-28(D6)).  To 
conclude, combining scenario 3 and exchange rate adjustment produces better results than 
both scenario I and scenario III.  Under scenario I, the 40 percent devaluation produces 
lower current account deficit as percentage of GDP but the reduction in savings-investment 
gap remains moderate due to still higher domestic investment demand compared to the 
current scenario.  On the other hand, compared with the current scenario, lower reductions 
in current account deficit and saving-investment gap are registered under scenario III by 
cutting growth target to 9 percent.  This suggests that
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Table 3-21: Simulation Forecast Results Assuming 9 Percent Growth and 20 Percent Devaluation 
  
Long-
term                   
Output                 
Growth                            
Target                             
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-         
Investment 
Gap        
(S_I_Q) 
Public                                  
Invest- 
mentR
equir
ement                                                  
(IG_Q) 
Private 
Sector     
Investment                            
Requireme
nt                          
(% GDP)             
(IP_Q) 
Total
Investment           
Requireme
nt               
(% GDP)      
(I_Q) 
Export of                        
G&S                    
(% GDP)                      
(X_USD 
_Q) 
Current Account 
Balance (in 
Millions of USD) 
(CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% GDP)           
(FX_GAP_Q) 
Target Policy Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 Bs Sc.4 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 9.7 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346 -$2,346 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
2014 9.0 13.2 24.2 21.6 37.4 34.8 12.0 10.4 13.3 12.0 14.8 22.8 -$3,573 $977 -1.6 9.3 -1.6 3.6 
2015 9.0 13.2 31.1 28.1 44.3 41.3 14.9 13.9 16.8 15.6 13.8 16.0 -$6,294 -$3,265 -4.7 0.4 -4.7 1.4 
2016 9.0 13.2 31.7 28.0 44.9 41.2 11.2 8.0 13.4 13.3 12.0 13.4 -$9,004 -$5,360 -6.9 -2.0 -6.9 -1.0 
2017 9.0 13.2 26.5 20.6 39.7 33.8 6.1 1.8 9.5 7.9 12.4 13.1 -$9,638 -$5,485 -5.9 -0.1 -5.9 0.9 
2018 9.0 13.2 27.9 21.3 41.1 34.5 14.7 12.6 10.2 9.7 13.9 15.3 -$10,928 -$5,663 -6.0 0.5 -6.0 1.6 
2019 9.0 13.2 33.6 28.8 46.8 42.0 14.9 14.3 12.0 12.6 13.0 14.2 -$14,834 -$8,410 -8.7 -2.7 -8.7 -1.7 
2020 9.0 13.2 33.0 28.2 46.2 41.4 11.2 8.5 12.8 13.8 12.9 13.5 -$18,059 -$10,689 -10.2 -4.7 -10.2 -3.6 
2021 9.0 13.2 32.5 25.7 45.7 38.9 11.8 8.6 12.4 12.9 14.1 15.3 -$20,458 -$11,290 -10.5 -4.3 -10.4 -3.1 
2022 9.0 13.2 37.1 30.8 50.3 44.0 15.0 13.8 13.5 14.5 13.8 15.4 -$26,498 -$14,776 -12.7 -6.6 -12.7 -5.4 
2023 9.0 13.2 37.9 32.4 51.1 45.7 10.8 8.8 13.4 14.6 12.9 13.8 -$33,601 -$19,795 -15.1 -9.8 -15.1 -8.6 
2024 9.0 13.2 35.9 28.8 49.1 42.0 10.2 6.9 13.5 14.8 13.5 14.5 -$38,983 -$22,510 -16.0 -10.6 -16.0 -9.4 
2025 9.0 13.2 37.8 30.5 51.0 43.7 12.6 10.6 13.6 15.2 13.8 15.1 -$47,522 -$27,235 -17.5 -12.2 -17.5 -11.0 
Aver-
age 9.0 13.2 32.4 27.1 45.6 40.3 12.1 9.8 12.9 13.1 13.4 15.2 -$19,949 -$11,125 -9.6 -3.6 -9.6 -3.0 
 1/ Figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals. 
198 
 
 
Figures 3-28:  Effects of Lowering Potential Growth Assumption to 9 percent and 
Devaluation of the Birr by 20 Percent Simultaneously. 
A. Goods and Services and Money Market  
 
B. Saving and Investment  
 
C. External Sector 
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D. Government Sector 
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coordinating exchange rate policy with aggregate demand policy produces better results in 
terms of sustaining growth and redressing current account deficit and saving-investment 
gap [Mbaye, 2012 and Skott et al, 2012]. 
Scenario V.  Central Bank Decision to Reduce Base Money by 7 percent selling 30 percent 
of its Financial Asset Holdings through Open Market Operation. 
These results are presented in Table 3-22 and Figures 3-29.  The objective of simulation is 
to experiment with the effect of a monetary policy shock in addressing money market 
disequilibrium.  By selling the stock of bonds in its possession, the central bank 
immediately withdraws an equivalent amount of currency stock from circulation.  
Consequently, excess money supply shrinks in the first four years until 2017 (Figure 
3.29(A7)) and it is back to its long run trend
93
.  This results in slightly lower inflation 
(Table 3.22 and Figure 3-29(A8)) which in turn helps the real exchange rate depreciate 
(Figure 3-29(C4)).  (Recall that the nominal exchange rate is assumed fixed because it is a 
policy variable.)  With a lower real exchange rate, exports increase while, as we have seen 
above, imports more or less maintain their baseline levels, so that the current account 
improves (Table 3.22 and Figure 3.29(C3)).  And, following this, the savings and 
investment gap improves slightly.   
As we can see from Figure 3-29(A1), the real GDP graph, there is no observable effect on 
output from this deflationary impulse; this is because REER depreciates slightly which is 
expected to the real sector through exports, as inflation drops marginally.  The lower 
inflation also weakens the transmission to the real sector through the real interest rate which 
is expected to lower private consumption demand.  Moreover, since the improvements in 
the financing gaps are so small, cutting the money supply does not serve to improve 
materially the chances of achieving the GTP targets.  
     In the government sector, the contractionary policy reduces the demand for government 
securities by the non-bank public in the first four years (Figure D5) which in turn is
                                                          
93
 The policy is a onetime shock in reserve money stock but it has a permanent effect on the level of reserve 
money.    
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Table 3-22: Simulation Forecast Results Assuming Lower Reserve Money Growth 
  
Long-
term                   
Output                 
Growth                            
Target                             
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-         
Investment 
Gap        
(S_I_Q) 
Public                                  
Invest
ment                               
Requi
rem-                              
ent                  
(IG
_Q) 
Private 
Sector         
Investment                            
Requireme
nt         
(% GDP)                                     
(IP_Q) 
Total
Investment           
Requireme
nt                 
(% GDP)                
(I_Q) 
Export of                        
G&S                    
(% GDP)                      
(X_USD 
_Q) 
Current Account Balance 
(in Millions of USD) 
(CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% GDP)           
(FX_GAP_Q) 
Target Policy Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 Bs Sc.5 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 9.7 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346.00 -$2,346.00 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
2014 11.0 13.2 24.2 24.1 37.4 37.3 12.0 12.1 13.3 11.1 14.8 15.0 -$3,573.00 -$3,415.00 -1.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.2 
2015 11.0 13.2 31.1 31.0 44.3 44.2 14.9 15.1 16.8 14.4 13.8 14.2 -$6,294.00 -$5,830.00 -4.7 -4.0 -4.7 -4.0 
2016 11.0 13.2 31.7 31.6 44.9 44.8 11.2 11.2 13.4 12.4 12.0 12.4 -$9,004.00 -$8,352.00 -6.9 -6.1 -6.9 -6.1 
2017 11.0 13.2 26.5 26.3 39.7 39.5 6.1 6.0 9.5 9.4 12.4 12.7 -$9,638.00 -$8,938.00 -5.9 -5.1 -5.9 -5.1 
2018 11.0 13.2 27.9 27.6 41.1 40.8 14.7 14.7 10.2 10.1 13.9 14.2 -$10,928.00 -$10,131.00 -6.0 -5.2 -6.0 -5.2 
2019 11.0 13.2 33.6 33.3 46.8 46.5 14.9 15.0 12.0 12.1 13.0 13.3 -$14,834.00 -$13,915.00 -8.7 -8.0 -8.7 -8.0 
2020 11.0 13.2 33.0 32.9 46.2 46.1 11.2 11.3 12.8 13.1 12.9 13.2 -$18,059.00 -$17,104.00 -10.2 -9.5 -10.2 -9.5 
2021 11.0 13.2 32.5 32.4 45.7 45.6 11.8 11.8 12.4 12.8 14.1 14.4 -$20,458.00 -$19,433.00 -10.5 -9.8 -10.4 -9.8 
2022 11.0 13.2 37.1 36.8 50.3 50.0 15.0 14.9 13.5 13.8 13.8 14.2 -$26,498.00 -$25,270.00 -12.7 -12.0 -12.7 -12.0 
2023 11.0 13.2 37.9 37.7 51.1 50.9 10.8 10.8 13.4 13.6 12.9 13.3 -$33,601.00 -$32,240.00 -15.1 -14.5 -15.1 -14.5 
2024 11.0 13.2 35.9 35.7 49.1 48.9 10.2 10.2 13.5 13.7 13.5 14.0 -$38,983.00 -$37,544.00 -16.0 -15.4 -16.0 -15.4 
2025 11.0 13.2 37.8 37.5 51.0 50.7 12.6 12.6 13.6 13.9 13.8 14.2 -$47,522.00 -$45,967.00 -17.5 -16.9 -17.5 -16.9 
Aver-
age 11.0 13.2 32.4 32.2 45.6 45.4 12.1 12.1 12.9 12.5 13.4 13.8 -$19,949.33 -$19,011.58 -9.6 -9.0 -9.6 -9.0 
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Figures 3-29: Effects of Central Bank Decision to Reduce Base Money 
A. Goods and Services and Money Market  
 
B. Saving and Investment  
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C. External Sector 
 
D. Government Sector 
 
 
reflected in a moderate decline in the government financing surplus in 2014 and 2015 
(Figure 3-29(D6)).  However, the surplus increases since 2016 due to a slightly lower 
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capital expenditure as percentage of GDP (Figure 3-29(D4)) and an increase in the non-
bank public demand for government securities. 
Scenario VI.  Solving for Exchange Rate Policy that Bring Foreign Exchange Gap (FX-
Gap) to zero  
In the first five scenarios, I have tried to demonstrate the reactions of the various markets 
for alternative policy shocks.  In this scenario, the model is asked to solve for the desired 
equilibrium level of exchange rate that brings the foreign exchange gap to zero so that the 
government’s growth targets will be realized and thus the position will be sustainable.  As 
demonstrated in scenarios 1 and 4, exchange rate policy is the primary policy instrument to 
address external and internal imbalance in the Ethiopian model.  Therefore, using E-views’ 
‘Solve Control for Target’ window, the model is requested to solve for the equilibrium 
exchange rate path.  The simulation results are presented in column 3 of Table 3.23.   
     It is clear from Table 3.23 that, to bring the foreign exchange gap to zero, the pace of 
devaluation need to be slower in the first five years than the case under scenario 1 (Table 
3.21, column 2) and needs to be faster afterwards.  By 2025, the value of the Birr needs to 
go as low as 78 Birr per dollar compared with 58 Birr per dollar under scenario 1, the 40 
percent depreciation scenario.  Table 3.18 proves that the 40 percent devaluation produces a 
foreign exchange surplus as high as 13 percent in the first year, 2014, and stays in surplus 
for the next four years until 2018.  On the contrary, after 2018, it turns into a continuously 
widening deficit.  So, one of the messages of the exercise is that exchange rate adjustment 
must not be a one-time act rather it must me a carefully monitored but continuous 
adjustment to keep the real exchange rate competitive [Rapetti, 2011and Aguirre and 
Calderon, 2005]. One issue with this policy conclusion is to ask whether a steady and 
anticipated depreciation will have the same effects as the essentially unforeseen surprise 
devaluation that the financial programming model presumes.  The risk with the former is 
that the goods and money markets may take into account anticipated depreciation in their 
respective equilibrium processes, and make the policy ineffective.  
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Table 3-23: Exchange Rate Simulation Results for Zero Foreign Exchange Gap 
 
Exchange Rate of the Birr (E) 
  Baseline Scenario
1/
 
40 Percent Devaluation 
(Scenario 1) 
Simulation Result for the 
FX_GAP_TAGET 
(Scenario 6) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
2014 19.3 27.0 20.6 
2015 20.4 28.6 24.7 
2016 21.7 30.4 28.7 
2017 23.0 32.2 28.9 
2018 24.4 34.1 31.1 
2019 25.8 36.2 36.4 
2020 27.4 38.3 40.6 
2021 29.0 40.6 44.3 
2022 30.8 43.1 51.6 
2023 32.6 45.7 59.0 
2024 34.6 48.4 66.0 
2025 36.6 51.3 78.4 
1/6% annual deprecation of the Birr is already assumed in the baseline scenario 
In the goods market, annual average growth in aggregate supply actual increases from 12.1 
percent in the baseline to 12.9 percent (Table 3.24).  This results from a sharp increase in 
exports from 13.4 percent in the baseline to 17.2 percent of GDP.  The boost in exports 
generates higher spillover effect to output.  Consequently, despite a strong increase in 
aggregate supply compared with the baseline, the required level of total investment declines 
by 2 percentage points from 45.6 percent to 43.6 percent of GDP on average (Table 3.24, 
column 6).  Table 3.24 and Figures 3-30(B6) and (C6) also show that this scenario 
produces not only zero foreign exchange gaps, which the model solves for, but also a zero 
saving-investment gap.  In the government sector, lower capital and consumption 
expenditure as ratios of GDP and higher demand for government securities by the non-bank 
sector due to improved income from exports result in a large surplus in government 
financing.   
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Table 3-24: Forecast Simulation Results by Forcing the Model to Solve for the Exchange Rate Path 
  
Long-
term                   
Output                 
Growth                            
Target                             
(gT) 
Investment Requirement 
Short-Run           
Aggregate          
Supply 
Growth 
(Q%) Inflation 
External Sector 
Saving-         
Investment 
Gap        
(S_I_Q) 
Public                                  
Invest
ment                             
Requir
-ement                          
(IG_Q) 
Private
Sector                      
Investment                         
Requirement                          
(% GDP)                             
(IP_Q) 
Total 
Investment           
Requireme
nt
(% GDP)     
(I_Q) 
Export of                        
G&S                    
(% GDP)                      
(X_USD 
_Q) 
Current Account 
Balance (in 
Millions of USD) 
(CUACB_USD) 
Foreign 
Exchange                        
Gap (% 
GDP)                
(FX_GAP_
Q) 
Target Policy Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 Bs Sc.6 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2013 11.0 13.2 22.6 22.6 35.8 35.8 9.7 9.7 12.3 12.3 13.7 13.7 -$2,346 -$2,346 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 
2014 11.0 13.2 24.2 23.8 37.4 37.0 12.0 12.5 13.3 12.9 14.8 15.3 -$3,573 -$2,802 -1.6 0.0 -1.6 0.0 
2015 11.0 13.2 31.1 30.3 44.3 43.5 14.9 16.4 16.8 15.7 13.8 15.5 -$6,294 -$3,451 -4.7 0.0 -4.7 0.0 
2016 11.0 13.2 31.7 30.8 44.9 44.0 11.2 12.5 13.4 12.6 12.0 14.4 -$9,004 -$4,298 -6.9 0.0 -6.9 0.0 
2017 11.0 13.2 26.5 25.8 39.7 39.0 6.1 5.8 9.5 9.1 12.4 14.3 -$9,638 -$5,415 -5.9 0.0 -5.9 0.0 
2018 11.0 13.2 27.9 26.1 41.1 39.3 14.7 13.5 10.2 9.0 13.9 15.5 -$10,928 -$5,948 -6.0 0.0 -6.0 0.0 
2019 11.0 13.2 33.6 30.9 46.8 44.1 14.9 15.7 12.0 10.6 13.0 15.6 -$14,834 -$6,507 -8.7 0.0 -8.7 0.0 
2020 11.0 13.2 33.0 31.7 46.2 44.9 11.2 13.8 12.8 13.3 12.9 16.7 -$18,059 -$7,085 -10.2 0.0 -10.2 0.0 
2021 11.0 13.2 32.5 31.6 45.7 44.8 11.8 12.5 12.4 13.2 14.1 18.2 -$20,458 -$7,675 -10.5 0.0 -10.4 0.0 
2022 11.0 13.2 37.1 33.6 50.3 46.8 15.0 14.1 13.5 12.9 13.8 18.8 -$26,498 -$8,263 -12.7 0.0 -12.7 0.0 
2023 11.0 13.2 37.9 33.6 51.1 46.8 10.8 12.1 13.4 13.2 12.9 19.6 -$33,601 -$8,831 -15.1 0.0 -15.1 0.0 
2024 11.0 13.2 35.9 33.1 49.1 46.3 10.2 12.5 13.5 14.9 13.5 21.2 -$38,983 -$9,352 -16.0 0.0 -16.0 0.0 
2025 11.0 13.2 37.8 33.8 51.0 47.0 12.6 12.5 13.6 15.1 13.8 21.8 -$47,522 -$9,792 -17.5 0.0 -17.5 0.0 
Aver-
age 11.0 13.2 32.4 30.4 45.6 43.6 12.1 12.8 12.9 12.7 13.4 17.2 -$19,949 -$6,618 -9.6 0.0 -9.6 0.0 
1/ Figures for fiscal year 2013 are actuals 
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Figures 3-30: Solving for Exchange Rate Policy that Bring Foreign Exchange 
Gap (FX-Gap) to zero 
A.  Goods and Services and Money Market  
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B. Saving and Investment  
 
C. External Sector 
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D. Government Sector 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we have seen that, similar to the East Asian tigers between the1960s and 
1990s, Ethiopia has experienced a sustainably high growth scenario.  Economic growth 
accelerated from an annual average of 4.5 percent between 1993 and 2002 to 10.9 percent 
during the last 10 years (2004-2013).  We also observe that the growth was heavily 
investment driven and that there was a moderate contribution from an increase in total 
factor productivity, particularly through the spillover effects of growth in infrastructure 
services, human capital and exports.  The long-run growth model reveals that 85.7 percent 
of the growth comes from physical capital accumulation and only 12.4 percent comes from 
a rise in total factor productivity.  Of the latter, human capital development, infrastructure 
output growth and export growth contributed 3.7 percent, 3.0 percent and 1.9 percent 
respectively, and the remaining 3.9 percent comes from residual TFP.  As a typical labor 
surplus economy, the contribution of labor is found to be only 1.9 percent.  This makes 
Ethiopia’s growth experience different from its East Asian counterpart – China.  In China, 
the physical capital stock, labor and human capital stock contributed 47.7 percent, 15.9 
percent and 11.0 percent respectively, during the reform period (1978-1999), while the 
9
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remaining 25.4 percent is found to be explained by the residual TFP [Wang and Yao, 
2002].  
     The First Five-year Growth and Transformation (2011-2015) announces an annual 
average growth target of 11.2 percent and the vision statement indicates that the 
government will continue to target double digit growth in the Second and the Third Five-
year Growth and Transformation Plans, in order to join the club of lower middle income 
countries by 2025.  However, the baseline simulation exercise warns that the current over 
reliance of growth on physical capital accumulation raises the question of viability of the 
plans in the coming years.  The simulation shows that as the Ethiopian economy grows in 
size, the required amount of investment as a percentage of GDP increases dramatically. 
     Assessment of the consistency of GTP-I, using the modified financial programming 
(MFP), found that, first, the plan under predicted the required level of investment to 
maintain the targeted level of growth in the absence of clear knowledge about the 
contribution of total factor productivity.  The plan envisaged raising the total investment to 
GDP ratio from 22.3 percent in 2010 to 28.1 percent by 2013.  However, the simulation 
exercise, assuming the same sets of policies as the plan, found that in order to maintain the 
average 11.2 percent growth rate over the five-year plan period, gross total fixed 
investment would have to increase to 36.9 percent by 2013.  The latter is close to the actual 
investment ratio (38.4 percent) required in 2013.   
     Second, the lack of an explicit exchange rate policy to keep the export market 
competitive is also found to be inconsistent with both the planned real GDP growth and 
export projections.  The appreciation of the exchange rate by 14% between 2011 and 2013 
depressed exports growth and contributed a fair share of the deviation between the actual 
and projected growth rates in two ways.  First, as a component of the demand side of the 
GDP, lower growth in exports means a lower contribution to growth.  Second, the export 
spillover effect on TFP would also be lower.    
     The third inconsistency is the plan’s under-predication of the domestic resource required 
to finance the intended investment.  The plan aims to raise the domestic savings-to-GDP 
ratio to 12.4 percent by 2013.  However, the simulation result indicates that, assuming a 
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zero saving-investment gap, domestic savings must increase to 18.6 percent of GDP by 
2013.  Otherwise, growth would have been much lower than achieved in 2013 because of 
financing constraint.  
     The baseline forecasts for the next 12 years (2014-2025) also reveal major 
inconsistencies between policies and targets.  Simulation results of the baseline scenario 
assuming an annual average 11 percent growth and a 9 percent inflation target, forecasts 
ever-widening current account deficits and foreign exchange gaps.  For instance, the annual 
current account deficit is forecast to reach USD 47.5 billion by 2025 from USD 2.3 billion 
in 2013.   Consequently, the foreign exchange and saving-investment gaps are forecast to 
reach 17.5 percent of GDP each, by 2025.  This implies that, under the baseline scenario, 
the 11 percent growth target is not feasible.  So, the government needs to reconsider its 
growth targets or must consider major policy adjustments to bring the gaps to zero. 
     Six alternative policy scenarios were run above to see the responses of the various 
markets and to test how the policy shocks address the resource gaps.  The model responds 
very positively to an exchange rate shock.  A 40 percent one-time devaluation increases 
exports to 18.4 percent of GDP from 13.8 percent in the baseline.  Consequently, the 
average annual current account deficit shrinks to USD 9.8 billion from USD 19.9 billion 
and the foreign exchange gap turns to a surplus for the first four years during 2014-2017.  
The saving-investment gap also sees a significant reduction, from 9.6 percent of GDP in the 
baseline to 6.1 percent.  The spillover effect from the strong export growth also lowers the 
required amount of total investment from 45.6 percent to 43.3 percent of GDP, despite the 
increase in the annual average aggregate supply growth rate to 12.3 percent from 12.1 
percent, in the baseline.  This implies that the exchange rate is an effective policy 
instrument in addressing problems related to the resource gap.  
    The second policy scenario, which aims at increasing private savings through forced 
savings scheme, on the other hand, seems to be less effective, although it produces the 
expected results in terms of the reaction of the various markets.  Despite the assumption to 
lower the magnitude of the income elasticity of consumption by 4 percentage points, the 
average annual saving-investment gap is lowered only by 0.2 percentage points from -9.6 
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percent in the baseline to -9.4 percent.  On the contrary, aggregate supply growth responds 
relatively strongly due to the direct effect of reduced aggregate consumption on aggregate 
demand.  The latter comes down to 11.8 percent from 12.1 percent in the baseline.  
Consequently, despite a marginal improvement in the current account balance mainly due 
to a reduction imports, the effect on export growth is also slightly negative.     
The third scenario which assumes a 2 percentage point lower potential GDP growth rate 
than the baseline also produced mixed results, although the responses in terms of the 
narrowing of the foreign exchange and saving-investment gaps are positive.  Exports see 
slight declines from the baseline while average inflation rises marginally to 13.2 percent 
from 12.9 percent in the baseline.  Lower aggregate supply growth is the main reason 
behind the depressed export growth and rising inflation.  On the other hand, the current 
account deficit narrows down from USD19.9 billion in the baseline to USD15.8 billion 
mainly due to decline in imports.  
     The simulation, which runs a lower potential growth assumption (scenario 3) combined 
with a 20 percent devaluation of the Birr, gets positive responses in almost all markets 
considered except in the money market.  Notwithstanding a 2-percentage point reduction in 
potential GDP growth, the 20 percent devaluation boosts exports to 15.2 percent of GDP 
from 13.4 percent in the baseline.  Consequently, the average annual current account deficit 
goes down to USD 11.1 billion from USD19.9 billion.  The saving-investment gap 
experiences a significant improvement, narrowing to 3 percent of GDP.  Therefore, the 
lesson this exercise is that use of combined policies produces better results than taking one 
policy measure at a time.   
     The contractionary monetary policy scenario that aims at addressing the money market 
disequilibrium by reducing the base money, also produced the expected results.  Inflation 
goes down, resulting in a real deprecation of the exchange rate.  The latter, in turn, boosts 
export growth and narrows down the gaps in foreign exchange market and saving and 
investment.  This indicates that, during high aggregate demand pressure, monetary policy 
could be invoked as an effective instrument to address excess demand.  
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     Last but not the least is the lesson from the sixth scenario, which solves for the 
equilibrium exchange rate.  The simulation that targets a zero foreign exchange gap 
throughout the projection period has demonstrated that exchange rate is an effective policy 
instrument in addressing the resource gap problem.  It illustrates that exchange rate 
adjustment needs not to be a one-time big shock, but instead must be a carefully designed 
series of depreciations that takes into account projected resource gaps in individual years. 
One issue with this policy conclusion is to ask whether a steady and anticipated 
depreciation will have the same effects as the essentially unforeseen surprise devaluation 
that the financial programming model presumes.  
     To conclude, this chapter finds that the targets in the Growth and Transformation Plans 
could be achieved only if the inconsistencies observed in the baseline scenario between the 
targets and the policy mixes and, the consequent widening resources gaps are properly 
addressed.  This demands the government to reexamine its current policy mixes. 
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Appendices 
Appendix for Chapter 1 
Annex 1.1 Derivation of the Three-Sector Model 
with Expected Infrastructure Output Growth 
F = F(LF, KF, GF)   
X = X(LX, KX ; F*)  .......................................................................................................  1 
R = R(LR, KR,; F*, X)  
Y = F + R + X    
  
Assumptions: 
Assmption1. Factor productivity difference between the export sector and private sector 
output, and generates spill-over to non-export private sector through skilled 
labour and high managerial efficiency.  
MPPLF/MPPLR = MPPKF/MPPKR = 1,   
MPPLX/MPPLR = MPPKX/MPPKR = 1 + δ .................................................. 2 
      -∞<δ < ∞ 
Assumption 2: Public infrastructure output generates externalities to the rest of the 
economy, and expected growth in infrastructural output attracts more 
investment in the rest of the economy.   
F*t – F*t-1 = θ [Ft-1 - F*t-1],      0 < θ ≤ 1  …………................................…… 3 
dF =   ∂F/∂KF (dKF) +      ∂F/∂LF (dLF)+ ∂F/∂GF (dGF) 
dX =  ∂X/∂KX (dKX)+    ∂X/∂LX (dLX)+ ∂X/∂F (dF*).......................................... 4 
dR =  ∂R/∂KR (dKR)  +    ∂R/∂LR (dLR)+ ∂R/∂F (dF*) + ∂R/∂X (dX)  
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 Using equation 5, we can substitute (1+δ) ∂R/∂KR  to ∂X/∂KX and ∂R/∂KR  to =  ∂F/∂KF; 
and the same applies to labour inputs. 
dF =            ∂R/∂KR (dKF) +          ∂R/∂LR (dLF)+ ∂F/∂GF (dGF) 
dX = (1+δ) ∂R/∂KR (dKX)+ (1+δ) ∂R/∂LR (dLX)+ ∂X/∂F (dF*) ….....…............. 5 
dR =           ∂R/∂KR (dKR)  +          ∂R/∂LR (dLR)+ ∂R/∂F (dF*) + ∂R/∂X (dX) 
              dF =            ∂R/∂KF (dKF) +   ∂R/∂LR (dLF)+ ∂F/∂GF (dGF) 
1/(1+δ) dX =         ∂R/∂KR (dKX)+    ∂R/∂LR (dLX)+ [1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F (dF) .............. 6 
         dR =           ∂R/∂KR (dKR)  +  ∂R/∂LR (dLR)+ ∂R/∂F (dF) + ∂R/∂X (dX)   
 
dF+dR+1/(1+δ) dX = ∂R/∂KR[DKF +dKR+dKX] + ∂R/∂LR[dLF +dLR+dLX] + 
∂F/∂GF(dGF) +[1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F(dF) + ∂R/∂F(dF) + 
∂R/∂X(dX)....................................................................................... 7 
dY + 1/(1+δ) dX - dX = ∂R/∂KR(dK) + ∂R/∂LR(dL) + ∂F/∂GF(dGF) 
+[1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F*(dF*) + ∂R/∂F*(dF*) + ∂R/∂X(dX)................. 8 
dY - δ/(1+δ) dX   = ∂R/∂KR(dK) + ∂R/∂LR(dL) + ∂F/∂GF(dGF) 
+[1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F*(dF*) + ∂R/∂F*(dF*) + ∂R/∂X(dX)........................ 9 
dY = ∂R/∂KR(dK) + ∂R/∂LR(dL) + ∂F/∂GF(dGF) +[1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F*(dF*) + 
∂R/∂F*(dF*) + ∂R/∂X(dX) +  δ/(1+δ)dX   ........................................ 10 
Assmption3: Following Feder (1983), I assume a linear relationship exists between the 
real marginal productivity of labour in a given sector and average output per 
labour in the economy. It was originally argued by Burno (1968). 
∂R/∂LR = B(Y/L)   ................................................................................ 11 
Let ∂R/∂KR = α; ∂F/∂G = μ; ∂R/∂X = c; where α, μ and c are constants representing 
marginal changes in the respective sectors with respect to a change in private capital, pubic 
capital and export output.   
Dividing equation 6 by Y and replacing ∂R/∂LR by B(Y/L), we get   
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dY/Y =α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [1/(1+δ)]∂X/∂F*(dF*/Y) + ∂R/∂F*(dF*/Y) + 
∂R/∂X(dX/Y) +  δ/(1+δ)dX/Y.......................................................................... 12 
Assmption4: A plausible specification for the spill-over effects is to assume that public 
infrastructure affect export and non-export private sectors with a constant elasticity and, 
similarly, export affect the non-export private sector with a constant elasticity.  The 
constant elasticity indicates the long-run partial effects of infrastructure output and export 
growth on the respective sectors. Wang (2002).  So, 
R = R(LR, KR,; F*, X)  =  (F*)
Zψ (LR, KR,;  X)  ................................................  13 
R = R(LR, KR,; F*, X)  =  (X)
ωΨ(LR, KR,; F*)  ..................................................  14 
X = X(LX, KX; F*)     =  (F*)
Vф (LX, KX) …………………..……………......…15 
Therefore, 
∂R/∂F* = z(R/F*) 
 ∂X/∂F*= v(X/F*) 
∂R/∂X = ω(R/X) 
dY/Y =α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [1/(1+δ)] v(X/F*)(dF*/Y) + z(R/F*)(dF*/Y) + 
ω(R/X)(dX/Y) +  δ/(1+δ)dX/Y......................................................................... 16 
Rearranging terms, 
dY/Y =α(dK/Y) + β(dL/L) + μ(dGF/Y) + [v/(1+δ)] (X/Y)(dF*/F*) + z(R/Y)(dF*/F*) + 
ω(R/Y)(dX/X) +  δ/(1+δ)(dX/X)(X/Y) ............................................................ 17 
After recursive expansion, the dynamic adjustment process of equation (6) is written as:  
F*t = θ∑(1- θ)
s
 Ft-s  ;              0 < s < ∞   ………………......................….….… 18 
“The expected level of F, which factors in the externality onto the private sector, is a 
weighted average of all present and previous values of Ft, since the weight sum to unity  
[θ∑(1- θ)s = 1]” Wang (2002).   
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Substituting equation (21) into equation (20) produces a specification associated with the 
adaptive expectation process.  Equation (22) below is identical to the formulation of the 
Koyck geometric lag.    
dYt/Yt = αθ(dKt/Yt) + βθ(dLt/Lt) + μθ(dGFt/Yt) + [v/(1+δ)]θ(Xt/Yt)(dFt*/Ft*) + 
zθ(Rt/Yt)(dFt*/Ft*) + ωθ(Rt/Yt)(dXt/Xt) + [δ/(1+δ)]θ(dXt/Xt)(Xt/Yt) +  
            (1-θ)dYt/Yt-1 ....................................................................................................... 19 
Equation (22) is a nested equation which encompasses the neo-classical one sector model if 
the first three terms are significant and the rest turns to be insignificant.  The two-sector 
models with spill-over from the infrastructure sector and spill-over from the export sector.  
This is the equation which will be used for empirical study in the rest of the paper.  The 
subscript ‘t’ represents time.  
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Appendex for Chapter 2 
Annex 2.1: Variable definition and descriptions 
 
Variable  
  
Variable Name 
 
Source 
 
Description 
Y Real GDP 
 
United nation 
National 
Account data 
base 
Real GDP is obtained by adding 
up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs, and deflating 
by a GDP deflator.  
Yag Real Agricultural 
GDP 
United nation 
National 
Account data 
base 
It is added as the net real output 
of agriculture after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. 
Ynag Real  Non-
Agricultural GDP 
own 
computation 
 
Calculated as the difference 
between Real GDP and real 
agricultural GDP. 
M1 Narrow Money  World 
development 
indicator 
Money is the sum of currency 
outside banks and demand 
deposits other than those of 
central government. 
M2 Broad Money  World 
Development 
Indicator 
Broad money comprise the sum 
of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those 
of the central government, and 
the time, savings, and foreign 
currency deposits of resident 
sectors other than the central 
government.  
 
P Consumer price 
index (2005=100) 
World 
Development 
Indicator 
Consumer price index reflects 
changes in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket 
of goods and services.  
REER Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
IFS Real effective exchange rate is 
the nominal effective exchange 
rate (a measure of the value of a 
currency against a weighted 
average of several foreign 
currencies) divided by a price 
deflator or index of costs. 
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  Annex 2.2.  Unit Root Test Results 
eries 
LLC Breitung IPS ADF PP 
Constant 
Constant 
&trend 
Constant 
&trend Constant 
Constant 
&trend Constant 
Constant 
&trend Constant 
Constant 
&trend 
Ln(M1/P) 2.365 -1.0544 1.504 4.362 0.38 6.635 16.158 3.931 14.719 
  (0.991) (0.146) (0.934) (1.000) (0.648) (0.993) (0.582) (0.999) (0.681) 
Ln(M2/P) 2.252 -0.443 1.954 4.838 0.126 6.403 25.226 3.864 21.327 
  (0.998) (0.329) (0.975) (1.000) (0.550) (0.994) (0.119) (0.999) (0.2637) 
LnY 4.869 0.073 4.528 8.473 1.79 0.269 16.11 0.247 18.405 
  (1.000) (0.529) (1.000) (1.000) (0.963) (1.000) (0.585) (1.000) (0.429) 
LnYP -0.195 0.115 0.936 2.717 1.488 9.412 14.14 0.305 24.999 
  (0.423) (0.545 (0.825) (0.997) (0.932) (0.949) (0.719) (1.000) (0.125) 
r 0.129 0.973 0.936 -0.478 1.64 14.393 8.289 18.797 9.233 
  (0.551) (0.834) (0.825) (0.316) (0.950) (0.703) (0.974) (0.404) (0.954) 
Infl -3.746 -6.586 -6.337 -3.933 -5.748 -45.856 68.527 79.31 84.348 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
LnREER -1.861 -0.793 -1.487 -0.95 -1.242 23.54 21.689 24.665 35.837 
 
(0.031)** (0.214) (0.069)* (0.171) (0.107) (0.171) (0.246) (0.134) (0.007)*** 
∆Ln(M1/P) -2.89 -1.225 -2.882 -4.921 -4.05 55.938 44.438 133.968 145.164 
  (0.002)*** (0.110) (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆Ln(M2/P) -3.897 -2.65 -2.575 -5.133 -4.275 61.404 48.105 139.758 128.835 
  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LnY -2.324 -0.576 -2.126 -4.637 -4.465 54.947 48.737 116.243 128.561 
  (0.010)*** (0.282) (0.017)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LnYP -2.442 -5.720 -1.152 -4.245 -2.422 49.051 29.833 134.521 82.418 
  (0.007)*** (0.000)*** (0.125) (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.39)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆r -0.448 0.305 -1.352 -3.144 -2.231 36.224 28.548 150.153 134.889 
  (0.327) (0.620) (0.088)* (0.001)*** (0.011)** (0.007)*** (0.054)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆LnREER -1.81 -0.811 -3.52 -6.288 -5.869 73.666 66.812 177.281 437.511 
  (0.035)** (0.209) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
∆Infl -18.308 -15.100 -9.125 -17.838 -16.295 208.417 266.712 236.771 843.365 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
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Annex 2-3:Permanent Income  
 
Dependent Variable: LN_Y 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 05/30/16   Time: 16:37   
Sample: 1980 2011   
Periods included: 32   
Cross-sections included: 8   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 256  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.177859 0.389926 3.020720 0.0028 
LN_Y(-1) 1.089330 0.057911 18.81036 0.0000 
LN_Y(-2) -0.131411 0.085356 -1.539552 0.1248 
LN_Y(-3) 0.027700 0.085051 0.325682 0.7449 
LN_Y(-4) -0.039231 0.084157 -0.466167 0.6415 
LN_Y(-5) 2.77E-05 0.056692 0.000488 0.9996 
TREND 0.003721 0.000723 5.145399 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.999739    Mean dependent var 37.0173 
Adj. R-squared 0.999726    S.D. dependent var 21.4575 
S.E. of regression 0.064807    Sum squared resid 1.14658 
F-statistic 74690.64    Durbin-Watson stat 2.07754 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.999254    Mean dependent var 23.2700 
Sum squared resid 1.232838    Durbin-Watson stat 2.39360 
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Appendex for Chapter 3 
Annex 3.1: Empirical Simulation Model of the 
Modified Financial Programming 
I. LONG-TERM GROWTH, INVESTMETN AND TOTAL FACTOR 
PRODUCTIVITY BLOCK 
 
I.1 LONG-TERM OUTPUT GROWTH 
 
QP  = QP(-1)  * (1  + POTN_GDP_GRWTH  / 100) 
 
QP_N  - QP  * DEF  / 100  = 0 
 
I.2      TOTAL INVESTMNET AND FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
1.2.1.    TOTAL CAPITAL STOCK 
 
K  - (0.97  * K_INITIAL  + 0.97  * K(-1)  + I)  = 0 
 
K_GROSS  - (K_INITIAL  + K(-1)  + I)  = 0 
 
I  - (IP  + IG)  = 0 
 
I_Q  - (I  / (QP))  * 100  = 0 
 
K_DEPRCIATION  - (K_GROSS  - K)  = 0 
 
IG  - QP  * IG_Q  = 0 
 
IG_N  - IG  * DEF  / 100  = 0 
 
KG  - (0.97  * KG_INITIAL  + 0.97  * KG(-1)  + IG)  = 0 
 
1.2.2.   TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT REQUIRMENT 
 
IP  - (((D(D(LOG(QP)))  - (-0.183503034257  * D(D(LOG(QP(-2))))  - 0.106004997805  * 
D(D(LOG(QP(-3))))  + 1.71976822694  * D(D(LOG(K)))  + 0.19664274636  * 
D(D(LOG(N_TOT_P)))  - 0.408390025544  * D(D(LOG(N_TOT_P(-1))))  - 
0.569539825821  * D(D(LOG(N_TOT_P(-2))))  - 0.439300765271  * 
D(D(LOG(N_TOT_P(-3))))  + 0.0564811283951  * D(D(LOG(H)))  - 0.140776312607  * 
D(D(LOG(F(-2))))  - 0.263242768798  * D(D(LOG(F(-3))))  + 0.0680585832204  * 
D(D(LOG(X)))  - 0.069399063238  * D(D(LOG(X(-1))))  + 0.0493760491661  * 
D(D(LOG(X(-3))))  - 0.717469102927  * D(LOG(QP(-1)))  - 0.0268409746155  * 
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D(LOG(N_TOT_P(-1)))  + 0.107418803642  * D(LOG(H(-1)))  + 0.0880306418235  * 
D(LOG(F(-1)))  + 0.0122498854599  * D(DSB2007)  * LOG(F(-1))  + 0.0577274789301  
* D(LOG(X(-1)))  - 0.0372668660874  * D(DUMY92)))  * K(-1))  / 0.382067783136  - IG  
+ K_DEPRCIATION )  = 0 
 
IP_Q  = (IP  / (Q  - Q_STDSP))  * 100 
 
1.2.3.  TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
 
1.2.3.1 HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
D(LOG(H))  - (0.129423990731  * D(LOG(H(-2)))  + 0.375735200356  * D(LOG(H(-3)))  
+ 0.157185306408  * D(LOG(H(-4)))  + 0.260539125087  * D(LOG(H(-5)))  + 
0.166387199692  * D(LOG(PC_Y))  - 0.139086398482  * D(LOG(PC_Y(-1)))  - 
0.362345360557  * D(LOG(PC_Y(-5)))  + 2.68906213055  * D(LOG(KG))  + 
1.21509046962  * D(LOG(KG(-2)))  + 0.863799456896  * D(LOG(KG(-5)))  - 
0.878846804927  * LOG(H(-1))  + 0.223316337166  * LOG(PC_Y(-1))  + 
0.985537101845  * LOG(KG(-1))  - 8.03944544288)  = 0 
 
PC_Y  - QP  / N_TOT_P  = 0 
 
1.2.3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE OUTPUT 
 
D(LOG(F)) – (0.462674592613*D(LOG(F(-1))) + 0.359919939011*D(LOG(F(-2))) + 
0.196016413648*D(LOG(F(-3))) + 0.168014485558*D(LOG(F(-4))) + 
1.69804357258*D(LOG(KG)) - 1.08464598977*D(LOG(KG(-1))) - 
0.504782206813*D(LOG(KG(-4))) + 0.368251582682*D(LOG(N_URB_P)) - 
0.856150520472*LOG(F(-1)) + 0.686835036126*LOG(KG(-1)) + 
0.0228044756655*DSB2000*LOG(KG(-1)) + 0.0757609892028*LOG(N_URB_P(-1)) - 
1.71077484516) = 0 
 
1.2.3.3 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
D(LOG(X))  - (0.268353859968  * D(LOG(X(-1)))  + 0.300174606784  * D(LOG(X(-2)))  
+ 0.418604548907  * D(LOG(X(-3)))  + 0.295587458819  * D(LOG(X(-4)))  - 
0.480365063468  * D(LOG(REER_F))  + 0.306014976245  * D(LOG(REER_F(-2)))  + 
0.616052380805  * D(LOG(REER_F(-3)))  + 0.316361980242  * D(LOG(REER_F(-4)))  + 
1.09971230364  * D(LOG(Q_F))  - 1.31149447799  * D(LOG(Q_F(-1)))  - 0.45502812056  
* D(LOG(Q_F(-4)))  - 0.783446772163  * LOG(X(-1))  - 0.52461230977  * 
LOG(REER_F(-1))  + 0.944273252806  * LOG(Q_F(-1))  + 0.415745132862 * 
DUMMY_84 - 0.439505310902  * DUMY92  - 1.16653174675)  = 0 
 
X_Q  - X  / Q  * 100  = 0 
X_USD  - (X  * DEF  / 100)  / E  = 0 
=============================================================== 
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II. SHORT-TERM AGGREGATE DEMAND BLOCK 
 
Q  - CP  - CG  - IP  - IG  - X  + Z  - Q_STDSP  = 0 
 
Q_PC  - (Q  / Q(-1)  - 1)  * 100  = 0 
 
Q_N  - Q  * DEF  / 100  = 0 
 
2.1 PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EQUATION 
 
D(LOG(CP)) – (-0.179586648238*D(LOG(CP(-1))) + 0.122746221169*D(LOG(CP(-4))) 
+ 0.603184652123*D(LOG(YDI)) + 0.00109498323304*D(RINTRATE(-1)) + 
0.000448527629734*D(RINTRATE(-2)) - 0.782175239731*LOG(CP(-1)) + 
0.845005344123*LOG(YDI(-1)) - 0.00169299122456*RINTRATE(-1) - 0.971513880545)  
= 0 
 
RINTRATE  - (((1  + INTRATE)  / (1  + DPD))  - 1)  * 100  = 0 
 
YDI  - (QP_N  - TX_Y  + (FYNETW_USD  + PVTRANSW_USD  + 
OFFTRANSW_USD)  * E)  / DEF  * 100  = 0 
 
TX_Y  - (TX_Y_R  * Q_N)  = 0 
 
CP_Q  - CP  / (Q  - Q_STDSP)  * 100  = 0 
 
2.2 GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
 
CG  - CG_Q  * QP  = 0 
 
2.3 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
Z  - Q  * Z_Q  / 100  = 0 
 
Z_USD  - (Z  * DEF  / 100)  / E  = 0 
=============================================================== 
III. THE MONEY MARKET BLOCK 
 
3.1 MONEY SUPPLY IDENTITIES 
 
3.1.1 BROAD MONEY SUPPLY 
 
M2  - M  * M0  = 0 
 
M2_Q_N  - M2  / (Q  * DEF  / 100)  = 0 
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3.1.2 RESERVE MONEY 
 
M0  - (BBNFA  + BBNGOV  + BBNPVT  + BBOIN)  = 0 
M0_PC  - (M0  - M0(-1))  / M0(-1)  * 100  = 0 
 
BBNGOV  - (BBNGOV(-1)  + DBBNGOV)  = 0 
 
BBNFA  - (BBNFA_USD)  * E  = 0 
 
3.1.3 OTHER COMPONENTS OF BROAD MONEY 
 
CBNPVT  - ( M2  + OIN  - NFA  - (BBNGOV  + BBNPVT  + CBNGOV))  = 0 
 
OIN  = OIN_R  * BBOIN 
 
NFA  = BBNFA  + CBNFA_USD  * E 
 
CBNGOV  = CBNGOV(-1)  + GOVCBFCYG  - GOVCALDIFF 
 
3.1.4 MONEY MULTIPLIER 
 
M  - ((1+C_DD +S_DD +T_DD) /(RQR *(1 +S_DD  +T_DD)  + C_DD  + E_DD))  = 0 
 
3.2 MONEY DEMAND 
 
3.2.1 MONEY DEMAND EQUATION 
 
D(LOG(M2D_PD_A))  - (-0.147176113783 * D(LOG(M2D_PD_A(-2)))  - 0.32578719075 
* D(LOG(M2D_PD_A(-3)))  - 0.507080365094 * D(LOG(Q(-1)))  - 0.241161338742 * 
D(LOG(Q(-2)))  - 0.339919421401 * D(LOG(Q(-3)))  - 0.367627116621 * 
D(LOG(PC_RUROUT))  + 0.399520194687 * D(LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1)))  - 
0.538041800196 * D(LOG(REER))  - 0.0583036952488 * D(LOG(REER(-1)))  - 
0.449168487092 * D(LOG(REER(-3)))  - 2.20703547584 * D(INTRATE)  - 
2.92965939503 * D(INTRATE(-3))  - 0.663323119294 * LOG(M2D_PD_A(-1))  + 
0.723995177031 * LOG(Q(-1))  - 0.681843094146 * LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1))  + 
0.196939201437 * DSB2006 * LOG(PC_RUROUT(-1))  - 0.298990595682 * 
LOG(REER(-1))  - 1.89611375351 * INTRATE(-1)  + 0.692630174946)  = 0 
 
M2D  - (M2D_PD_A  * PD_A  / 100)  = 0 
 
3.2.2 PERCAPITA RURAL OUTPUT 
 
RUROUT  - (QAG_R  * Q)  = 0 
 
PC_RUROUT  - (RUROUT  / N_RUR_P)  = 0 
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3.2.3 MONEY MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
EXCESS_MONSUPPLY  - (M2  - M2D)  / M2D  = 0 
============================================================== 
IV. EXTERNAL SECTOR BLOCK 
 
4.1 EXTERNAL FINANCING GAP IDENTITIY 
 
FX_GAP  - (X_USD  - Z_USD  + FYNETW_USD  + PVTRANSW_USD  + 
OFFTRANSW_USD  + F_BOR_NET_USD  + F_BOR_OTH_NET_USD  + 
SHT_CAP_USD  + FDI_USD  - DBT_RELF_USD  + ER_OM_USD  - DBBNFA_USD  - 
DCBNFA_USD)  = 0 
 
CUACB_USD  - (X_USD  - Z_USD  + FYNETW_USD  + PVTRANSW_USD  + 
OFFTRANSW_USD)  = 0 
 
CAB_USD  - ( F_BOR_NET_USD  + F_BOR_OTH_NET_USD  + SHT_CAP_USD  + 
FDI_USD  + ER_OM_USD)  = 0 
 
FX_GAP_FEA  = FX_GAP  / FEA 
 
FEA  - (X_USD  + FYNETW_USD  + PVTRANSW_USD  + OFFTRANSW_USD  + 
F_BOR_NET_USD  + F_BOR_OTH_NET_USD  + SHT_CAP_USD  + FDI_USD  - 
DBT_RELF_USD  + ER_OM_USD)  = 0 
 
FX_GAP_TARGET  - (FX_GAP  - FX_GAP)  = 0 
 
4.2 GROSS INT'L RESERVES AND CENTRAL BANK NFA 
 
RES_IN_M_OF_Z  - BBGROSR_USD  / Z_USD  * 12  = 0 
 
BBNFA_USD  - (BBGROSR_USD  - BBGROSL_USD)  = 0 
=============================================================== 
V. GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT BLOCK 
 
GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q_N  - (TX  + NTX  + GRANT  + GOVEXTFCYG  + 
DBBNGOV  + GOVCBFCYG  + GOVNNBNKFCYG  + GOVRESFCYG  - GOVCON_E  
- GOVCAP_E )  / Q  = 0 
 
GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q_ADJ  = 0.5  * GOVTOTFINCYG_GAP_Q_N 
 
GRANT  - GRANT_R  * (OFFTRANSW_USD  * E)  = 0 
 
GOVCON_E  - GOVCON_E_R  * (CG  * DEF  / 100)  = 0 
 
GOVCAP_E  - GOVCAP_E_R  * (IG  * DEF  / 100)  = 0 
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GOVEXTFCYG  - GOVEXTFCYG_R  * (F_BOR_NET_USD  * E)  = 0 
 
GOVCBFCYG  = GOVCBFCYG_R  * (M2  - M2(-1)) 
GOVNNBNKFCYG  - GOVNNBNKFCYG_R  * (M2  - M2(-1))  = 0 
 
TX  - TX_R  * (Q  * DEF  / 100)  = 0 
 
NTX  - NTX_R  * (Q  * DEF  / 100)  = 0 
=============================================================== 
VI. SAVING INVESTMENT EQUILIBRIUM BLOCK 
 
6.1 DOMESTIC SAVINGS 
 
S  - (X  - Z  + I)  = 0 
 
SAVING_GAP  - (S  - I)  = 0 
 
S_Q  - S  / Q  * 100  = 0 
6.2 NATIONAL SAVINGS 
 
S_NTL  - ((X_USD  - Z_USD  + FYNETW_USD  + PVTRANSW_USD  + 
OFFTRANSW_USD)  * E  / DEF  * 100  + I)  = 0 
 
SAVING_GAP_TOTAL  - (S_NTL  - I)  = 0 
 
S_NTL_Q  = S_NTL  / Q  * 100 
 
6.3 FOREING SAVINGS 
 
S_FORGN - (CAB_USD - DBBNFA_USD - DCBNFA_USD - DBT_RELF_USD) * E 
/DEF  * 100  = 0 
 
6.4 SAVING-INVESTMENT EQUILIBRIUM 
 
S_I  - (SAVING_GAP_TOTAL  + S_FORGN)  = 0 
 
S_I_Q  - (SAVING_GAP_TOTAL  + S_FORGN)  / Q  * 100  = 0 
=============================================================== 
VII.  SHORT-TERM AGGREGATE DEMAND AND SUPPLY EQUILIBRIUM AND 
PRICES BLOCK 
 
7.1 SHORT-TERM INFLATION DETERMINATION 
 
DPD - (AGG_EXCESS_DD+WORLDFOODINFL+INFLATION_EXPECTATION)= 0 
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AGG_EXCESS_DD  - 0.35  * EXCESS_MONSUPPLY  = 0 
 
WORLDFOODINFL  - 0.35  * (WPF  - WPF(-1))  / WPF(-1)  = 0 
INFLATION_EXPECTATION  - 0.30  * DPD_E  = 0 
 
DPD_E -(0.95*(PD-PD(-1)) /PD_A(-1)+ 0.05 * (PD_A(-1) - PD_A(-2)) /PD_A(-2))  = 0 
 
INFLATION  - DPD  * 100  = 0 
 
PD_A  - PD_A(-1)  * (1  + DPD)  = 0 
 
INFLATION_TARGET  - (PD  - PD(-1))  / PD(-1)  * 100  = 0 
 
7.1 GDP DEFLATOR 
 
LOG(DEF)  - (0.912957714168  * LOG(DEF(-1))  + 0.116084564995  * LOG(DEF(-3))  - 
0.143816162685  * LOG(DEF(-4))  + 0.55357000866  * LOG(PD_A)  - 0.41822548015  * 
LOG(PD_A(-1))  - 0.14392786117  * LOG(PD_A(-2))  + 0.0816927201312  * 
LOG(PD_A(-3))  - 0.037907800095  * LOG(PD_A(-4))  + 0.170419328359  * 
DUMMY_85  + 0.103110993736  * DUMY93  + 0.0815637159291  * DUMY98  - 
0.0374047157023  * DUMMY_2010  + 0.00629527458391  * @TREND  + 
0.0967173899042)  = 0 
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Annex 3.2: Definition of Variables used in the 
MFP Model and Sources of Data 
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
I.     Endogenous Variables  
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
AGG_EXC 
ESS_DD 
Aggregate Excess Demand      Computed from MOFED’s 
National Accounts Statistics 
BBNFA Net Foreign Assets of the NBE NBE, Annual Reports 
BBNFA_USD Net Foreign Assets of the NBE (in USD) " 
BBNGOV Net Claims on Government by the National Bank 
of Ethiopia 
" 
CAB_USD Capital Account of the BOPs (in USD)  " 
CBNGOV Net Government Borrowing from Commercial 
Banks (Calendar Month) 
" 
CBNPVT Net Private Sector Borrowing from Commercial 
Banks 
" 
CG Real Government Consumption Demand MOFED, National Accounts  
CP Real Private Sector Consumption Demand " 
CP_Q Private Consumption-to-GDP Ratio MOFED National Accounts 
CUACB_USD Current Account of the Balance of Payments (in 
USD) 
National Bank of Ethiopia, 
Annual Reports 
DEF GDP Deflator (2011 = 100) MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
DPD Change in Domestic Consumer Price as a Ratio 
of Previous Year’s Price  
National Bank of Ethiopia, 
Annual Reports 
DPD_E Change in Expected Consumer Price as a Ratio 
of Previous Year’s Price  
" 
EXCESS_ 
MONSUPPLY 
Excess Money Supply Computed from NBE, 
Annual Reports 
F Real Infrastructure Output MOFED, National Accounts  
FEA Foreign Exchange Availability (in USD) Computed from NBE’s 
Annual Reports 
FX_GAP Foreign Exchange Gap (in USD) " 
FX_GAP_FEA  Foreign Exchange Gap as a Ratio of Foreign 
Exchange Availability (in USD) 
" 
FX_GAP_ 
TARGET 
Foreign Exchange Gap Target (in USD) National Bank of Ethiopia, 
Financial Program  
GOVCAP_E Government Capital Expenditure MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
GOVCBFCYG Government Financing of the Budget from 
Commercial Banks (Fiscal Month) 
" 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data    
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
I.     Endogenous Variables (Cont'd)   
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
GOVCON_E Gov’t Consumption 
Expenditure 
" 
GOVEXT 
FCYG 
Government External Financing  " 
GOVNNBN 
KFCYG 
Government Non-Bank 
Financing  
" 
GOVTOTFIN 
CYG_GAP_Q_N  
Government Total Financing 
Gap as a Ratio of Nominal 
GDP 
Computed from MOFED, Annual 
Reports and Fiscal Statistics 
GRANT Grant Revenue in the Budget MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
H Human Capital Index Computed from Central Statistics 
Authority’s Publications 
I Real Gross Total Capital 
Formation   
MOFED, National Accounts 
I_Q Real Gross Total Capital 
Formation as a Ratio of GDP 
Computed from MOFED National 
Accounts Statistics 
IG Real Gross Government Capital 
Formation 
MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
IG_N Nominal Gross Government 
Capital Formation  
Computed from MOFED National 
Accounts Statistics 
INFLATION Inflation Rate (Percentage 
Change in Consumer Price 
Index) 
MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
INFLATION_ 
EXPECTATION 
Inflation Expectation 
(Percentage Change) 
Computed from NBE, Annual 
Reports 
INFLATION_ 
TARGET 
Inflation Target (Program 
Target) 
Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 2010 
IP Real Gross Private Capital 
Formation 
MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
IP_Q Gross Private Capital 
Formation as a Ratio of GDP 
" 
K Real Net Total Capital Stock " 
K_DEPRCIATION Accumulated Depreciation of 
Capital Stock 
" 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the 
MFP Model and Sources of Data    
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
I.     Endogenous Variables (Cont'd)    
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
K_GROSS Real Gross Total Capital Stock " 
KG Real Net Gov’t Capital Stock " 
M Broad Money Multiplier NBE, Annual Reports 
M0 High-powered (Reserve) Money NBE, Annual Reports 
M0_PC High-Powered Money 
(Percentage Change) 
" 
M2 Broad Money Supply " 
M2_Q_N  Broad Money Supply as a Ratio 
of Nominal GDP 
" 
M2D Broad Money Demand " 
M2D_PD_A Real Demand  " 
NEER Nominal Effective Exchange 
Rate Index (2011 = 100) 
Computed based on information 
from NBE, Annual Reports and IMF 
International Financial Statistics 
NFA Net Foreign Assets of the 
Banking System 
National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual 
Reports 
NTX Non-Tax Revenue of the 
Government 
 MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
OIN Other Item Net of the Banking 
System 
National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual 
Reports 
PC_RUROUT Per-capita Rural Output  MOFED, National Accounts 
PC_Y Per-capita GDP “ 
PD_A Consumer Price Index Computed based on information 
from NBE and Central Statistics 
Authority 
Q Real GDP (Actual) MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
Q_N Nominal GDP (Actual) " 
Q_PC Real GDP (Percentage Change) " 
QP Real Potential Output Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 2010 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data    
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
I.     Endogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of 
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
QP_N Nominal Potential Output Fed. Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia, 2010 
REER Real Effective Exchange Index 
(2011=100) 
Computed based on 
information from NBE, 
Annual Reports and IMF’s 
IFS 
RES_IN_M_OF_Z Gross International Reserves in 
Months of next year’s Imports of 
Goods and Services  
NBE, Annual Reports 
RGDP_GROWTH Real GDP Growth MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
RINTRATE Real Interest Rate NBE, Annual Reports 
RUROUT Rural Output MOFED, National Accounts 
Statistics 
S Real Gross Domestic Savings 
(Domestic Private Sector plus 
Public Sector savings) 
" 
S_FORGN Real Foreign Savings NBE, Annual Reports 
S_I Saving-Investment Gap Computed from MOFED's 
National Accounts 
S_I_Q Saving-Investment Gap as a Ratio 
of GDP 
" 
S_NTL Real Gross National Savings " 
S_NTL_Q Real Gross National Savings as a 
Ratio of GDP 
" 
S_Q Gross Domestic Savings as a Ratio 
of GDP 
" 
TX Total Tax Revenue  MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
TX_Y Total Income Tax Revenue " 
WORLD 
FOODINFL 
World Food Inflation NBE's Annual Reports 
WPF Consumer Price Indices of  Major 
Trading Partner Countries of 
Agricultural Outputs 
" 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data    
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
I.     Endogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of 
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
X Real Exports of Goods and 
Services 
MOFED, National Accounts  
X_Q Exports of Goods and 
Services as a Ratio of GDP 
Computed from MOFED 
National Accounts Statistics 
X_USD Exports of Goods and 
Services (in USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
YDI National Disposable Income  MOFED, National Accounts  
Z Imports of Goods and 
Services  
NBE, Annual Reports 
II.     Exogenous Variables (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
BBGROSL 
_USD 
Gross International Liability 
of the NBE (in USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
BBGROSR 
_USD 
Gross International Reserves 
of the NBE (in USD) 
" 
BBNPVT Net Claims on the Private 
Sector of the NBE 
" 
BBOIN Other Items Net of the NBE " 
CBNFA_USD Net Foreign Assets of 
Commercial Banks (in USD) 
" 
CG_Q Government Consumption to 
GDP Ratio 
Computed based on 
information from MOFED 
National Accounts Statistics 
DBBNFA_USD Change in Net Foreign 
Assets of the NBE (in USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
DBBNGOV Change in Net Claims on 
Government of the NBE 
" 
CBNFA_USD Net Foreign Assets of 
Commercial Banks (in USD) 
" 
CG_Q Government Consumption to 
GDP Ratio 
Computed based on 
information from MOFED 
National Accounts Statistics 
DBBNFA_USD Change in Net Foreign 
Assets of the NBE (in USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
DBBNGOV Change in Net Claims on 
Gov’t of the NBE 
" 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data    
      (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
II.     Exogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
DBT_RELF_USD Debt Relief (in USD) NBE, Annual Reports  
DCBNFA_USD Change in Net Foreign Assets of 
Commercial Banks (in USD) 
" 
DSB2000 Dummy for Structural Change 
starting from 2000 
  
DSB2006 Dummy for Structural Change 
starting from 2006 
  
DSB2007 Dummy for Structural Change 
starting from 2007 
  
DUMMY_2007 Dummy for 2007   
DUMMY_2009 Dummy for 2009   
DUMMY_2010 Dummy for 2010   
DUMMY_2011  Dummy for 2011   
DUMMY_2012  Dummy for 2012   
DUMMY_2013  Dummy for 2013   
DUMMY_84  Dummy for 1984   
DUMMY_85  Dummy for 1985   
DUMY92  Dummy for 1992   
DUMY93  Dummy for 1993   
DUMY98  Dummy for 1998   
E Nominal Exchange Rate of the Birr 
(Birr/USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
ER_OM_USD Errors and Omissions of the Balance 
of Payments (in USD) 
Computed based on 
information from NBE, 
Annual Reports 
F_BOR_NET_USD Official Net Foreign Borrowing From 
Abroad (in USD) 
NBE, Annual Reports 
FDI_USD Foreign Direct Investment (in USD) " 
FYNETW_ 
USD 
Net Foreign Income from Abroad (in 
USD) 
" 
GOVCAL 
DIFF 
Difference between Fiscal and 
Calendar Month Gov’t Borrowing 
from the Banking System  
Computed from 
MOFED's Fiscal 
Statistics and NBE's 
Annual Reports 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data  
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
II.     Exogenous Variables (Cont'd)  
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
GOVCAP_ 
E_R 
Gov’t Capital Expenditure as a 
ratio of Gross Government 
Capital Formation  
Computed from MOFED 
National Accounts and Fiscal 
Statistics 
GOVCBF 
CYG_R 
Commercial Bank Financing of 
Gov’t Deficit as a Ratio of 
Change in Broad Money Supply 
" 
GOVCON 
_E_R 
Gov’t Consumption Expenditure 
to Gov’t Consumption Demand 
Ratio 
" 
GOVEXTF 
CYG_R 
Government External Financing 
to Official Net Foreign 
Borrowing Ratio 
MOFED's Fiscal Statistics and 
NBE's Annual Reports 
GOVNNBN 
KFCYG_R 
Government Non-Bank 
Financing to Change in Broad 
Money Supply Ratio 
" 
GOVRESF 
CYG 
Government Residual Financing  MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
GRANT_R Grants to Official transfer Ratio Computed from MOFED's 
Fiscal 
IG_Q Gross Gov’t Capital Formation 
to GDP Ratio 
Computed from MOFED’s 
National Accounts 
INTRATE Minimum Interest Rate  NBE, Annual Reports 
K_INITIAL Initial Gross Total Capital Stock Computed from MOFED’s 
National Accounts 
KG_INITIAL Initial Gross Gov’t Capital Stock " 
N_RUR_P Total Rural Population of 
Ethiopia 
Central Statistical Authority 
Reports 
N_TOT_P Total Population of Ethiopia " 
N_URB_P Total Urban Population of 
Ethiopia 
" 
NTX_R Non-Tax Revenue to GDP Ratio MOFED, Fiscal Statistics 
PD Consumer Price Index (2011 = 
100) 
National Bank of Ethiopia, 
Annual Reports 
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Annex 3.2 (Cont'd): Definition of Variables used in the MFP 
Model and Sources of Data  
     (In Local Currency Unless Otherwise Specified) 
II.     Exogenous Variables (Cont'd)   
Name of the 
Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
POTN_GDP_ 
GRWTH 
Potential Real GDP Growth 
Rate 
Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 2010 
PVTRANSW_USD Private Transfers (in USD) National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual 
Reports 
Q_STDSP Statistical Discrepancies in 
National Accounts  
Computed based on information 
from MOFED National Accounts 
Statistics 
QAG_R Agricultural Output to GDP 
Ratio 
Computed based on information 
from MOFED National Accounts 
Statistics 
SHT_CAP_USD Short-term Capital Net 
Inflows (in USD) 
National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual 
Reports 
TX_R Total Tax Revenue to GDP 
Ratio 
Computed based on information 
from MOFED National Accounts 
Statistics and Fiscal Statistics 
TX_Y_R Income Tax to GDP Ratio " 
Z_Q Total Imports of Goods and 
Services to GDP Ratio 
Computed based on information 
from NBE's Annual Reports 
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Annex 3.3: Real Effective Exchange Rate and 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
3.3.1 METHODOLOGY  
REER = ∑BREERi……………………………………………………………..…. 1 
BREERi = wi (e
f
i/e)(PD
f
i/PD) …………….…………………………….......…….. 2 
where REER is real effective exchange rate, ∑ is the summation operator and BREERi is 
bilateral real effective exchange rate of country i.   ‘w’ is a weight which measures the share 
of total trade (export plus import of goods) of a trading partner ‘i’ from total exports and 
imports of goods of Ethiopia. ‘e’ is nominal exchange rate of the Birr in terms of USD, i.e., 
USD-to-Birr ratio (Birr is the national currency); e
f
 is the exchange rate of a trading partner 
country in terms of USD, i.e., USD-to-trading-partner-country’s-national-currency ratio; 
PD is domestic consumer price index; and PD
f
 is the consumer price index of a trading 
partner. The subscript ‘i’ refers to a major trading partner of Ethiopia.  The top seventeen 
major trading partner countries, which accounts collectively for more than 80 percent of 
total trade are taken to construct the REER index. 
3.3.2 Computation of REER and NEER Identities 
3.3.2.1 Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) Index 
REER  = BREERBEL  + BREERCHI  + BREERDJI  + BREERFRA  + BREERGER  
+ BREERIND  + BREERITA  + BREERJPN  + BREERKEN  + BREERKOR  + 
BREERNZD  + BREERSA  + BREERSWD  + BREERSWZ  + BREERTKY  + 
BREERUK  + BREERUS ……………………………….……… 3 
3.2.2.2  Bilateral Real Effective Exchange Rates of Major 
Trading Partner Countries (BREERs) 
CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  = (100  / 0.062034739)  * CUR_BIRR_ETH 
CUR_BIRR_ETH  = 1  / E 
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Germany 
CUR_BIRR_GER  =CUR_USD_INX_GER  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_GER  = (100  / 0.73417)  * CUR_USD_GER 
BREERGER  =CUR_BIRR_GER  * (CPI_ ETH / CPI_GER)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_GER 
China 
CUR_BIRR_CHI  =CUR_USD_INX_CHI  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_CHI  = (100  / 6.46146)  * CUR_USD_CHI 
BREERCHI  =CUR_BIRR_CHI  * (CPI_ETH / CPI_CHI)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_CHI 
Saudi Arabia 
CUR_BIRR_SA  =CUR_USD_INX_SA  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_SA  = (100  / 3.75000)  * CUR_USD_SA 
BREERSA  =CUR_BIRR_SA  * (CPI_ETH  / CPI_SA)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_SA 
Switzerland 
CUR_BIRR_SWZ  =CUR_USD_INX_SWZ  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_SWZ  = (100  / 0.947037)  * CUR_USD_SWZ 
BREERSWZ  =CUR_BIRR_SWZ  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_SWZ)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_SWZ 
UnitedStates 
BREERUS  =CUR_USD_INX_ETH  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_US)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_US 
UnitedKingdom 
CUR_BIRR_UK  =CUR_USD_INX_UK  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_UK  = (100  / 0.62857)  * CUR_USD_UK 
BREERUK  =CUR_BIRR_UK  * (CPI_ETH  / CPI_UK)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_UK 
Japan 
CUR_BIRR_JPN  =CUR_USD_INX_JPN  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_JPN  = (100  / 83.1045)  * CUR_USD_JPN 
BREERJPN  =CUR_BIRR_JPN  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_JPN)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_JPN 
Belgium 
CUR_BIRR_BEL  =CUR_USD_INX_BEL  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_BEL  = (100  / 0.73417)  * CUR_USD_BEL 
BREERBEL  =CUR_BIRR_BEL  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_BEL)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_BEL 
 
Kenya 
CUR_BIRR_KEN  =CUR_USD_INX_KEN  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_KEN  = (100  / 82.09824)  * CUR_USD_KEN 
BREERKEN  =CUR_BIRR_KEN  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_KEN)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_KEN 
 
France 
CUR_BIRR_FRA  =CUR_USD_INX_FRA  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
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CUR_USD_INX_FRA  = (100  / 0.73417)  * CUR_USD_FRA 
BREERFRA  =CUR_BIRR_FRA  * (CPI_ETH  / CPI_FRA)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_FRA 
Italy 
CUR_BIRR_ITA  =CUR_USD_INX_ITA  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_ITA  = (100  / 0.73417)  * CUR_USD_ITA 
BREERITA  =CUR_BIRR_ITA  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_ITA)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_ITA 
Netherlands 
CUR_BIRR_NZD  =CUR_USD_INX_NZD  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_NZD  = (100  / 0.73417)  * CUR_USD_NZD 
BREERNZD  =CUR_BIRR_NZD  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_NZD)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_NZD 
Sweden 
CUR_BIRR_SWD  =CUR_USD_INX_SWD  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_SWD  = (100  / 6.69917)  * CUR_USD_SWD 
BREERSWD  =CUR_BIRR_SWD  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_SWD)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_SWD 
India 
CUR_BIRR_IND  =CUR_USD_INX_IND  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_IND  = (100  / 45.31603)  * CUR_USD_IND 
BREERIND  =CUR_BIRR_IND  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_IND)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_IND 
South Korea 
CUR_BIRR_KOR  =CUR_USD_INX_KOR  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_KOR  = (100  / 1129.31825)  * CUR_USD_KOR 
BREERKOR  =CUR_BIRR_KOR  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_KOR)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_KOR 
Turkey 
CUR_BIRR_TKY  =CUR_USD_INX_TKY  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_TKY  = (100  / 1.674955)  * CUR_USD_TKY 
BREERTKY  =CUR_BIRR_TKY  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_TKY)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_TKY 
Djibouti 
CUR_BIRR_DJI  =CUR_USD_INX_DJI  * (CUR_USD_INX_ ETH  / 100) 
CUR_USD_INX_DJI  = (100  / 177.7)  * CUR_USD_DJI 
BREERDJI  =CUR_BIRR_DJI  * (CPI_ ETH  / CPI_DJI)  * TRADE_WEIGHT_DJI 
============================================================== 
3.3.2.3 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) 
NEER = (TRADE_WEIGHT_BEL  * CUR_BIRR_BEL)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_CHI  * 
CUR_BIRR_CHI)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_DJI  * CUR_BIRR_DJI )  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_FRA  * CUR_BIRR_FRA)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_GER  * 
CUR_BIRR_GER)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_IND  * CUR_BIRR_IND)  + 
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(TRADE_WEIGHT_ITA  * CUR_BIRR_ITA)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_JPN  * 
CUR_BIRR_JPN)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_KEN  * CUR_BIRR_KEN)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_KOR  * CUR_BIRR_KOR)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_NZD  * 
CUR_BIRR_NZD)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_SA  * CUR_BIRR_SA)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_SWD  * CUR_BIRR_SWD)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_SWZ  * 
CUR_BIRR_SWZ)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_TKY  * CUR_BIRR_TKY)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_UK  * CUR_BIRR_UK)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_US  * 
CUR_BIRR_ETH) 
============================================================== 
3.3.2.4 Weighted Consumer Price Indices of Ethiopia's Major 
Trading Partner Countries (PF) 
PF  = (TRADE_WEIGHT_BEL  * CPI_BEL)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_CHI  * CPI_CHI)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_DJI  * CPI_DJI )  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_FRA  * CPI_FRA)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_GER  * CPI_GER )  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_IND  * CPI_IND)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_ITA  * CPI_ITA)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_JPN  * CPI_JPN)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_KEN  * CPI_KEN)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_KOR  * CPI_KOR)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_NZD  * CPI_NZD)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_SA  * CPI_SA)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_SWD  * CPI_SWD)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_SWZ  * CPI_SWZ)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_TKY  * CPI_TKY)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_UK  * CPI_UK)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_US  * CPI_US) 
 
3.3.2.5 Weighted Consumer Price Indices of Ethiopia's Major 
Agricultural Goods Trading Partner Countries (WPF)  
WFP = (TRADE_WEIGHT_CHI  * CPI_CHI)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_DJI  * CPI_DJI )  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_IND  * CPI_IND)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_KEN  * CPI_KEN)  + 
(TRADE_WEIGHT_SA  * CPI_SA)  + (TRADE_WEIGHT_TKY  * CPI_TKY) 
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Annex 3.4: Definition of Variables used in the 
REER and NEER Model  
I.     Endogenous Variables  
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable 1/ Source of 
Data 
BREERBEL Bilateral REER of Belgium vis-à-vis Ethiopia  NBE's 
Annual 
Reports and 
IMF, IFS 
BREERCHI Bilateral REER of China vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERDJI Bilateral REER of Djibouti vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERFRA Bilateral REER of France vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERGER Bilateral REER of Germany vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERIND Bilateral REER of India vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERITA Bilateral REER of Italy vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERJPN Bilateral REER of Japan vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERKEN Bilateral REER of Kenya vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERKOR Bilateral REER of South Korea vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERNZD Bilateral REER of Netherlands vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERSA Bilateral REER of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERSWD Bilateral REER of Sweden vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERSWZ Bilateral REER of Switzerland vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERTKY Bilateral REER of Turkey vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
BREERUK Bilateral REER of United Kingdom vis-à-vis 
Ethiopia 
" 
BREERUS Bilateral REER of United States vis-à-vis Ethiopia " 
CUR_BIRR_BEL Exchange Rate of Birr per Belgium's Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_CHI Exchange Rate of Birr per Chinese Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_DJI Exchange Rate of Birr per Djibouti's Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_ETH Exchange Rate of Birr per USD " 
CUR_BIRR_FRA Exchange Rate of Birr per France's Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_GER Exchange Rate of Birr per Germany's Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_IND Exchange Rate of Birr per Indian Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_ITA Exchange Rate of Birr per Italy's Currency  " 
1/ REER means Real Effective Exchange Rate 
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Annex 3.4 (Cont'd):   Definition of Variables used in the 
REER Model and Sources of Data 
I.     Endogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of  
the Variable 
Definition of the Variable 1/ Source of 
Data 
CUR_BIRR_JPN Exchange Rate of Birr per Japanese Currency  IMF’s IFS 
CUR_BIRR_KEN Exchange Rate of Birr per Kenyan Currency  " 
CUR_USD_INX_BEL Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Belgium's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_CHI Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Chinese 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_DJI Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Djibouti's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_ETH Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per USD  " 
CUR_USD_INX_FRA Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per France's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_GER Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Germany's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_IND Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Indian Currency  " 
CUR_USD_INX_ITA Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Italy's Currency  " 
CUR_USD_INX_JPN Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Japanese 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_KEN Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Kenyan 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_KOR Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Korean 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_NZD Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Netherland's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_SA Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Saudi's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_SWD Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Sweden's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_SWZ Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Switzerland's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_TKY Index of Exch. Rate of Birr per Turkey's 
Currency  
" 
CUR_USD_INX_UK Index of Exch. Rate of  Birr per UK's Currency  " 
1/ Index of exchange rate of Birr per trading partner’s currency (2011 = 100) 
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Annex 3.4 (Cont'd):   Definition of Variables used in the 
REER Model and Sources of Data 
I.     Exogenous Variables  
Name of the  
Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
CUR_BIRR_KOR Exchange Rate of Birr per Korean Currency  Computed 
from  IMF, IFS 
CUR_BIRR_NZD Exchange Rate of Birr per Netherlands’ Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_SA Exchange Rate of Birr per Saudi's Currency  " 
CUR_BIRR_SWD Exchange Rate of Birr per Sweden's Currency " 
CUR_BIRR_SWZ Exchange Rate of Birr per Switzerland's Currency " 
CUR_BIRR_TKY Exchange Rate of Birr per Turkey's Currency " 
CUR_BIRR_UK Exchange Rate of Birr per UK's Currency  " 
PF Weighted General Price Indices of  Ethiopia's Major 
Trading Partner Countries  (2011 = 100) 
" 
CPI_FRA Consumer Price Index of France (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_GER Consumer Price Index of Germany (2011 =100) " 
CPI_IND Consumer Price Index of India (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_ITA Consumer Price Index of Italy (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_JPN Consumer Price Index of Japan (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_KEN Consumer Price Index of Kenya (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_KOR Consumer Price Index of Korea (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_NZD Consumer Price Index of Netherlands (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_SA Consumer Price Index of Saudi Arabia (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_SWD Consumer Price Index of Sweden (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_SWZ Consumer Price Index of Switzerland (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_TKY Consumer Price Index of Turkey (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_UK Consumer Price Index of United Kingdom (2011 = 100) " 
CPI_US Consumer Price Index of United States (2011 = 100) " 
CUR_USD_BEL Exchange Rate of USD per Belgium's Currency " 
CUR_USD_CHI Exchange Rate of USD per Chinese Currency " 
CUR_USD_DJI Exchange Rate of USD per Djibouti's Currency " 
CUR_USD_FRA Exchange Rate of USD per France's Currency " 
CUR_USD_GER Exchange Rate of USD per Belgium's Currency " 
CUR_USD_IND Exchange Rate of USD per Indian Currency " 
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Annex 3.4 (Cont'd):   Definition of Variables used in the 
REER Model and Sources of Data 
I.     Exogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of the  
Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
CUR_USD_ITA Exchange Rate of USD per Italy's Currency " 
CUR_USD_JPN Exchange Rate of USD per Japanese 
Currency 
" 
CUR_USD_KEN Exchange Rate of USD per Kenyan Currency " 
CUR_USD_KOR Exchange Rate of USD per Korean Currency " 
CUR_USD_NZD Exchange Rate of USD per Netherland's 
Currency 
" 
CUR_USD_SA Exchange Rate of USD per Saudi's Currency " 
CUR_USD_SWD Exchange Rate of USD per Sweden's 
Currency 
" 
CUR_USD_SWZ Exchange Rate of USD per Switzerland's 
Currency 
" 
CUR_USD_UK Exchange Rate of USD per United 
Kingdom's Currency 
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_BEL Belgium's Trade (Import plus Export) 
Weight  
 NBE's Annual 
Reports  
TRADE_WEIGHT_CHI China's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_DJI Djibouti's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_FRA France's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_GER Germany’s Trade (Import plus Export) 
Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_IND India's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_ITA Italy's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_JPN Japan's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_KEN Kenya's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_KOR Korea's Trade (Import plus Export) Weight  " 
TRADE_WEIGHT_NZD Netherland's Trade (Import plus Export) 
Weight  
" 
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Annex 3.4 (Cont'd):   Definition of Variables used in the 
REER Model and Sources of Data 
I.     Exogenous Variables (Cont'd) 
Name of the  
Variable 
Definition of the Variable Source of Data 
TRADE_WEIGHT_SA Saudi's Trade (Import plus 
Export) Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_SWD Sweden's Trade (Import 
plus Export) Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_SWZ Switzerland's Trade (Import 
plus Export) Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_TKY Turkey's Trade (Import plus 
Export) Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_UK United Kingdom's Trade 
(Import plus Export) 
Weight  
" 
TRADE_WEIGHT_US United States’ Trade 
(Import plus Export) 
Weight  
" 
 
Annex 3.5: Determining Long-term Growth 
Target Consistent Government Borrowing 
In line with the FP principle and avoid the danger of flow of excess domestic credit, given 
gross international reserves target given by the targeted ratio of imports of goods and 
services coverage, the long-run equilibrium level of government borrowing from the central 
bank could be pre-determined outside the system in the money market.  First, substituting 
equation (25) into equation (57), and equations (17) and (19) into the money supply 
equation (equation 16);then applying the money market equilibrium condition (equation 
27); and rearranging the resulting equation, we get a money market equilibrium equation, 
which expresses net government borrowing from the central bank (∆Dmgt) as a function of 
all the other variables as follows: 
 M
d
t = (M
d
/Pd)t-1 [1 + ∆ln(M
d
/Pd)t]Pdt………………...…………………….….….. 57 
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∆Dmgt = (M
d
/Pd)t-1[1+ (∑β81∆ln(M
d
/Pd)t-m-1 + ∑β82 ∆lnQ
T
t-m+ ∑β83 ∆lnPC-RUROUTt-m + 
∑β84 ∆rt-m+ ∑β85 ∆lnREERt-m + ∑β86 ∆lnPdt-m-1 +α81[(ln(M
d
/Pd)t-1 + α82lnY
d
t-1+ 
α83lnPC-RUROUTt-1 +α84∆rt-1 + α85lnREERt-1+ α86])]Pd/m- (Fmt-1 +∆Fmt) - Dmgt-1 + 
OINt……………………………..…………………………......…….. 58 
For the long-term equilibrium solution, actual output (Q) is substituted by long-term output 
target (Q
T
).  Moreover, as interest rate and exchanger rate are exogenously determined 
policy instruments, actual real interest rate and real effective exchange rate are substituted 
by their respective targets.  Using equation (26), we can compute the expected long-term 
level of per capita rural output (PC-RUROUT) by substituting long-term output target.  
Form money supply side, change in international reserves of the central bank (∆Fmt) is a 
policy target in the FP framework.  Finally, equation (58) could be solved for the 
equilibrium level of government borrowing consistent with long-term inflation and 
international reserves targets.    
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Annex 3.6: Asymptotic critical value bounds for the 
F-statistic 
                           (Testing for the existence of a levels relationship) 
Annex VII (i) Case I: No intercept and no trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 3.00 3.00 4.20 4.20 5.47 5.47 7.17 7.17 1.16 1.16 2.32 2.32 
1 2.44 3.28 3.15 4.11 3.88 4.92 4.81 6.02 1.08 1.54 1.08 1.73 
2 2.17 3.19 2.72 3.83 3.22 4.50 3.88 5.30 1.05 1.69 0.70 1.27 
3 2.01 3.10 2.45 3.63 2.87 4.16 3.42 4.84 1.04 1.77 0.52 0.99 
4 1.90 3.01 2.26 3.48 2.62 3.90 3.07 4.44 1.03 1.81 0.41 0.80 
5 1.81 2.93 2.14 3.34 2.44 3.71 2.82 4.21 1.02 1.84 0.34 0.67 
6 1.75 2.87 2.04 3.24 2.32 3.59 2.66 4.05 1.02 1.86 0.29 0.58 
7 1.70 2.83 1.97 3.18 2.22 3.49 2.54 3.91 1.02 1.88 0.26 0.51 
8 1.66 2.79 1.91 3.11 2.15 3.40 2.45 3.79 1.02 1.89 0.23 0.46 
9 1.63 2.75 1.86 3.05 2.08 3.33 2.34 3.68 1.02 1.90 0.20 0.41 
10 1.60 2.72 1.82 2.99 2.02 3.27 2.26 3.60 1.02 1.91 0.19 0.37 
 
Annex VII (ii) Case II: Restricted intercept and no trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 3.80 3.80 4.60 4.60 5.39 5.39 6.44 6.44 2.03 2.03 1.77 1.77 
1 3.02 3.51 3.62 4.16 4.18 4.79 4.94 5.58 1.69 2.02 1.01 1.25 
2 2.63 3.35 3.10 3.87 3.55 4.38 4.13 5.00 1.52 2.02 0.69 0.96 
3 2.37 3.20 2.79 3.67 3.15 4.08 3.65 4.66 1.41 2.02 0.52 0.78 
4 2.20 3.09 2.56 3.49 2.88 3.87 3.29 4.37 1.34 2.01 0.42 0.65 
5 2.08 3.00 2.39 3.38 2.70 3.73 3.06 4.15 1.29 2.00 0.35 0.56 
6 1.99 2.94 2.27 3.28 2.55 3.61 2.88 3.99 1.26 2.00 0.30 0.49 
7 1.92 2.89 2.17 3.21 2.43 3.51 2.73 3.90 1.23 2.01 0.26 0.44 
8 1.85 2.85 2.11 3.15 2.33 3.42 2.62 3.77 1.21 2.01 0.23 0.40 
9 1.80 2.80 2.04 3.08 2.24 3.35 2.50 3.68 1.19 2.01 0.21 0.36 
10 1.76 2.77 1.98 3.04 2.18 3.28 2.41 3.61 1.17 2.00 0.19 0.33 
 
Annex VII (iii) Case III: Unrestricted intercept and no trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 6.58 6.58 8.21 8.21 9.80 9.80 11.79 11.79 3.05 3.05 7.07 7.07 
1 4.04 4.78 4.94 5.73 5.77 6.68 6.84 7.84 2.03 2.52 2.28 2.89 
2 3.17 4.14 3.79 4.85 4.41 5.52 5.15 6.36 1.69 2.35 1.23 1.77 
3 2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 3.69 4.89 4.29 5.61 1.51 2.26 0.82 1.27 
4 2.45 3.52 2.86 4.01 3.25 4.49 3.74 5.06 1.41 2.21 0.60 0.98 
5 2.26 3.35 2.62 3.79 2.96 4.18 3.41 4.68 1.34 2.17 0.48 0.79 
6 2.12 3.23 2.45 3.61 2.75 3.99 3.15 4.43 1.29 2.14 0.39 0.66 
7 2.03 3.13 2.32 3.50 2.60 3.84 2.96 4.26 1.26 2.13 0.33 0.58 
8 1.95 3.06 2.22 3.39 2.48 3.70 2.79 4.10 1.23 2.12 0.29 0.51 
9 1.88 2.99 2.14 3.30 2.37 3.60 2.65 3.97 1.21 2.10 0.25 0.45 
10 1.83 2.94 2.06 3.24 2.28 3.50 2.54 3.86 1.19 2.09 0.23 0.41 
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Annex 3.6 (cont’d) 
 
Annex VII (iv) Case IV: Unrestricted intercept and restricted trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 5.37 5.37 6.29 6.29 7.14 7.14 8.26 8.26 3.17 3.17 2.68 2.68 
1 4.05 4.49 4.68 5.15 5.30 5.83 6.10 6.73 2.45 2.77 1.41 1.65 
2 3.38 4.02 3.88 4.61 4.37 5.16 4.99 5.85 2.09 2.57 0.92 1.20 
3 2.97 3.74 3.38 4.23 3.80 4.68 4.30 5.23 1.87 2.45 0.67 0.93 
4 2.68 3.53 3.05 3.97 3.40 4.36 3.81 4.92 1.72 2.37 0.51 0.76 
5 2.49 3.38 2.81 3.76 3.11 4.13 3.50 4.63 1.62 2.31 0.42 0.64 
6 2.33 3.25 2.63 3.62 2.90 3.94 3.27 4.39 1.54 2.27 0.35 0.55 
7 2.22 3.17 2.50 3.50 2.76 3.81 3.07 4.23 1.48 2.24 0.31 0.49 
8 2.13 3.09 2.38 3.41 2.62 3.70 2.93 4.06 1.44 2.22 0.27 0.44 
9 2.05 3.02 2.30 3.33 2.52 3.60 2.79 3.93 1.40 2.20 0.24 0.40 
10 1.98 2.97 2.21 3.25 2.42 3.52 2.68 3.84 1.36 2.18 0.22 0.36 
 
Annex VII (v) Case V: Unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 9.81 9.81 11.64 11.64 13.36 13.36 15.73 15.73 5.33 5.33 11.35 11.35 
1 5.59 6.26 6.56 7.30 7.46 8.27 8.74 9.63 3.17 3.64 3.33 3.91 
2 4.19 5.06 4.87 5.85 5.49 6.59 6.34 7.52 2.44 3.09 1.70 2.23 
3 3.47 4.45 4.01 5.07 4.52 5.62 5.17 6.36 2.08 2.81 1.08 1.51 
4 3.03 4.06 3.47 4.57 3.89 5.07 4.40 5.72 1.86 2.64 0.77 1.14 
5 2.75 3.79 3.12 4.25 3.47 4.67 3.93 5.23 1.72 2.53 0.59 0.91 
6 2.53 3.59 2.87 4.00 3.19 4.38 3.60 4.90 1.62 2.45 0.48 0.75 
7 2.38 3.45 2.69 3.83 2.98 4.16 3.34 4.63 1.54 2.39 0.40 0.64 
8 2.26 3.34 2.55 3.68 2.82 4.02 3.15 4.43 1.48 2.35 0.34 0.56 
9 2.16 3.24 2.43 3.56 2.67 3.87 2.97 4.24 1.43 2.31 0.30 0.49 
10 2.07 3.16 2.33 3.46 2.56 3.76 2.84 4.10 1.40 2.28 0.26 0.44 
Source: Pesaran, et al (2001), “Bound Testing Approaches to the Analysis of Level Relationships” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics (16); pp. 289-326. 
Note: The columns headed ‘I(0)’ refer to the lower critical values bound obtained when xt 
is purely 1(0), while the columns headed ‘I(1)’ refer to the upper bound obtained 
when xt is purely I(1). 
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Annex 3.7: Asymptotic critical value bounds of the 
t-statistic 
 Annex VIII (i): Case I: No intercept and no trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 -1.62 -1.62 -1.95 -1.95 -2.24 -2.24 -2.58 -2.58 -0.42 -0.42 0.98 0.98 
1 -1.62 -2.28 -1.95 -2.60 -2.24 -2.90 -2.58 -3.22 -0.42 -0.98 0.98 1.12 
2 -1.62 -2.68 -1.95 -3.02 -2.24 -3.31 -2.58 -3.66 -0.42 -1.39 0.98 1.12 
3 -1.62 -3.00 -1.95 -3.33 -2.24 -3.64 -2.58 -3.97 -0.42 -1.71 0.98 1.09 
4 -1.62 -3.26 -1.95 -3.60 -2.24 -3.89 -2.58 -4.23 -0.42 -1.98 0.98 1.07 
5 -1.62 -3.49 -1.95 -3.83 -2.24 -4.12 -2.58 -4.44 -0.42 -2.22 0.98 1.05 
6 -1.62 -3.70 -1.95 -4.04 -2.24 -4.34 -2.58 -4.67 -0.42 -2.43 0.98 1.04 
7 -1.62 -3.90 -1.95 -4.23 -2.24 -4.54 -2.58 -4.88 -0.42 -2.63 0.98 1.04 
8 -1.62 -4.09 -1.95 -4.43 -2.24 -4.72 -2.58 -5.07 -0.42 -2.81 0.98 1.04 
9 -1.62 -4.26 -1.95 -4.61 -2.24 -4.89 -2.58 -5.25 -0.42 -2.98 0.98 1.04 
10 -1.62 -4.42 -1.95 -4.76 -2.24 -5.06 -2.58 -5.44 -0.42 3.15 0.98 1.03 
Annex VIII (iii): Case III: Unrestricted intercept  and  no trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 -2.57 -2.57 -2.86 -2.86 -3.13 -3.13 -3.43 -3.43 -1.53 -1.53 0.72 0.71 
1 -2.57 -2.91 -2.86 -3.22 -3.13 -3.50 -3.43 -3.82 -1.53 -1.80 0.72 0.81 
2 -2.57 -3.21 -2.86 -3.53 -3.13 -3.80 -3.43 -4.10 -1.53 -2.04 0.72 0.86 
3 -2.57 -3.46 -2.86 -3.78 -3.13 -4.05 -3.43 -4.37 -1.53 -2.26 0.72 0.89 
4 -2.57 -3.66 -2.86 -3.99 -3.13 -4.26 -3.43 -4.60 -1.53 -2.47 0.72 0.91 
5 -2.57 -3.86 -2.86 -4.19 -3.13 -4.46 -3.43 -4.79 -1.53 -2.65 0.72 0.92 
6 -2.57 -4.04 -2.86 -4.38 -3.13 -4.66 -3.43 -4.99 -1.53 -2.83 0.72 0.93 
7 -2.57 -4.23 -2.86 -4.57 -3.13 -4.85 -3.43 -5.19 -1.53 -3.00 0.72 0.94 
8 -2.57 -4.40 -2.86 -4.72 -3.13 -5.02 -3.43 -5.37 -1.53 -3.16 0.72 0.96 
9 -2.57 -4.56 -2.86 -4.88 -3.13 -5.18 -3.43 -5.54 -1.53 -3.31 0.72 0.96 
10 -2.57 -4.69 -2.86 -5.03 -3.13 -5.34 -3.43 -5.68 -1.53 -3.46 0.72 0.96 
Annex VIII (v): Case V: Unrestricted intercept  and  unrestricted trend 
 0.100 0.050 0.025 0.010 Mean Variance 
k I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
0 -3.13 -3.13 -3.41 -3.41 -3.65 -3.66 -3.96 -3.97 -2.18 -2.18 0.57 0.57 
1 -3.13 -3.40 -3.41 -3.69 -3.65 -3.96 -3.96 -4.26 -2.18 -2.37 0.57 0.67 
2 -3.13 -3.63 -3.41 -3.95 -3.65 -4.20 -3.96 -4.53 -2.18 -2.55 0.57 0.74 
3 -3.13 -3.84 -3.41 -4.16 -3.65 -4.42 -3.96 -4.73 -2.18 -2.72 0.57 0.79 
4 -3.13 -4.04 -3.41 -4.36 -3.65 -4.62 -3.96 -4.96 -2.18 -2.89 0.57 0.82 
5 -3.13 -4.21 -3.41 -4.52 -3.65 -4.79 -3.96 -5.13 -2.18 -3.04 0.57 0.85 
6 -3.13 -4.37 -3.41 -4.69 -3.65 -4.96 -3.96 -5.31 -2.18 -3.20 0.57 0.87 
7 -3.13 -4.53 -3.41 -4.85 -3.65 -5.14 -3.96 -5.49 -2.18 -3.34 0.57 0.88 
8 -3.13 -4.68 -3.41 -5.01 -3.65 -5.30 -3.96 -5.65 -2.18 -3.49 0.57 0.90 
9 -3.13 -4.82 -3.41 -5.15 -3.65 -5.44 -3.96 -5.79 -2.18 -3.62 0.57 0.91 
10 -3.13 -4.96 -3.41 -5.29 -3.65 -5.59 -3.96 -5.94 -2.18 -3.75 0.57 0.92 
Source:  Pesaran, et al (2001), “Bound Testing Approaches to the Analysis of Level Relationships” 
Journal of Applied Econometrics (16); pp. 289-326. 
Note: The columns headed ‘I(0)” refer to the lower critical values bound obtained when xt 
is purely 1(0), while the columns headed ‘I(1)’ refer to the upper bound obtained 
when xt is purely I(1).
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Annex 3-8. Simulation Results of Baseline Scenario (2014-2025) 
 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
AVERAGE 
(2014-2025) 
I GOODS AND MONEY MARKETS 
  
 
% GROWTH RATES 
1.1 QP 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
1.2 Q 12.0 14.9 11.2 6.1 14.7 14.9 11.2 11.8 15.0 10.8 10.2 12.6 12.1 
1.3 QP_Q (1.1 -1.2) -1.0 -3.9 -0.2 4.9 -3.7 -3.9 -0.2 -0.8 -4.0 0.2 0.8 -1.6 -1.1 
1.4 H 4.9 8.4 10.3 7.8 11.3 13.8 14.1 15.4 14.8 15.6 15.3 14.4 12.2 
1.5 F 6.7 3.2 3.2 5.0 6.1 7.4 8.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.2 7.9 6.9 
1.4 EXCESS_           
MONSUPPLY 0.04 0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.1 
1.5 INFLATION 12.6 15.8 13.3 10.3 8.8 10.8 13.0 12.6 12.1 12.9 14.1 13.4 12.5 
    AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
1.6 IP 24.2 31.1 31.7 26.5 27.9 33.6 33.0 32.5 37.1 37.9 35.9 37.8 32.4 
1.7 IG 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 
II SAVING-INVESTMENT EQUILIBRIUM 
    AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
2.1 S_Q 19.1 22.8 20.8 17.2 18.2 20.5 19.1 18.8 20.4 19.5 17.8 18.4 19.4 
2.2 S_NTL_Q 29.8 32.1 29.6 26.2 26.6 28.2 26.3 25.6 26.6 25.3 23.3 23.3 26.9 
2.3 I_QP 37.4 44.3 44.9 39.7 41.1 46.8 46.2 45.7 50.3 51.1 49.1 51.0 45.6 
2.4 S_I_GAP_Q -7.2 -10.3 -13.2 -13.4 -13.2 -15.5 -16.7 -16.7 -18.4 -20.5 -21.0 -22.0 -15.7 
2.5 S_FORGN_Q 5.7 5.6 6.3 7.5 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.3 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.5 6.1 
2.6 S_I_Q -8.4 -9.3 -10.4 -11.0 -14.2 -16.4 -18.7 -21.5 -23.5 -25.4 -27.5 -29.5 -18.0 
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Annex 3-8 (Cont’d):  Simulation Results of Baseline Scenario (2014-2025) 
    2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 
AVERAGE 
(2014-2025) 
III EXTERNAL SECTOR 
    % GROWTH RATES 
3.1 X 21.2 7.1 -3.6 9.3 29.1 7.4 10.0 22.2 12.7 3.4 15.9 14.8 12.5 
3.2 Z 19.6 17.2 13.4 8.2 17.0 17.2 13.4 14.0 17.3 13.1 12.4 14.9 14.8 
3.3 REER 5.1 9.7 8.0 7.5 -0.4 1.5 3.5 3.2 2.7 3.4 4.5 3.8 4.4 
    AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
3.4 X_Q_USD 14.8 13.8 12.0 12.4 13.9 13.0 12.9 14.1 13.8 12.9 13.5 13.8 13.4 
3.5 Z_Q_USD 32.8 33.4 34.1 34.8 35.5 36.2 36.9 37.6 38.4 39.2 39.9 40.7 36.6 
3.6 
CUACB_USD 
(BILL. OF USD) -3.6 -6.3 -9.0 -9.6 -10.9 -14.8 -18.1 -20.5 -26.5 -33.6 -39.0 -47.5 -19.9 
3.7 CUACB_USD_Q -11.0 -17.8 -24.4 -26.1 -27.3 -34.2 -39.7 -42.6 -50.9 -61.7 -68.9 -79.0 -40.3 
3.8 FX_GAP                         
(BILL. OF USD) -0.77 -2.84 -4.71 -4.22 -4.98 -8.33 -11 -12.8 -18.2 -24.8 -29.6 -37.7 -13.3 
3.9 FX_GAP_Q -1.7 -5.6 -9.1 -7.4 -7.7 -12.3 -15.1 -15.9 -21.2 -27.3 -30.5 -37.4 -15.9 
IV FISCAL SECTOR 
    AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
4.1 TX_Q 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 13.6 
4.2 NTX_Q 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 
4.3 GOVCON_E_Q 7.9 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.5 
4.4 GOVCAP_E_Q 11.5 11.7 11.2 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.0 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.3 10.2 10.9 
4.5 GOVNNBNK-           
FCYG_Q 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
4.6 GOVTOTFIN-
CYG_ GAP_Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0 
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